



QUEENSHIP AND POWER



THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF ELIZABETH I

EDITED BY
CHARLES BEEM



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QUEENSHIP AND POWER

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
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PREFACE

The origin of this project lay in a desire to publish a handful of intriguing papers presented at the annual meeting of the Elizabeth I Society in Kansas City, Missouri, in March 2008. In the big picture of Elizabethan foreign relations, the provocative and idiosyncratic essays that formed the core of this volume had little to do with each other except that they all opened portals into areas not usually contemplated or discussed within the conventional parameters of what may be termed “Elizabethan Foreign Relations.” Because of this, the editors of the “Queenship and Power” book series agreed that these papers should be revised in order to form the nucleus for a collection of studies on this generalized topic. That said, this book makes no claim to be, in any sense, a comprehensive study of Elizabethan foreign relations, and the reader may refer to the works listed in the select bibliography for more comprehensive discussions of various facets of Elizabethan foreign relations. Instead, collectively, the studies included in this volume are intended to broaden our understanding of the relations between Elizabeth and Ireland, various European nations and rulers, pirates and privateers, and the dynamic Islamic world of the sixteenth century, in which Elizabeth, as an unmarried and long-lived regnant queen who never left her kingdom, was arguably the most globally famous personage of that century.

In some ways, the book title suggests a modern sensibility for a subject that may not have been all that easily recognizable to the Elizabethans. The Tudors never really had something they could cogently label foreign policy—there was no recognized foreign minister, while virtually anyone could be deputized to serve as an overseas liaison for the monarch in politics, religion, and commerce. As a second rate European power, England’s sixteenth-century foreign entanglements were far more defensive and reactive than offensive—the major exception to this general rule were the essentially vanity wars that Henry VIII fought in France. For the rest of the Tudors,

an expansive and aggressive foreign policy was beyond the kingdom's resources; only when she was convinced that military action was absolutely necessary did Elizabeth consent to formal military operations in Scotland, France, The Netherlands, on the high seas, and later in Ireland.

This volume brings together a collection of chapters that examine a number of different facets of Elizabethan foreign affairs to further illuminate how Elizabeth I of England perceived her relationships to the world around her, how she interacted with this world, and how the world perceived her. In this book, the contributors describe how Elizabeth and/or her government interacted with a variety of personages, pressures, and opportunities to shape a kaleidoscope of policies that add up to something, for lack of a better term, called "foreign relations." Collectively, these studies reveal a queen and her kingdom much more connected and integrated into a much wider world than usually detected and discussed in the voluminous scholarly works pertaining to the queen and her reign.

The chapters included in this volume have been sequenced to follow concentric circles of relations radiating out of England and the British isles to Europe, the Islamic world of North Africa, and western Asia, and India. Charles Beem and Carole Levin investigate a question not usually contemplated in works on Elizabeth and her foreign policy, namely *why* she never physically journeyed beyond her realm of England. This chapter also discusses how Elizabeth exploited her position internationally as an entirely *domestic* queen. As such, foreigners who wished to meet her had to travel to England to do so. In the following chapter, Nathan Martin provides a unique microhistory of inter-European relations as he describes the complications surrounding the 1565 English visit of princess Cecilia of Sweden, the brother of one of Elizabeth's erstwhile would-be husbands, king Eric of Sweden, underscoring Elizabeth's international renown in the early years of her reign. B. R. Siegfried concludes the section on Britain with her study of how Elizabeth sought to augment her authority in her Irish kingdom by issuing a new coinage stamped with her image, and by erecting three public clocks in the city of Dublin, events framed in verse, titled, "The Song on Queen Elizabeth."

The second section of the book details foreign relations with various parts of Europe. Nate Probasco revisits the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 in France to offer an explanation of Elizabeth's compartmentalized yet pragmatic response, while Anna Riehl

Bertolet contributes a dramatically original and occasionally amusing discussion of Elizabeth's and Russian Tsar Ivan the IV's "failure to communicate." This portion of the book concludes with literary scholar Claire Jowitt's incisive analysis of Thomas Heywood's play *Fair Maid of the West* to draw the theoretical connections between Elizabeth and the successful prosecution of piracy.

The final section of the book is also the most startlingly original, with groundbreaking discussions of Elizabethan relations with the civilizations of Islam and India. Nabil Matar contributes a powerful essay describing the only account of Elizabeth as perceived by the Morocco of Mulay Ahmad al-Mansur, while Bernadette Andrea offers an account of how Elizabeth learned to communicate with the imperial courts of the sophisticated and cosmopolitan Islamic rivals, Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Persia. Concluding the book is Nandini Das's essay concerning the efforts of Elizabeth's government, English merchants, and Richard Hakluyt to begin the process of creating a commercial relationship with Mughal India, an event that presaged the emergence of the seventeenth-century British Empire.



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Many wonderful friends and colleagues offered their kind assistance to this project. Carole Levin, my “Queenship and Power” series coeditor, offered much inspiration and help as an unofficial editor. This book would not have been published without her; thank you, Carole! Our series editor Christopher Chappell and his delightful assistant Sarah Whalen helped me out of a few jams—*muchas gracias!* (much thanks!) Thanks also to Paul E. J. Hammer for his reading list, Susan Doran, Anna Riehl Bertolet, and Helen Hackett for their thoughtful comments, and Richard Cosgrove, John Watkins, and Linda Shenk for reading and commenting on portions of the manuscript. Thanks also to Ted Huik for providing the cover image. Last but not least, my partner Jay Brown helps make possible everything that happens in my life. Nabil Matar’s chapter, “Elizabeth through Moroccan Eyes,” was originally published in *The Journal of Early Modern History*, and is reprinted here with their kind permission.



CONTRIBUTORS

Bernadette Andrea is professor of English at the University of Texas at San Antonio. She is the author of *Women and Islam in Early Modern English Literature* (2007). She has edited special issues on *Postcolonial Revisions of the Early Modern* for the *Journal of Early Modern Cultural Studies* 6.2 (2006), and on *Space, Place, and Signs in Early Modern Studies* for *Genre: Forms of Discourse and Culture* 30.1 (1997). She has two books forthcoming: *Early Modern England and Islamic Worlds*, co-edited with Linda McJannet, and *English Women Staging Islam, 1696–1707*.

Charles Beem is an associate professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Pembroke. He is the author of *The Lioness Roared: the Problems of Female Rule in English History* (2006), and the editor of *The Royal Minorities of Medieval and Early Modern England* (2008). With Carole Levin, he is also the coeditor of the book series, “Queenship and Power” for Palgrave Macmillan. He is currently at work on the monograph *The Pastimes of George Ferrers: The Life and Times of a Tudor Renaissance Gentleman*.

Anna Riehl Bertolet is an assistant professor of English at Auburn University. She received her PhD from the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her essays on early modern literature and culture have appeared in *English Literary Renaissance* and in the essay collections, *Queens and Power in Medieval and Early Modern England* (2009), and *Tudor Court Culture*. She is the coeditor of *Tudor Court Culture* and the author of *The Face of Queenship: Early Modern Representations of Queen Elizabeth I* (2010).

Nandini Das is lecturer in Renaissance literature at the School of English, University of Liverpool. Her recent publications include an edition of Robert Greene’s *Planetomachia* (2007), a complex combination of humanist astronomical discourse and sensational Italianate tales, and essays on both Renaissance prose fiction and travel. Her monograph, *Renaissance Romance: The Transformation of English Prose Fiction, 1570–1620*, will be published in 2011. Das is currently working

on a project on Renaissance travel, cross-cultural encounters, and cultural memory.

Claire Jowitt is professor of Renaissance literature at Nottingham Trent University. She is the author of *Voyage Drama and Gender Politics 1589–1642* (2003) and *The Culture of Piracy 1580–1630: English Literature and Seaborne Crime* (2010). She is one of the general editors of the new Oxford University Press edition of Richard Hakluyt's *The Principal Navigations* (1598–1600), and is currently editing Volume 14 on *The South Seas*.

Carole Levin is Willa Cather professor of history and director of the Medieval and Renaissance Studies Program at the University of Nebraska. She has published a number of books, including *The Heart and Stomach of a King* (1994), *The Reign of Elizabeth I* (2002), *Dreaming the English Renaissance* (2008), and, coauthored with John Watkins, *Shakespeare's Foreign Worlds* (2009). She has held National Endowment for the Humanities fellowships at the Newberry Library and the Folger Shakespeare Library, and her work has been honored by the Sixteenth Century Studies and Society and by the Society for the Study of Early Modern Women. She has served as president of the Queen Elizabeth I Society.

Nathan Martin is an assistant professor of history at Charleston Southern University in Charleston, South Carolina. He is a member of the South Central Renaissance Society, has written several book reviews for the *Sixteenth Century Journal*, and has also presented papers at numerous international conferences. His research interests include Anglo-Swedish foreign relations in the Early Modern Period and late medieval social history, and he is currently at work on his first book, entitled *Anglo-Swedish Foreign Relations During the Age of Elizabeth I*.

Nabil Matar is professor of English and adjunct professor of history at the University of Minnesota. He is author of a trilogy on Anglo-Islamic relations in the early modern period: *Islam in Britain* (1998), *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (1999), and *Britain and Barbary* (2005). He is also author and translator of *In the Lands of the Christians* (2003) and *Europe through Arab Eyes, 1578–1727* (2009).

Nate Probasco is a doctoral student at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. His research interests include Tudor/Stuart foreign affairs and the Atlantic World. His dissertation will examine Sir Humphrey

Gilbert's role in English expansion, and he is currently revising an essay on firearms in Elizabethan England.

B. R. Siegfried is an associate professor of English at Brigham Young University. She has published prolifically on topics relating to ethics, theology, and representation in a variety of venues including *Early Modern Literary Studies*, *Shakespeare Yearbook*, *Sixteenth-Century Studies*, *George Herbert Journal*, and *Literature and Belief*. Currently she is polishing her book *The Woman's Line: Literary Conquest in the Wake of Elizabeth Tudor, 1603–1700*, and has begun another book project, *The Literary History of Grace O'Malley, 1550–2000*.



PART I

BRITAIN



CHAPTER I

WHY ELIZABETH NEVER LEFT ENGLAND

Charles Beem and Carole Levin

Like her siblings Edward VI and Mary I, Elizabeth I never left England to visit other realms in the British Isles and the European continent during her reign. This was in marked contrast to her father, Henry VIII, and nearly all his predecessors going back to the Norman Conquest, and many of her contemporaries, the princes of other European states. Elizabeth did routinely show herself to the citizens of London and her subjects in the Thames valley and, occasionally, in the Midlands and East Anglia during her summer progresses. But her subjects in northern England and Wales, Ireland, the people who populated the royal courts of European states, an undetermined number of Muslims, and select groups of peoples in the Americas only knew Elizabeth through secondhand sources. As such, they obtained knowledge of the queen through the mediation of various forms of representation, such as the reports of ambassadors, literary and iconographic depictions, and letters sent directly from the queen herself to the princes of western Europe, Russia, and various states in the Islamic world.

As Mary Hill Cole has noted, Elizabeth loved to travel in the southern home counties of England, embarking on summer progresses for twenty-three out of forty-four regnal years.¹ Both on her progresses and at her court, Elizabeth frequently displayed her skill at dancing, musical talents, languages, and humanist erudition. However, she confined the display of these qualities entirely within her realm. As a consummate diplomat, Elizabeth would have dazzled her contemporaries in Europe and beyond in face-to-face encounters and ritualized spectacles as she did for her own subjects and foreign nationals visiting England. Nevertheless, she passed on

all the possible occasions that arose to meet with *any* of her fellow European monarchs. Even the well-travelled Mary Queen of Scots, Elizabeth's not-so-welcome guest in England for nineteen years, and Mary's son, James VI, who succeeded to Elizabeth's crown in 1603, never obtained the opportunity to meet their closest living relative despite their relative proximity to her royal person.

Why Elizabeth never left England is a question akin to other, ultimately insoluble problems, such as the depth of Elizabeth's religiosity or why she never married. Similar to her unmarried state, the fact that Elizabeth never left her realm was never a conscious, clear-cut decision—it simply worked out that way for a variety of reasons to be discussed later in the text. Among her copious literary remains, Elizabeth left few clues concerning how and why she never left her realm. Thus, while this chapter cannot be more than speculative, we suggest that there were a number of good reasons why Elizabeth kept her political talents and obvious personal charms safe in England. Informing a parliamentary delegation in 1566 that if she were “turned out of the realm in my petticoat I were able to live in any place in Christendom,” Elizabeth emphatically made the connection between quitting the realm, losing her monarchical power, and her own self-proclaimed survival skills.² English regnant queenship, which made its debut with Elizabeth's predecessor and elder sister Mary I, brought with it a number of particular problems that ultimately served to confine Mary and Elizabeth entirely within their realms during their reigns.

The continuing evolution of the Protestant and Counter-Reformations in the second half of the sixteenth century also created problems for European female rulers. Although late medieval and early Renaissance European royalty had constituted a fairly homogeneous and cosmopolitan society who visited and married each other in highly ritualized spectacles even while they fought each other, the religious polarizations of the later sixteenth century effectively split European royals into two camps, Catholic and Protestant, creating a form of doctrinal iron curtain that, for the final three decades of her reign, threatened Elizabeth's life and her throne. Elizabeth's domestic and foreign Catholic threats were compounded by her position as an unmarried female ruler who lacked a certain heir apparent or an obvious regent. These factors in turn, coupled with Elizabeth's innate fiscal conservatism, help to explain why Elizabeth directed her foreign military exploits on land and sea from the armchair of her royal study. There is also the real question of where she might have

gone and what reasons she would have had to travel out of England. All of these factors combined to restrain Elizabeth from hazarding her body natural by leaving the realm. As she did for so many other facets of her reign, Elizabeth turned her need to stay in England into strengths in both her domestic and her foreign relations.

Why English Kings left England

Prior to the accession of Edward VI in 1547, the vast majority of English kings left their realm to go to France and occasionally to Scotland, usually to fight wars.³ Beginning with the Norman Conquest of 1066, when William, Duke of Normandy, made good his claim to be Edward the Confessor's heir, English kings also ruled extensive lands in France as vassals of the French king. But early Norman succession patterns were fluid; in the twelfth century, William's granddaughter, the empress Matilda, failed to succeed her father, Henry I, because she was not physically present in England when he died in 1135. Her son, Henry II (r. 1154–1189), through diplomacy and military action, recovered his mother's inheritance and expanded it with his marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine, creating that patchwork of lordships in France known as the Angevin Empire. As such, Henry II traveled back and forth between the British Isles and France routinely over the course of his entire reign. Henry II's youngest son, however, John (r. 1199–1216), offered great impetus to the process of rendering English kings more *anglocentric* by losing most of the Angevin Empire to the French king Philip Augustus.

For the remainder of the Middle Ages and into the Early Modern epoch, a number of English kings felt compelled to recover the Angevin "inheritance" by fighting wars in France, most notably the Hundred Years War (1337–1453), begun by Edward III (r. 1327–1377). Leading armies was an almost textbook method for medieval English kings to gain prestige and earn the goodwill of their nobility and subjects. Conversely, later medieval kings who shunned warfare as an occupation often suffered deposition, such as Richard II, who was absent in Ireland when the revolution that toppled him began in 1399. Elizabeth well knew the fate of Richard II; like herself, Richard lacked a direct heir, a fact not lost on the Elizabethan Earl of Essex, whose followers staged a performance of Shakespeare's *Richard II* on the eve of Essex's ill-starred 1601 revolt. Although the early fifteenth-century Lancastrian king Henry V (r. 1413–1422) duplicated the martial exploits of Edward III in the second phase of the

Hundred Years War, and played a substantial diplomatic role in the affairs of France, his successor, Henry VI (r. 1422–1461, 1470–1471), shunned warfare during his adult reign and ultimately suffered deposition. He did, however, receive a suitably grand French coronation in Paris in 1431.⁴ But by the time the Yorkist Edward IV (1461–1483) had wrested Henry's crown away in 1461, all that was left of the rejuvenated Angevin Empire was Calais. Instead, the beginnings of what we might call English national feeling began to be wrapped up in the insular-looking idea, summed up nicely by William Shakespeare in *Richard II*, of a *sceptered island fortress*.

It made good sense for later medieval English kings to remain safely behind the ramparts of fortress England. While Edward IV made his kingly reputation as a skilled military commander during the Wars of the Roses, he had no interest in resuming the Hundred Years War with France, correctly realizing that late fifteenth-century England lacked the resources for sustained military operations on the continent.⁵ Edward's son-in-law, the Tudor Henry VII (1485–1509), shared his disdain for foreign conflicts. As one of the few Lancastrians with any sort of claim to the throne left standing after the Battle of Tewkesbury in 1471, Henry had fled to Brittany at the age of fourteen with his uncle Jasper Tudor. He did not return to England until he defeated Richard III in 1485 at Bosworth Field (August 22, 1485) and became king. Once on his throne, as the fourth usurping king of the fifteenth century, with various Yorkist pretenders on the prowl in Europe and eyeing his throne, Henry was much more interested in domestic tranquility than in foreign glory and had little interest in resuming the Hundred Years War. Ultimately, Henry VII considered it prudent to remain in England and consolidate his authority at home. While Henry crossed over to Calais in 1492 with 15,000 men and besieged Boulogne and subsequently negotiated a generous peace for England, he remained in England for the remainder of his reign.

His successor, Henry VIII (1509–1547), however, had no wish to be the warden of an island fortress. Instead, in his stance as an "imperial" king beholden to no other authority in Europe, he desired to be a Pan-European Renaissance power broker as well as a mighty warrior king and took ample opportunities to demonstrate his abilities as both. Over the course of his reign, Henry visited France several times as king during both peace and war. In league with his first father-in-law, Ferdinand of Aragon, the youthful Henry resurrected the long-dormant Hundred Years War and fought against Louis XII of

France in Aquitaine in southwest France in 1512 and northern France the following year, when he was rewarded by a smashing victory at Guinegate (the Battle of the Spurs, August 13, 1513) and the capture of Tournai and Théorouanne. In the process, Henry depleted much of the treasury left to him by his parsimonious father.

But Henry's ardor for war was tempered by the difficulties inherent in leaving the realm without a clear-cut successor, as his queen Catherine of Aragon had yet to bear him an heir after four years of marriage. Just prior to leaving for France in 1513, Henry ordered the execution of the Yorkist pretender Edmund de la Pole, Duke of Suffolk, who had been a prisoner in the Tower of London since 1506. Once Henry was in France, with Queen Catherine as his regent, his Scottish brother-in-law James IV took advantage of the royal absence to invade England, only to be annihilated by an English force at Flodden Field (September 9, 1513). Thirty years later, in 1544, a more mature Henry VIII once again invaded France in person, leaving his sixth wife, Catherine Parr, as regent, after Parliament passed a third Act of Succession, which reinstated both of his daughters, Mary (b. 1516) and Elizabeth (b. 1533), in the line of succession. On September 14, 1544, the city of Boulogne fell to an English siege, an expensive and utterly useless acquisition that was eventually ransomed back to France in the succeeding reign.

Henry also enjoyed the role of peace broker. In the year 1520, Henry travelled to the European continent to meet the archrivals Francis I of France and the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, his nephew by marriage. As England at this time was essentially a second-rate European power, Henry VIII needed desperately to forge an alliance with one of the parties. In 1520, prompted by his chief advisor, Cardinal Wolsey, Henry approached Francis I, and the two agreed on a meeting near Calais, between Guines and Ardres. The two kings were close in age and spent their entire reigns as rivals both personally and politically. Thus, the kings set out to impress and outshine each other, arriving at the meeting with large retinues. In attempting to outshow the other, the kings spared no expense in their displays of wealth. This ostentation earned the meeting the title "Field of the Cloth of Gold." The meeting, which had taken place over three weeks (June 7 to June 24, 1520), nearly bankrupted the treasuries of France and England and was useless politically. Francis and Henry failed to sign a treaty, and a few weeks later, Henry signed a treaty of alliance with Charles V. Within a month, the Emperor declared war on Francis, and England followed suit. Twelve years

later, Henry again met Francis in Calais at the end of 1532, in the company of Elizabeth's mother, Anne Boleyn, in a sort of premarriage honeymoon that served as the probable place of Elizabeth's conception.

Henry VIII's foreign adventures were an anomaly for the Tudor dynasty, however. His children, all of whom succeeded him on the imperial English throne, were either unable or unwilling to play the role of Renaissance peace broker or warrior king. In fact, for the rest of the sixteenth century, if Europeans wished to behold a Tudor monarch in the flesh, they needed to come to England to do so. As Henry was succeeded by his nine-year-old son Edward VI, the peculiar circumstances of a minority reign argued against the youthful king leaving England for any reason. While previous minor kings such as Richard II and Henry VI possessed numerous adult royal male relatives as their heirs, Edward VI was the last male Tudor; beyond him was the specter of a female succession.⁶ As a bona fide supreme head of the church, Edward's person was especially sacred and needed to be protected at all costs. At the same time, Edward's physical body was the source of dynastic legitimacy, which meant that the leaders of Edward's minority governments, the Dukes of Somerset and Northumberland, needed to have possession of the king's person. Both men kept Edward on a short physical leash. Furthermore, Edward's status as the sole remaining male Tudor meant that guarding his health, which was problematic, was a constant concern. For most of his reign, Edward was kept bottled up in the various royal residences of the Thames Valley, on the run from disease and pestilence.

However, Edward was able to compensate for his lack of physical mobility by his performances for foreign notables visiting his royal court. For the most part, European ambassadors and other visitors were impressed with Edward's intellect, skills at languages, and royal deportment. His most distinguished diplomatic moment was the reception given for the Scottish dowager queen Mary of Guise, who visited the fourteen-year-old Edward's royal court at Hampton Court and Westminster in 1551 and was suitably impressed with the entertainments and banquets offered on her behalf.⁷ Not surprisingly, Edward enjoyed a positive foreign press during his reign in the royal courts of Europe.⁸ Edward also displayed a keen interest in the military affairs of the British Isles and Europe, such as the campaigns of his uncle Somerset in Scotland in the 1540s and those of the swashbuckling Mediterranean sea captain, Andrea Doria.⁹ Edward

also commissioned an ill-fated voyage to find a northwest passage to Asia in the final months of his reign.¹⁰ Had Edward not been felled by a fatal illness shortly before his sixteenth birthday (July 6., 1553), in all likelihood he would have incorporated the military dimensions of kingship into his adult reign. Edward was well aware that one of the primary reasons why Henry VIII thought it so important for him to have a son to succeed him was that the battlefield was “unmeet for woman’s imbecilities,” a reality that neither Mary nor Elizabeth sought to challenge.¹¹

Ironically, England’s final minority king was immediately succeeded by its first regnant queen, an unprecedented form of kingship that ultimately precluded both Mary I and Elizabeth I from leaving their realms.¹² The effects of the English Reformation also limited the rationale for any form of foreign travel for both sisters prior to their accessions. This was in direct contrast to the experiences of the first generation of Tudor princesses, Henry VIII’s sisters Margaret and Mary Tudor. For both, service to the dynasty meant marriage to a foreign prince. The statutory bastardization of both of Henry VIII’s daughters, however, rendered them problematical as diplomatic pawns, not only because of religious concerns, but also because both sisters, restored to the succession in 1543, were heirs to the throne, which meant that a potential husband for either of them could very well become an English king by marriage. Though there were potential marriage negotiations for both Mary and Elizabeth before they became queens, in the end, they all came to nothing. In addition, the dubious circumstances surrounding their parent’s marriages and their temporary removals from the succession precluded any opportunity for them to join a foreign royal household, as was common for royal and aristocratic women on the European continent.¹³

In fact, the closest that Mary, as a Catholic heir to the militantly Protestant Edward VI, came to leaving the realm was in 1551, when she seriously considered fleeing to the Low Countries because of the pressures on her to conform to the Edwardian Reformation. Conversely, Northumberland’s regime was unwilling to allow either sister to marry or live abroad while Edward remained unwed and without direct heirs.¹⁴ The logistical problems that prevented Mary’s escape actually proved to be a blessing later on. Following Edward’s death (July 6, 1553) and the attempt to divert the succession to the Protestant Lady Jane Grey, Mary’s physical presence in England allowed her to immediately gather support amid the Catholic gentry

in East Anglia and mount a successful challenge that resulted in her accession (July 19, 1553). But following the announcement of her impending marriage to her Catholic Hapsburg cousin Prince Philip of Spain in the fall of 1553, Mary was compelled to put down Wyatt's Revolt, which erupted at the end of January 1554, an insurrection that not only wished to prevent the foreign marriage, but to replace Mary with her Protestant half-sister Elizabeth. While Mary's government successfully put down the revolt, Jane Grey, an inconvenient Protestant alternative, went to the block, while Elizabeth, who maintained her innocence, suffered interrogation and incarceration. Ultimately, Mary's government was unable to uncover direct evidence linking her to the revolt. Thus, for the remainder of her reign, Mary was faced with the unsavory prospect of cohabitating in her kingdom with a half-sister that many of her Protestant subjects would have preferred to be their queen. Because of this, Mary could ill afford to set foot out of her kingdom and allow potentially traitorous Protestant subjects to replace her with Elizabeth. Not surprisingly, Mary never left England when she was queen. The terms of her marriage treaty, in fact, prohibited Philip from removing Mary from England, suggesting unease at foreign travel for a ruling queen that was never a factor in the marriage treaties of English kings.¹⁵ Mary was able to subvert other aspects of the treaty, however, such as when she eventually caved to Philip's demand that the English join the Hapsburg/Valois War in 1557. Mary never considered assuming any aspects, symbolic or otherwise, of the traditional monarchical role of military commander, delegating these tasks to her husband and her English generals, and watching on the sidelines as Calais, England's last continental possession, fell to the French in 1558. Elizabeth also apparently realized that her best interests lay in staying put in England. Well aware that she needed to be physically present in England after her sister's death, Elizabeth resisted all attempts to marry her off to a foreign prince during her sister's reign, a policy that enjoyed the support of the xenophobic English people also.¹⁶ Elizabeth was later supported in this, ironically, by her brother-in-law Philip, who had never discounted the possibility that Elizabeth would one day succeed her sister.¹⁷

Why Elizabeth Never Left England

Following her accession (November 17, 1558), Elizabeth I was keenly aware of the problems that had destabilized her sister's regime. Like

Mary, the unmarried Elizabeth had no direct heir, other than those designated in Henry VIII's will, which was given statutory force by the 1544 Third Act of Succession.¹⁸ While many of her subjects celebrated her accession as a providentially sent English Deborah, Elizabeth was not a legitimate monarch to the other princes of Catholic Europe, who did not recognize the validity of Henry VIII's marriage to Anne Boleyn. To the French in particular, the legitimate queen of England was Mary Queen of Scots, Elizabeth's closest living relative and resident in France as the wife of their dauphin and subsequent king, Francis II (r. 1559–60). Given these circumstances, there was simply no reason for Elizabeth to leave her realm, consumed as she was with consolidating her authority as queen, hammering out an acceptable religious settlement, and spending time with favorite Robert Dudley, her master of the horse. According to William Camden, writing with historical hindsight in the reign of James I, Elizabeth told her first parliament, she had "joined my self in marriage to an husband, namely the Kingdom of England," implying that she intended, like a good wife, to tend to her home.¹⁹

Elizabeth's analogy as her kingdom's wife was a strategy first employed by Mary I as an effort to legitimize female rule.²⁰ The Henrician Reformation had greatly expanded the scope of the king's prerogative, collapsing spiritual and temporal authority within the powers of the supreme headship, which, as A. N. McLaren has suggested, was predicated on the rule of an adult male king.²¹ To counter worries over the wielding of an expanded royal prerogative by first a minor king and then two regnant queens, who were accounted "weaker vessels" than adult male kings, the concept of the "mixed monarchy" arose, first articulated by John Aylmer, and expanded upon by Sir Thomas Smith, as a means to rein in the deficiencies of even a providentially provided female ruler by the active collaboration of her male subjects, in particular, the members of the privy council and the representatives of the realm in parliament.²² As Christopher Haigh has argued, Elizabeth's primary task, performed over the course of her entire reign, was to keep her male subjects at bay from encroaching upon her royal prerogative.²³

Indeed, if Elizabeth's contemporaries agreed on anything, it was that she needed much more help ruling her kingdom and much more protection from physical danger than any of her adult male predecessors.²⁴ Contemporaries also expressed great anxiety concerning what might happen if she died prematurely, while there was utterly no consensus within Elizabethan political society concerning who

would wield the royal prerogative if the Queen were in any way incapacitated or removed from the realm.²⁵ Had Elizabeth stepped foot outside her kingdom, she would have had to appoint a regent. But whom could Elizabeth appoint that would have been acceptable to both her Privy Council and her subjects at large? Just as no one could agree who would be the right husband for Elizabeth, even though her subjects wanted her married, there could be no consensus on a regent, and most did not want her to leave the realm. The second half of the sixteenth century lacked the plethora of royal princes who served as regents and lord protectors in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.²⁶ Royal consorts also made convenient regents; kings as far back as William the Conqueror had frequently left the realm with their wives in charge of their royal prerogatives. Henry VIII was merely following an established precedent when he appointed his first and last wives, Catherine of Aragon and Catherine Parr, as regents when he had left England to fight in France. Elizabeth, however, lacked a consort. Whereas the unmarried Henry V had left England in the charge of his brothers and closest heirs John, Duke of Bedford, and Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, when he was out of the realm, Elizabeth's statutory heir in the early years of her reign, Catherine Grey, with whom she had a rather problematic relationship, would have been unpalatable as even an in name only regent.²⁷ This left either her chief nobles or her councilors. Her closest male relative, Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk, conservative in religion and lacking the requisite leadership qualities, would have been a divisive choice, while the only other preeminent noble choice, Henry Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel, was also unpalatable for similar religious predilections and political limitations.

This left her councilors. Especially in the first few decades of the reign, William Cecil, created Lord Burghley in 1571, whose social origins were from the middling level of the gentry, would not have been acceptable to the nobility as a sole regent. Neither would royal favorite Robert Dudley, created Earl of Leicester in 1564, whom Elizabeth had wished to name as regent when she was stricken with and nearly died from smallpox in 1562. In other words, there was no one, either by birth, position, or achievement, who towered even slightly above Elizabethan political society to serve as a sole viceroy should there be an occasion for the queen to leave the realm. This situation actually suited Elizabeth nicely, as the queen had no desire for any individual to play the role of either rising sun or her own winding sheet.²⁸ However, while the lack of a clear-cut regent may have satisfied the

queen's taste in power dynamics, it precluded her from quitting the realm.

The English people appeared to be in agreement with this situation. Elizabeth's close brush with death in 1562, and her continued resistance to either marrying or naming a successor, ultimately rendered protecting her royal person a national obsession.²⁹ Elizabeth's councilors considered even traveling to York to be a risky venture, considering the conservative religious climate in the northern shires, and Elizabeth never ventured that far north. When Elizabeth had expressed interest in a face-to-face meeting with Mary Queen of Scots soon after her arrival in Scotland in 1562, her council strongly opposed the measure. Ultimately, the meeting was scotched due to renewed civil war in France. The next year, Elizabeth again requested a meeting, which never came to pass, while, in 1566, Mary herself requested a meeting. That year on her summer progress Elizabeth travelled to Stamford in Lincolnshire, as north as she ever travelled, in case it was convenient for Mary, who was unable to travel following the birth of her son, the future James VI and I, in June of that year.³⁰

However, Mary's subsequent forced abdication in 1567 and flight to England the following year ended any chance of Elizabeth even visiting her northernmost shires. As a Catholic heir on English soil, Mary was in exactly the same position as Elizabeth during her sister's reign, a viable religious alternative to the current occupant of the throne. From this point on, Elizabeth never considered a face-to-face meeting with Mary, wishing to keep her at arm's length and refusing to allow her to obtain the status that a personal meeting would give her. Elizabeth, in fact, kept very close to the capital for her 1568 summer progress, as the Spanish ambassador reported, in case of "troubles and disturbances" that might arise.³¹ The Catholic threat to Elizabeth that Mary represented was compounded by the Revolt of the Northern Earls in 1569 and the issuance of the papal bull *Regnans in Excelsis* in 1570, which declared Elizabeth deposed and absolved her Catholic subjects from their allegiance to her. Military threats usually served to keep Elizabeth physically close to the capital, while, during the 1569 revolt, Elizabeth remained principally at fortified residences surrounding in and around London. It is hard to imagine *any* scenario that might have induced Elizabeth to leave England while the Catholic Mary, literally a heartbeat away from the succession by hereditary right, remained on English soil.

One of the ways that Elizabeth could have neutralized Mary's threat was by taking a husband and bearing her own heirs, something her

councilors, parliaments, and subjects continuously urged upon her the first twenty-five years of her reign. Especially during her child bearing years, Elizabeth was, as Francis Walsingham put it, “the best marriage in the parish.”³² As such, potential suitors needed to come to her, as she clearly stated that she would not dream of marrying a man she had not seen, and it was hardly befitting a woman to initiate courtship, even if she were a queen. King Eric of Sweden begged to be allowed to come to England in the early years of her reign, but Elizabeth refused. But Elizabeth did suggest that the Austrian Hapsburg Archduke Charles and the French Duke Henri of Anjou come to England for a meeting, which both of these potential suitors ultimately declined to do, though it is highly doubtful that Elizabeth actually wanted them to make the visit. When Spanish ambassador Guzman de Silva teased Elizabeth that Charles might actually be in England as part of the imperial entourage, Elizabeth nearly fainted.³³ Anjou’s younger brother, however, Francis, Duke of Alencon and later Anjou, did come to England in 1579 and 1581 to pay court to a queen who was old enough to be his mother in a series of negotiations that may have been the closest that Elizabeth ever came to actually marrying. In 1582, in fact, Elizabeth did Alencon the signal honor of personally escorting him through Rochester and Canterbury in Kent, and on to Dover, where she literally walked to the edge of her island fortress to send off, whether happily or not, her final suitor.³⁴

The only other area where Elizabeth might have had a reason for leaving her realm was the personal exercise of the military dimensions of kingship, the most common reason most of her progenitors, the kings of England, had departed the realm. In marked contrast to her other abilities to co-opt the more masculine aspects of English kingship, such as touching for the king’s evil, or conceptualizing herself as king and prince in the abstract, Elizabeth, like her sister Mary, tread warily upon the military aspects of kingship, and made no effort to inhabit the role of a military leader who led troops in the field, staying put in London as the Revolt of the Northern Earls was put down by her lieutenants in 1569.³⁵ Thus, Elizabeth was constrained to watch the periodic successes and more frequent disasters of her armies and navy from the safety of fortress England, usually exasperated by her inability to control her commanders once they left England’s shores. Elizabeth’s exasperation was returned in kind by her commanders in the field and on the seas, constrained by her slow decision-making process, her penny-pinching fiscal policies, and her perennial suspicion of the efficacy of the military exploits constantly urged upon her by the more hawkish members of her council.³⁶

In her old age, as her final and mercurial favorite Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, progressively lost his patience with Elizabeth's innate conservatism in military affairs, Elizabeth's identification with Richard II served to validate her long-standing moratorium on leaving England for any reason.³⁷ Elizabeth, in fact, placed little faith in the utility of warfare and only authorized military deployments when she felt she absolutely had to. Whether this was because she was a woman has been endlessly debated, but it is just as plausible that her reasons were similar to those of her grandfather, Henry VII, who also saw little reason for hemorrhaging England's limited resources for the uncertainties of armed conflict. Even at the beginning of her reign, according to Camden, Elizabeth already knew that "it was more glorious to establish peace with wisdom, than to make an end of war with armies in the field."³⁸ As Paul Hammer has argued, Elizabeth also saw the corrosive effects which revenue-raising and the debasing of coinage had upon the royal authority of her father.³⁹ To Elizabeth, war was at best a necessary evil, a policy that kept her at odds with the more military-minded of her subjects from Leicester to Essex. Had she ever given any thought to leaving the realm to physically serve as a military leader in the field, her unmarried status, lack of a clear-cut heir, and the presence of a Catholic heir on English soil would have been more than enough reason not to do so. Elizabeth repeatedly refused to accept the sovereignty of the Dutch United Provinces in the early 1580s, who nonetheless considered her "the protectress of true evangelical religion."⁴⁰ Elizabeth did, of course, address her troops at Tilbury in 1588 during the 1588 Armada invasion rather than staying safe in London. However, although she affirmed she did have the "heart and stomach of a king," she did not have to leave England to broadcast to her subjects and a wider European audience England's providential ability to withstand a much more powerful invasion force.⁴¹ As Mary Cole Hill has noted, while European princes tended to adhere to male-gendered expectations of kingly military leadership by leading armies in the field, Elizabeth crafted spectacles for both domestic and foreign consumption, such as inspecting coastal fortifications and witnessing mock battles, that celebrated the English capacity for war.⁴² Accession day festivities, which greatly increased in popularity over the course of her reign, also projected a sense of domestic strength and unanimity, such as in 1587, when Thomas Cavendish's fleet in the south seas blasted artillery and sent up fireworks in honor of the Queen, as onlooking Spaniards were overcome with emotion.⁴³ All of these efforts were

masks for Elizabeth's perennial desire to avoid going to war. In her final speech before parliament, in December 1601, Elizabeth made explicit the connection between peace and remaining within her own realm, informing her final parliament that "I never gave just cause of war to any prince," noting that she no other "ambition than to maintain my own state in security and peace..."⁴⁴

Elizabeth preferred peace to war, but she had no interest in playing the European power broker on the scale of her father and would have never dreamed of entertaining foreign monarchs on the scale of the Field of Cloth of Gold. Fiscally, Henry VIII was the black sheep of the Tudors. Both Edward IV and Henry VII, often called the best business man to ever sit on the English throne, realized that England's resources were no match for an expansive foreign policy on the scale of Henry V. In contrast, Henry VIII spent two enormous fortunes, his own inheritance and the proceeds from the dissolution of the monasteries, fighting what were essentially vanity foreign wars that did nothing to bolster England's long-term material and strategic interests.⁴⁵ The governments of both Edward VI and Mary I fully realized the need for financial retrenchment, while Elizabeth, in particular, felt the pinch of the sixteenth century runaway inflation, and made no effort to modernize English tax structures, because foreign policy was done on the cheap while military endeavors on land and sea were increasingly privatized. As a fiscally conservative monarch, it is highly unlikely that Elizabeth would have paid for any meeting with European monarchs, à la the Field of Cloth of Gold, purely for display. Instead, Elizabeth played the game of European realpolitik from the home court advantage of England.

The Home Court Advantage

The varied reasons why Henry VIII visited Europe in war and peace never materialized with Elizabeth. Instead, Elizabeth exploited her position as an entirely English queen in both her domestic and her foreign policies. Unlike her sister Mary, the daughter of a foreign consort who married outside of the realm, Elizabeth emphasized her position as entirely or "mere" English, being the daughter of both an English father and mother. As she informed her parliament of 1566,

Was I not borne of this realm? Were my parents born in any foreign country? Is there any cause I should alienate myself from being careful over this country? Is not my kingdom here?⁴⁶

As such, Elizabeth was emulating the worldview of her subjects; as one foreign travel writer observed at the end of Elizabeth's reign, "the English for the most part do not travel much, but prefer to learn foreign matters and take their pleasures at home."⁴⁷ This was sound policy; unlike her sister or her cousin Mary Queen of Scots, Elizabeth could not count on the support of powerful foreign relatives to bolster her position in England—she literally had no choice but to court the popularity of her own subjects. This process began with her coronation procession of January 1559, in which Elizabeth's active engagement of the people of London who lined the streets to see their new queen set in motion the creation of a widespread perception that she loved her people.⁴⁸ Her stance as a "mere" English monarch, coupled with her seeming lack of desire to leave her realm, were policies fully consistent with the desires of her increasingly xenophobic subjects at large—feelings exasperated by the religious polarizations of the later sixteenth century. Ten years into her reign, the Spanish ambassador Guerau de Spes betrayed his frustrations with Elizabeth's subjects as he observed that "the English hate the very name of foreigner."⁴⁹ In contrast, Elizabeth made sure foreign correspondents, who often accompanied her on her summer progresses, were able to see how much Elizabeth's subjects esteemed her, which they could pass on to their royal patrons back in Europe, a form of psychological weapon during the first-quarter century of Elizabeth's rule, when England could not have successfully rebuffed the efforts of European Catholicism to remove her from her throne.⁵⁰ By 1585, the Protestant king Henri of Navarre (later Henri IV of France) acknowledged Elizabeth's signal domestic advantages, "seeing that she is in a sure port, while others are tossed at sea..."⁵¹

Elizabeth went on progress many times during her reign. Although she never traveled to certain areas in England, such as Yorkshire, Cornwall, Devon, or to any place in Wales, Elizabeth did, however, visit twenty-five of the fifty-three counties of her realm, in trips that averaged between forty-eight and fifty-two days. Elizabeth's summer progresses were important forms of queenly multitasking, placing part of the burden of maintaining her court on her well-heeled subjects, who vied for the opportunity to earn the prestige that came only with a successful and satisfying royal visit and entertainment.⁵² But as she travelled from town to town, she showed herself liberally, accepting gifts, listening to orations, and speaking *ex tempore*, inspiring loyalty in her subjects, and allowing her to perform the

kind of political theatre that clearly brought her immense pleasure. In 1568, the Spanish ambassador reported:

She was received everywhere with great acclamations and great joy, as is customary in this country; whereat she was extremely pleased and told me so, giving me to understand how beloved she was by her subjects and how highly she esteemed this, together with the fact that they were peaceful and contented, whilst all her neighbors on all sides are in such trouble.⁵³

Three years later, after the Ridolfi plot to assassinate Elizabeth and replace her with Mary Queens of Scots was uncovered, Elizabeth refused to cancel her summer progress, indicative of how important it was to her not only to both see and be seen by her subjects, but also to broadcast this fact to foreign observers.⁵⁴

Elizabeth, in fact, received an overwhelmingly positive press from the foreign ambassadors resident in her court. As Nate Probasco has demonstrated, the drama inherent in Elizabeth's funeral-like reception for the French ambassador, Bertrand de Salignac de la Motte-Fénélon, after the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572, was primarily meant to convey the queen's attitude to a royal audience back in France, with predictable results on a rattled Charles IX, who was hardly Elizabeth's equal in the complexities of diplomacy.⁵⁵ Nearly twenty years later, Elizabeth staged an impromptu performance for her court, occasioned by the ill-advised oration by a Polish ambassador, who received a sound drubbing in *ex tempore* Latin that was reported all over Europe, reminding her contemporaries of her princely majesty, even in the last decade of her reign.⁵⁶ As Ilona Bell has noted, Elizabeth well knew that her words to ambassadors were scrutinized in foreign courts—as the ambassadors recalled their memories of their audiences with Elizabeth, the drama, spectacle, clothing, and personality that surrounded Elizabeth's words undoubtedly colored their responses to their royal patrons.⁵⁷

Given the relative novelty of female rule and England's relative weakness against its more powerful European neighbors, Elizabeth I may have believed that some of her power and safety for her kingdom came from the mystique that she created as a domestic icon who never left her realm. Within England that meant allowing more of her subjects to see her and develop their loyalty. Conversely, in her relations with other nations, Elizabeth's mystique came from *not* being seen. Barely half a decade into her reign, Elizabeth's fame as

an independent ruling queen was such that she was visited by the Swedish princess Cecilia, sister of Elizabeth's spurned suitor King Eric, who travelled land and sea while pregnant in order to meet the already legendary Elizabeth, in person. Various representations of Elizabeth, portrayed as Solomon and visited by Cecilia as the Queen of Sheba, seeking wisdom, underscored Elizabeth's identification as a wise and learned queen.⁵⁸ Henry VIII had also been represented as an English Solomon in written texts and iconography, visited by the Queen of Sheba.⁵⁹ While Henry was the Solomon who left his realm to consort with his fellow monarchs, Elizabeth was the more authentic Solomon who remained in her kingdom for others to travel to and partake of her wisdom. As Linda Shenk has explained, Elizabeth's developing international persona as a learned queen encompassed an imperial image for European consumption of a female Solomon superior in knowledge and virtue as well as a champion for European Protestants.⁶⁰ By the end of her reign, Thomas Dekker wrote in his play *Old Fortunanus* (1599), "Are you then traveling to the temple of Eliza? ... I am of her country, and we adore her by the name of Eliza."⁶¹

Conversely, it is entirely possible, if not probable, that Elizabeth was clever enough to realize that her queenly persona in person would never be as powerful, as awe-inspiring, as frightening, as it was in international political imaginary. She may have been especially aware of this concept in terms of her most serious enemy, Philip II of Spain. Philip is one of the few European princes who *had* actually met Elizabeth in person when he was married to her older half-sister and resident in England. The young princess Elizabeth possessed, according to imperial ambassador Simon Renard, "a power of enchantment," which had not been meant admiringly.⁶² However, many believed that this enchantment had actually captured the young Philip, who lusted after his sister-in-law. How much more powerful to never replace that image for the king of Spain with the older image of the queen; for Philip, Elizabeth was always the vivacious twenty-something coquette.

For all other Europeans, the image of Elizabeth was presented in portraits, coins, and poetry. These forms of representation were perhaps the most far reaching and influential. Far more people saw the queen's image than who ever saw her in person. One result was that those abroad who had not seen Elizabeth very much wanted to know if the portraits they saw were genuine likenesses of the queen. Both Thomas Radcliffe, Earl of Sussex, and Frances, lady Cobham,

assured the French royal family that the images they saw were truly of Elizabeth. As Anna Riehl Bertolet points out, Sussex and Cobham became “the ambassadors in whose power lies not only the truthfulness of the image, but also the very formation of the concept of Elizabeth’s real face in the viewer’s minds.”⁶³

Elizabeth and her governments did their best to exercise control over how her image was represented to the rest of the world, a not altogether successful task.⁶⁴ In 1598, a German traveler, Paul Hentzner described the aged Elizabeth, “wrinkled . . . her teeth black,” wearing “false hair, and that red,” as an old woman.⁶⁵ In her court, however, residents, including ambassadors, never officially recognized that the queen was subject to the aging process. As the ageless icon of courtly love, Elizabeth’s portraits, which circulated in the courts of Europe, also served to keep the image of Elizabeth as eternally youthful. While the French kings Charles IX, Henri III, and Henri IV never had the opportunity to meet the mature Elizabeth in person, they could gaze upon the eternally youthful countenance of her portraits, as they digested the frequently effusive reports of their ambassadors. In addition, images could also convey Elizabeth’s power. Louis Montrose has described how Elizabeth’s image was exported to chieftains in Ireland, while a Dutch representation from the 1580s displays Elizabeth as Diana slaying Pope Gregory VII.⁶⁶ As B. R. Siegfried has explained, the cleanup of the base elements of English and Irish coinage broadcast to Europe and beyond not just the queen’s image, but the solvency of her finances, and, by analogy, the vigor of her rule, without having to step foot out of her realm.⁶⁷ Elizabeth’s contemporary image even made it to the new world, as Walter Raleigh distributed coins stamped with Elizabeth’s image to the indigenous peoples of Guiana in return for their “obeisance” to the Queen.⁶⁸

Elizabeth’s later portraits also broadcast the image of a monarch fully in control not only of her own kingdom but of the world around her, such as the Dichtley portrait of 1592, commissioned by Sir Henry Lee, which displayed Elizabeth standing confidently over a map of England, “bestride the narrow world like a Colossus.”⁶⁹ Five years later, French ambassador Andre Hurault, Sieur de Maisse, informed Elizabeth that,

she was well advertised of everything that happened in the world, she replied that her hands were very long by nature and might, *an nescis longas Regibus esse manus*; whereupon she drew off her glove and

showed me her hand, which is very long and more than mine by more than three broad fingers.⁷⁰

In this exchange, in the fourth decade of her reign, Elizabeth made explicit her belief that her foreign relations had never suffered from the fact she had never left the realm, even though she only knew the world secondhand.

Yet, late in Elizabeth's reign, there was at least a whisper of a suggestion that Elizabeth was willing to leave her realm if necessary. In 1595, the English were greatly concerned that Henri IV was considering a truce with Spain. Diplomat Henry Unton felt rather desperate at the cold reception the French king gave him, and "let him know her majesty can be contented to come to a Conference with him . . . or give him any other convenient satisfaction."⁷¹ If Elizabeth had *ever* dreamed of visiting the European continent, this occasion could have provided her with the opportunity to do so. But of course Elizabeth did not go to France to meet with Henri. Like her many offers to marry when the time was right earlier in her reign, at the end of it, Elizabeth stayed in England, *her* realm.

This proved to be a rather enduring precedent for most of the seventeenth century. While so many monarchs before Elizabeth had travelled beyond their kingdoms, in the Stuart century that followed her, English monarchs usually remained in England once they were crowned. James I (r. 1603–1625) traveled to Scotland only once after succeeding Elizabeth in England, even though he had been king of the northern kingdom for thirty-six years prior to his English accession.⁷² However, James never travelled to the continent, even though he entertained pretensions to be a Henrician style pan-European peace broker. James's successor Charles I (r. 1625–1649) travelled to Spain in 1623 as Prince of Wales, but once he was king, he never left his British kingdom. Once Charles II was restored to his father's throne in 1660, after more than a decade of wandering the courts of Europe as a royal pretender in search of support, he never wanted to go on his travels again. Only with the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 and the Hanoverian succession of 1714, which brought foreign-born monarchs to the English and British thrones, was the Elizabethan precedent of a stay-at-home monarch overturned.

Despite the fact that most of the world only knew her from secondhand sources, Elizabeth both created and enjoyed a wide-ranging fame over much of the old world of Europe, Central and Western Asia, and Northern Africa. To those areas closest to England in

western, northern, and central Europe, Elizabeth exported the image of an iconic, semireligious domestic goddess much loved by a people determined to protect her from any foreign danger. Rather than take her obvious charms, talents, and transcendent wisdom to other lands, she relied on ambassadors, other foreign observers, and various forms of iconographic representation to do this for her, with the exception of those foreigners visiting England who had the pleasure of her company. In this sense, of Europeans keenly aware of a dazzling and legendary queen they had never seen, Elizabethan foreign relations marked a significant break with the past. However, to those areas of the wider world where the first strands of British protoimperial foreign relations were being created, in Russia, Morocco, The Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia, and Mughal India, Elizabeth presented a perplexing portrait of a queen bound to her land and in the thrall of her subjects without any desire for foreign conquest.

Notes

1. Mary Hill Cole, "Monarchy in Motion: an Overview of Elizabethan Progresses" *The Progresses, Pageants, and Entertainments of Queen Elizabeth I* ed. Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Elizabeth Goldring, and Sarah Knight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27–45.
2. *Elizabeth I: Collected Works* (afterwards referred to as *CW*) ed. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 97. *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I, Volume I 1558–1581* ed. T.E. Hartley (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981), 148.
3. In marked contrast to their contemporaries in Medieval Europe, only two English kings, Richard I (r. 1189–1199) and the future Edward I (r. 1272–1307) went on Crusade to the Holy Land, whereas Henry IV (r. 1399–1413) went on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and fought alongside Teutonic knights in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania prior to his usurpation of Richard II's throne.
4. R.A. Griffiths, *The Reign of King Henry VI* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2004), 189–194.
5. Edward IV did make one brief foray into France in 1475 only to be quickly pensioned off by King Louis XI. See Charles Ross, *Edward IV* (London: Methuen, 1974), 204–38.
6. For a succinct recent study of Edward VI's reign, see Charles Beem, "Have Not Wee a Noble Kynge? The Minority of Edward VI," in *The Royal Minorities of Medieval and Early Modern England* ed. Charles Beem (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 211–248.

7. Edward provided his own account of his entertainments for the Scottish dowager queen. See Edward VI, *The Chronicle and Political papers of Edward VI*, ed. W.K. Jordan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 90–92. (The original of Edward VI's political chronicle is British Library Cotton MSS, Nero, C, X.)
8. Edward played a central role in the negotiations for a French alliance in the late spring of 1551. See W.K. Jordan, *Edward VI: The Threshold of Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 23–34.
9. Edward VI, *Chronicle*, 42, 45–47, 65–66.
10. See Beem, “Have Not Wee a Noble Kynge?” 239–40.
11. *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII*, vol. 21, Pt. 1, James Gairdner, R.H. Brodie, eds. (London, 1908), no. 356, 174–75.
12. See Charles Beem, *The Lioness Roared: The Problems of Female Rule in English History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1–12.
13. Sharon L. Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 67–110.
14. Susan Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony* (London: Routledge, 1996), 16.
15. “The Marriage Treaty of Mary and Philip” *Statutes of the Realm*, vol. IV, Part I, *Edward VI to 27 Eliz. 1547–1584–5*, Anno I Marie, Session 3 A.D. 1554, cap. 2, 223. This treaty also served as the blueprint for drafts of projected marriage treaties for Elizabeth. See *Historical Manuscripts Commission*, vol. 9, pt. 1, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Honorable Marquis of Salisbury*, K.G. 288–93, 543–44.
16. British Library (afterwards BL) Cotton MS Titus B ii fol. 109, cited in Doran, *Monarchy*, 20.
17. David Loades, *The Reign of Mary Tudor* 2nd. Edition (London and New York: Longman, 1991), 192–93.
18. Henry VIII's will stipulated that, should his children die without heirs, the crown should go to the descendants of Henry VIII's younger sister Mary, excluding the descendants of his elder sister Margaret, who married James IV of Scotland. See Mortimer Levine, *Tudor Dynastic Problems* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973), 71.
19. William Camden, *The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, late Queen of England*, ed. Wallace T. McCaffrey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 29.
20. Beem, *The Lioness Roared*, 63–99.
21. A.N. McLaren, *Political Culture in the Reign of Elizabeth I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–11.
22. John Aylmer, *An Harborowe For Faithfull and Trewe Subjects, against the late blowne Blaste, Concerninge the Government of Women* (Strasbourg, 1559), Sir Thomas Smith, *De Republica Anglorum* ed. Mary Dewar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

23. Christopher Haigh, *Elizabeth I* (London: Longman, 1988).
24. The need to protect Elizabeth culminated in the 1584 Bond of Association, designed to punish anyone (but Mary Queen of Scots in particular) who sought to harm the queen. *CW*, 183–85.
25. For the most famous example of this, see “The Commons Petition to the Queen at Whitehall,” January 28, 1563, in *CW*, 72–77.
26. For a still useful discussion of this phenomenon, see J.R. Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England, With Special Reference To its Origins,” *English Historical Review* vol. 68, no. 267 (April 1953), 193–233.
27. *Ibid.* Christopher Allman, *Henry V* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), *passim*.
28. *CW*, 65–66, *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*, 145–153.
29. For a discussion of this issue, see Stephen Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 1558–1569* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 194–99.
30. Mary Hill Cole, *The Portable Queen: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Ceremony* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 146–47.
31. *Calendar of Letters, etc. Relating to English Affairs, vol. 2 1568–1579* (afterwards *CSP, Span.*), ed. Martin A.S. Hume (London 1894), 50.
32. Quoted in Ilona Bell, *Elizabeth I: the Voice of a Monarch* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 4.
33. Carole Levin, *The Heart and Stomach of a King* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 53.
34. John Nichols, *The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth, vol. 2* (London: John Nichols and Son, 1823), 345–47. For more on this courtship, see Levin, *Heart and Stomach*, 60–66.
35. For a recent study on the rebellion, see K.J. Kesselring, *The Northern Rebellion of 1569: Faith, Politics, and Protest in Elizabethan England* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
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37. Paul E.J. Hammer, “The Crucible of War: English Foreign Policy, 1589–1603,” *Tudor England and its Neighbors*, eds. Susan Doran and Glenn Richardson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 235–262.
38. Camden, *History*, 24.
39. Paul E.J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1–8.
40. *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth, vol. XIX, August 1584–August 1585* (afterwards *CSPF*), ed. Sophie Crawford Lomas (London: 1916), 40.
41. Susan Frye, “The Myth of Elizabeth at Tilbury” *Sixteenth Century Journal* vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), 95–114.
42. Cole, *Portable Queen*, 2.

43. Roy Strong, *The Cult of Elizabeth* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 121.
44. CW, 348.
45. S. Gunn, "The French Wars of Henry VIII" in *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe*, J. Black, ed. (Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1987), 28–51.
46. *Proceedings*, 146.
47. Thomas Platter, *Thomas Platter's Travels in England 1599*, tr. Clare Williams (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), 170.
48. CW, 53–55. For a recent discussion of the significance of Elizabeth's coronation festivities, see Bell, *Voice of a Monarch*, 31–43.
49. CSP, Span. 157.
50. For instance, when Elizabeth visited Norwich in August, 1578, she was accompanied by the French ambassadors sent by the duke of Alençon, sieurs de Bacqueville and de Quincy. CW, 174–77.
51. CSPF, 314.
52. Cole, *Portable Queen*, 1–12.
53. Cited in J. E. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth I* (New York: Archon, 1957), 211–212.
54. See Conyers Read, *Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1960), 40.
55. See later in the text, Nate Probasco, "Queen Elizabeth's Reaction to the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre."
56. See Janet M. Green, "Queen Elizabeth I's Latin Reply to the Polish Ambassador" *Sixteenth Century Journal* vol. 31, no. 4 (2000), 987–1008.
57. Bell, *Voice of a Monarch*, 69.
58. See later in the text, Nathan Martin, "Princess Cecilia's Visitation to England, 1565–1566."
59. For a succinct discussion (with illustrations) of Henry VIII as Solomon, see David Cressy, "Spectacle and Power: Apollo and Solomon at the Court of Henry VIII" *History Today*, vol. 32 no. 10 (1982), 16–23.
60. See Linda Shenk, *Learned Queen: The Image of Elizabeth I in Politics and Poetry* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 21–53.
61. Cited in Strong, *Cult of Elizabeth*, 15.
62. *Calendar of Letters, Despatches, and State Papers, Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archive at Simancas and Elsewhere*, Vol. XI. Royall Tyler, ed. (London, 1914), 228.
63. Anna Riehl, *The Face of Queenship: Early Modern Representations of Elizabeth I* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 171.
64. Louis A. Montrose, "Idols of the Queen, Policy, Gender, and the Picturing of Elizabeth I" *Representations* no. 68 (Autumn 1999), 108–161.

65. Elizabeth W. Pomeroy, *Reading the Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (Hamden Conn.: Archon Books, 1989), 40
66. Montrose, "Idol," 123.
67. See later in the text, B. R. Siegfried, "The Song on Queen Elizabeth."
68. Montrose, "Idol," 134.
69. Roy Strong, *Gloriana: the Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 135–138.
70. André Hurault, Sieur de Maisse, *A Journal of All That Was Accomplished*, trans. and ed. G. B. Harrison and R. A. Jones (Bloomsbury, IN: Nonesuch, 1931), 58.
71. *A Collection of State Papers Relating to Affairs in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth From the year 1571 to 1596*. William Murdin, ed. (London, 1759), 702. Our thanks to Linda Shenk for sharing this research with us.
72. In 1589, James VI sailed from Leith to Norway to fetch his future wife Anne of Denmark, and later visited Denmark with her, the only occasion James departed the British Isles.



CHAPTER 2

PRINCESS CECILIA'S VISITATION TO ENGLAND, 1565–1566

Nathan Martin

In 1565, princess Cecilia, a younger sister of king Erik XIV of Sweden, travelled to England to visit Queen Elizabeth, with whom she had established a friendship. The motivations for her visit serve as a clear example of the fundamental principle of Anglo-Swedish relations during the late 1500s, which was based upon personal royal relationships, reciprocity, and gift-giving. For Cecilia, Elizabeth was the ultimate European female role model, whose royal person itself was the siren song that compelled Cecilia to visit a monarch who was already being referred to as a real life female Solomon. For her brother, King Erik, however, Cecilia played an important role in the larger context of Swedish international relations. He wanted Cecilia to keep Elizabeth on friendly terms with him as he was at war during this time with Denmark and Poland. Important to notice, however, is that, from the available records, Cecilia did not participate in political discussions: her presence was sufficient to meet Erik's diplomatic aims. Thus, this episode in Anglo-Swedish relations must be understood as a dualistic experience—one with both prosopographical and diplomatic significance.

While she was resident in England, Cecilia engaged in social activities with important individuals connected with Elizabeth's court, gave birth to a son, and learned the English language. Upon leaving the country, Cecilia was memorialized in the prose work *Queen Elizabeth and a Swedish Princess* by James Bell. Cecilia's stay in England, however, was not necessarily a wholly positive experience: she incurred debt, became fairly unpopular, and took great exception to the behavior of a number of people connected with Elizabeth's royal court. Ultimately, it was the negative press that Cecilia's visit

engendered that reveals the significance of this rather provocative cultural exchange between the English and Swedish royal courts, each with its own particular relationships, protocols, and hierarchies. Nevertheless, for better or worse, at the conclusion of her ultimately disastrous visit, Cecilia was instrumental in bringing to the Baltic regions of Europe a personal and realistic account of the fabled English virgin queen and her royal court.

There has been a temptation by some historians to regard Cecilia's trip as part of her brother's lengthy marital negotiations with Elizabeth.¹ This flawed view has been espoused by some for basically two reasons: a scarcity of good English sources on the matter and a desire to link Erik's failed proposal, a major project, with all other aspects of Anglo-Swedish relations during his reign. As a consequence, a popular misrepresentation of Cecilia's trip has emerged. It is clear that Cecilia's coming to see Elizabeth was not a part of the marriage talks between Erik and Elizabeth, and it should not even be seen as an extension of the talks; Cecilia came to England for personal reasons. Historian Ingvar Andersson notes the lack of political discussion between Cecilia and Elizabeth. He writes: "Cecilia's visit there, rich in happy, pitiful, and tragic episodes, did not generate anything in the matters of the proposed marriage, but left, in another sense, a certain exchange."² The Spanish ambassador in Elizabeth's court, Don Guzman de Silva, reported that Cecilia had done nothing to advance her brother's suit for marriage, and, in fact, Cecilia does "her best to urge Leicester's suit...praising him highly...no doubt because she thinks it pleases the Queen."³ De Silva would have been keenly aware of the possibility that Cecilia would attempt to revive or continue her brother's negotiations with Elizabeth since his king, Philip II, also had an interest in her. Additionally, it appears that Erik gave no instructions to Cecilia to promote his interest in Elizabeth.

However, while Cecilia's trip should not be considered as an element of Erik's negotiations, it was very much a consequence of them. The marriage talks had opened up diplomatic dialogue between Sweden and England, two countries that had had only sporadic contact before 1557. Consequently, the Swedish understanding of the English court had been enhanced and a cadre of ambitious middlemen developed. Many of these were merchant-class Englishmen who were interested in gaining new fortunes in Sweden and had gained the confidence of the Swedish ambassador in England, Nils Gyllenstierna, from 1561 to 1562. Notably among these were John

Dymoch, Geoffrey Preston, John Keyle, and George North. In one of the earliest correspondences between Cecilia and Elizabeth, in November 1562, Cecilia petitioned the queen regarding John Keyle. Cecilia had sent letters to the queen through Keyle, and "having heard that the said Kele has fallen under her displeasure, she begs [Keyle] may be pardoned and restored to favour."⁴ Cecilia's friendship with another Englishman, George North, was also vital for the trip. He appeared at her landing in England and perhaps served as a chaplain for her. North had earlier in 1561 produced a work on Scandinavia, *A Description of Swedland, Gotland, and Finland*, a highly edited work⁵ that describes the history, geography, and customs of the Scandinavian area. Dymoch, too, served as a de facto liaison for the English and Swedish courts. Dymoch, North, Keyle, and others in this little band of adventurers allowed the cultural exchange between England and Sweden to flourish.

As Cecilia's brother and king, Erik did have some role to play. It is evident that even after the ending of formal, face-to-face negotiations, seen to be defined by Gyllenstierna's return to Sweden in April 1562, Erik still had aspirations for a union of the two crowns. There were frequent rumors about his coming to England, spread throughout the continent on different occasions, and he sent a number of letters to her expressing his love for her. The last of these was sent in 1567, one year before his brother's coup. In regard to Cecilia's trip, he played a secondary role. Cecilia wrote to the queen informing her that she needed to obtain a license from her brother to travel.⁶ After Elizabeth had sent letters of invitation to Cecilia to come to England, she also informed King Erik of the invitation by letter, as a matter of protocol. Erik sent a reply in which he expressed his thankfulness to Elizabeth for her kind invitation to Cecilia.⁷ Considering his prior dealings with England, which had engendered the emergence of some rather negative stereotypes and xenophobic generalizations about the Swedish people among the English, Cecilia possessed a unique opportunity to construct a more positive image for Sweden once she arrived in England.

However, Cecilia was a poor choice as an official diplomatic representative of the Swedish Vasa dynasty. She had in her earlier years demonstrated a penchant for independence; in this, she was very much like Elizabeth. Cecilia was born on November 6, 1540, in Stockholm; her mother was Margareta Lejonhuvud. Like her other brothers and sisters, she received an education with some of the most prolific scholars in Sweden. She had learned foreign languages and

was particularly skilled at Latin, as was Elizabeth; she loved music, too, and played the lute and clavier.⁸ She was sickly most of her young life, but she had an adventurous spirit that often put her at odds with the irreproachable royal image the Vasa kings wanted to portray. One demonstration of this was a controversial incident that occurred in 1559 in connection with the marriage of her sister, Katarina, with Edzard of Ostfriesland. Edzard's brother, John, had been in Sweden negotiating a marriage between Edzard and Katarina. During his time in Sweden, he started a romance with Cecilia, and in one incident, was caught in a suggestive condition coming out of Cecilia's window. Cecilia was severely reprimanded by her father, King Gustav, and stated to her brother that Gustav had "ripped all the hair out of my head."⁹ Later, Erik minted a coin representing Cecilia as Susannah, the biblical figure who was wrongfully accused of licentious behavior, in an attempt to restore her honor.¹⁰

Cecilia resembled Elizabeth in another way, too; she resisted marriage proposals that others in her circle had prepared for her. The controversy surrounding the incident with John of Ostfriesland could have been mitigated by Cecilia accepting a proposal of marriage with him, but she was unwilling to marry him. In another example, Cecilia had been coaxed by her brother, Erik, who had become king in 1560, to marry into a dynastic house of another land, and in a letter of desperation to Queen Elizabeth, Cecilia expresses sorrow over having others control the selection of her mate. In the first officially recorded exchange between the two, Cecilia tells Elizabeth that "she has no mind to marry before she has seen the Queen," and:

About a year past there came a nobleman of Poland, the Earl of Teyn, who moved for her marriage with her master. Her brother agreed thereto, contrary to her will, but in the end it was broken off. Now he would have her marry the eldest son of the Landgrave of Hesse; to which she will in nowise consent, but would rather serve her [the Queen], and continue unmarried.¹¹

Cecilia further instructs the queen that she would like to receive a letter of invitation from her by Easter of that year (1563), and it should be sent by one of the noblemen who had connections with the Swedish court. The Landgrave's son, it was thought, would be coming to Sweden to court Cecilia around the time she wanted to leave for England, and this would provide Cecilia with an excuse to dodge his proposal.¹² Queen Elizabeth responded kindly. She wrote in

March that she “thanks her for the expression of goodwill; and if she comes she will treat her more like a good friend than as a mistress.” There was still some trepidation on the part of the queen to write to Erik. She explains that “there are however some causes which move her to forbear to write to the King, her brother, which she has declared to some of her friends.”¹³ Therefore, it seems, marriage did have something to do with Cecilia’s planned trip to England, but it was based more on avoiding her own than it was on advocating for her brother’s.

Cecilia, however, was coerced into marriage with Christopher, the Marquis of Baden, before she was able to travel to England. The marriage was arranged by Erik and took place in 1564. She apparently agreed to the marriage with Christopher in part because he agreed to allow her to visit England within a year of marriage; he also accompanied her on her journey and on most of her visit in England.¹⁴

Based on the evidence and similarities of circumstances, it is clear that Cecilia identified Elizabeth as a type of role model, and this became one of her main motivations to travel to England. Elizabeth was seven years older than Cecilia, had become queen at twenty-five, and knew the tribulations and perils that a female royal would face. Cecilia’s trip, therefore, must be understood mainly in personal terms; there was a political backdrop, but that did not seem to affect the immediate relationship between Cecilia and Elizabeth. In response to Cecilia’s expression of her desire to come to England, Elizabeth sent Cecilia a plain, unset ruby. Cecilia, in a letter of May 23, 1563, expressed her thanks to Elizabeth for it and thanked her for the invitation to come to England. She added that “her brother does not mislike her request,” indicating that the original idea to come to England was her own, and “asks the Queen to write three or four lines to him in her favour.”¹⁵ Thus, Cecilia was using her brother’s interest in Elizabeth for the advancement of her own trip.

Preparations for her journey began in late December 1564. She chose a number of young women from the nobility to accompany her to England. They were: Kristina Gabrielsdotter Oxenstierna, who would come under the service of a later Swedish queen; Birgitta Hansdotter Bååt; Kristina Abrahamsdotter, whose father, Jakob Turesson Rosengren, was a member of the Riksråd (the Swedish Council); Anna Jörensdotter; and Helena Ulfsdotter Snakenborg, a fifteen-year-old girl who came from an influential noble family. Along with these personal attendants of Cecilia, one Dr. Olof, who served as Cecilia’s chaplain, and her husband, Christopher of Baden,¹⁶

travelled with her. She was ready to leave, despite complaints from some that her entourage was too small, and the trip would be susceptible to assault. Before Cecilia left Sweden, however, she had received a prayer book, in which her sisters, brothers, and closest friends had written proverbs and wishes for safe journey. Interestingly, some of the dates associated with the signatures go back to May 1563, indicating that she had intended to leave a good deal earlier than she did.¹⁷

The reason for the delay cannot be definitively ascertained. Shortly after receiving the letter of invitation from Elizabeth, Cecilia was thrown in the midst of marriage negotiations with the Earl of Teyn, which could have delayed her. The more likely cause, however, was Erik's own fickle personality. James Bell, in *Queen Elizabeth and a Swedish Princess*, a work dedicated to the queen, takes this view. He writes:

Yea the Kinge him self sometime with halfe commaundinge wordes, sometime with sweete and gentle entreatie, sometime with wylie policies, proceedinge yeat from naturall and tender affeccione assaied the same: one daie gevinge his worde that she shoulde cause her fournyture and provisione to be brought a shippe boorde, and commaundinge all things necessarie to be in a readynes, the nexte daye revoking his promse and repealinge his commaundment and so from daye to daye still delayenge the tyme, to thende the crueltie of the extreame winter beinge now at hande might cause a terror to her grace and make her to revolte.¹⁸

This fits well with Erik's characteristic of unpredictable behavior described by Swedish historians. His decision to let his sister visit England depended upon his mood, his demeanor, and ultimately his liking of Elizabeth.¹⁹ The journey began in late 1564.

Bell describes the journey in great detail, and although his account suffers from embellishment and exaggeration, he presumably had interviewed Dr. Olof, considered a firsthand source since he accompanied Cecilia on her journey, for the basis of his information in the work. Bell's aim, of course, was to praise Cecilia's virtues and tenacity in getting to England. She left Stockholm on November 12, 1564, and Bell sets the scene at the docks where "her brothers and sisters did honorable conducte her to the waters side," and "there were sweete kyssinges intermyxte with salte teares." She sailed to Waxholm, staying there the next day. The next three days, she sailed around the "monstruous rockes of Fynnelande" with her ship barely avoiding a shipwreck. Next, the ship passed through a narrow passage named

Quivelax on November 17. After avoiding the Swedes' warring Danish neighbors, she landed at User in Finland, staying there until December 9. After this, they set out again, encountering a terrible winter storm, barely escaping death, and landed at Revel in Livland, an important Swedish trading city. It was because of these difficult circumstances—war and storms—that the entourage decided to embark upon a land route instead of a sea route. Cecilia and her assistants also decided to celebrate Christmas in Livland. Thereafter, she had to obtain a passport from the king of Poland to cross his country, which was a difficult endeavor, and which she did not obtain until March 2, 1565. From Revel, she travelled through Livland by sled and horse through ice and snow to reach first Kegel, then Pades, and finally Pernov. She reached the town of Sales on March 7, after nearly running out of food, and the next day went to Lemsey, where she rested for a couple of days. She left for the Polish city of Rie, on March 11, but she was refused entry by city officials, so she went on to Newmyll, where she recovered from a minor illness. On March 19, she reached Sallade in Litov, the inhabitants of which Bell describes as “a people as rude of manners as frowarde of stomach.” On March 30, they went on to Cowyne, where they stayed until April 28, 1565, at which time she was apprehended by city officials apparently because of unauthorized transit through the region. After being released, Cecilia and her train moved on to Prussia in June 1565, through the cities of Ragnette, Tylzey, and Quinseburgh; in Prussia, she was kindly welcomed by government officials. At last, she reached Steckuzen in East Friesland, where Cecilia's sister Katrina was residing. Later, she left Steckuzen and travelled 400 miles through Embden, East Friesland, West Freisland, and Brabante to Antwerp, a journey “in so shorte a tyme perfourmed, not onlie not to ladies in their progresse, but skarse by marchauntes with their poste horses in their daylie Achates.” Finally, she came to Calais. After a number of days, the entourage crossed the English Channel, after finding favorable winds, and arrived in Dover on September 9.²⁰

Cecilia was met in Dover by Elizabeth's “horse-litter,” accompanied by Lord and Lady Cobham. She was brought through Canterbury, Rochester, and Gravesend, where she met Lord Hunsdon and six of the queen's servants, and then to Bedford House, where she would stay.²¹ There, the Countess of Sussex and Cecil's wife, Mildred, greeted her. On September 11, she entered London at two o'clock in the afternoon. Her entrance was described by de Silva in great detail. She wore a black velvet dress with a silver apron and a golden crown

upon her head; her personal assistants wore crimson dresses. De Silva relates that “this seemed to me a new style of dress, I venture to relate these trifles to your Majesty.”²² The queen returned from Windsor to London on September 14 to meet Cecilia. Cecilia “received her Majesty at the door, where she embraced her warmly, and both went up to her apartments.”²³ On September 17, De Silva had an audience with Elizabeth, where the queen “praised very much to me, both for her good looks and elegance and for the grace and facility with which she speaks English.”²⁴ Thus, it seems Cecilia’s arrival in England was met with a good deal of excitement, not only from nobles but from the queen herself.

Another cause for excitement was the impending birth of Cecilia’s son. She had conceived in December, and very soon after her initial meeting with Elizabeth, she gave birth to a son on September 15. Two weeks later, the boy was christened at Westminster. The setting for the ceremony was ornate with beautifully designed tapestries on the stalls of the church, silver and gold ornamentation on the altar, and the child himself was laden with jewels.²⁵ The ceremony proceeded in a straightforward manner. There was no singing of music, and the bishop read the baptism ritual with little embellishment. The Duke of Norfolk, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the queen were named godparents, and the child was named *Edwardus Fortunatus*, allegedly in honor of his mother’s safe arrival in England.²⁶ After the final procession, the Marquis of Baden expressed his appreciation for the gifts they had received for the boy, and he and a number of English lords dined after the ceremony.²⁷ On October 14, de Silva reported that another ceremony of purification and confirmation was held for Cecilia and the infant, in which “there were great rejoycings.”²⁸ The reception of the new infant in England was positive; the queen, as a godmother, granted an annual salary of 2,000 English pounds to Christopher as long as Cecilia resided in England. A patent for this pension reads, in reference to Cecilia: “She hath enriched our realm with a fine son whom we have also, by our assistance, brought into the society of the Church through baptism.”²⁹

An interesting aspect of Cecilia’s stay in England was that she exhibited a good command of the English language—a rare feat for a foreigner from the north. The previous quote from the queen praising her English language skills seems to indicate that Cecilia could have been studying the language before she arrived. Bell states that “she labored so ferventlie aswell by greate studie as by contynual conference that within foure years space she hathe attayned the

englishe tounge.”³⁰ It should be remembered, too, that Cecilia had received an education focusing highly on language arts, so that learning a new language would not be as difficult as one could expect. Also, her brother John, Duke of Finland, had five years earlier, come to England for several months and presumably had picked up some English grammar and vocabulary, which he could impart to his sister. Bell adds that English is “a language not verie easie to be learned the greate noumbre of Straungers notwithstanding nourished uppe from their greene years here in the Pale of Englande declare no lesse.”³¹ Bell goes on to state that it takes the Italian, Portuguese, Irish, French, and Dutch visitors more than twenty years to perfect the English language, but Cecilia could become fluent in it in a matter of a few years. The motivation behind this, in Bell’s opinion, was that Cecilia “endeavored her selfe altogether to be an Englishe woman.”³² On a practical level, Cecilia could communicate in the queen’s native tongue, which broke down a cultural barrier that would otherwise have minimized their closeness; and on another level, it demonstrated Cecilia’s desire to relate to English culture.

During her stay in England, Cecilia attended many social functions with nobles and dignitaries. On October 13, she and her husband, Christopher, dined with de Silva and Elizabeth at their own invitation.³³ After the purification ceremony following the birth of Edward, there was a party thrown in her honor as well. She attended the Earl of Warwick’s wedding ceremony in mid-November and at some point later had dinner with the Earl of Arundel.³⁴ While these were the more important instances of social interaction, Seaton observes, “there were probably many other hospitalities given and received of which no record remains.”³⁵

Cecilia’s attitude about her English venture began to sour around Christmas time, however. In a presentation of *Sapientia Salomonis, Drama comico-tragicum* by the Westminster boys, Cecilia lodged a complaint to her brother several years later that

she being bidden to see a comedy played, there was a black man brought in, and as he was of an evil-favoured countenance, so was he in like manner full of lewd, spiteful, and scornful words which she said represented the Marquis, her husband.³⁶

The play’s subject matter was about King Solomon, the king of Israel, and his relationship with the queen of Sheba, who had traveled to visit Solomon to seek out his wisdom. Interestingly, there was a

contemporary biblical representation of Cecilia as the queen of Sheba coming to seek out the wisdom of Queen Elizabeth. This representation had longevity, as it appears in James Bell's *Queen Elizabeth and a Swedish Princess*, published after Cecilia's departure. Seaton argues that the allusion of the subject matter of the play could have also annoyed Cecilia.³⁷ Also, Seaton advances the idea that Cecilia could have confused the presentation of *Sapientia Salomonis* with another presentation at the court in February, which clearly portrayed the Marquis in a negative manner.³⁸

To add to her problems, Cecilia faced financial difficulties, too. Impatient creditors demanded immediate payment of loans that were taken out to finance her lifestyle, but her unchecked spending habits continued beyond her allotted salaries, a characteristic pattern of the Vasa household. Elizabeth, and many other nobles, undoubtedly would have remembered the expenses incurred by Nils Gyllenstierna, Erik's chancellor, during his extended visit in 1561–1562 during his marriage negotiations with the queen. Also, this matter was still unresolved. Among Gyllenstierna's lenders was John Dymoch, who also financed Cecilia. Dymoch was also trying to recover a loan of 10,000 pounds lent to Gyllenstierna, and his strategy was to seize Cecilia's personal property to better position himself in getting back the earlier loan.³⁹ On April 12, 1566, he took a large portion of her jewelry, silverware, and clothing as collateral for a 2,500-pound loan he had given to her.⁴⁰ Cecilia later complained about this by relating that "all her plate and apparel to the value of 100,000 daller seized, out of which John Dymoch gave the Queen a jewel worth 16,000 daller to the intent that he might have better sentence pronounced."⁴¹ In another case, Cornelius de Alneto, a self-proclaimed "scientist," who had become wealthy because of his alleged ability to cure illness, had pledged Cecilia 10,000 pounds in January 1566 to be paid back in one year in 1,000-pound installments, with an added fee of course.⁴² Additionally, Cecilia's former servant, George North, had, in the presence of the London alderman Lionel Duckett, granted her a 10,000-pound loan.⁴³ By March 1566, Elizabeth was beginning to hear the complaints of these and other lenders who had granted loans to Cecilia, and to help her visitor repay them, the queen, in addition to the 2,000-pound pension afforded to Christopher, granted Cecilia 3,500 pounds to pay off her debts. Cecilia made a list of the lenders and the amounts, but her expenditure still superseded her payment. As a result, she suffered a high degree of embarrassment. She complained later to her brother

John that “at her walking with in the court of England divers English men cried out ‘pay us our money,’ and as she went to her lodgings [they] plucked off her slippers and made in the street a fire of old shoes and slippers and cried out: ‘this is a banquet for this sovereign lady.’”⁴⁴

From the sources from her list of goods after her departure, one can see the extravagant and unrestrained spending habits that came to define Cecilia’s stay in England. She had fourteen large chests containing all types of jewelry, necklaces, rings, precious gems (including diamonds and rubies), clothes, books, and pictures.⁴⁵ Presumably, many of these items had been brought to England by Cecilia the previous year; some had been undoubtedly been given as gifts, but many also were purchased by Cecilia in England during her stay.

In a letter dated March 19, 1566, written to Elizabeth, Cecilia implores the queen to assist her in facing her creditors. Specifically, Cecilia cited the case of Ehippiarus, one of her many lenders, who, instead of helping her restructure her debt payments, had her secretary imprisoned. Further, Ehippiarus had been spreading a rumor that Cecilia and her entourage were planning a quiet and quick departure in order to escape the payment of the incurred debt. Cecilia states that “he has not only roused against us others to whom we have pledged our faith for the payment of our debts, but also has sullied our good name, which we have always kept spotless.”⁴⁶ She wanted Ehippiarus punished in some form and her secretary released from arrest; to do this, she appealed to the queen’s protection:

and whereas your Majesty did most graciously promise to the Most illustrious Prince Lord Christopher, Marquis of Baden, my Well-beloved husband, at his departure, to protect me until his Return, we trust the man...will not go unpunished, lest our own Condition appear to be the same as that of a common person.⁴⁷

Cecilia also appealed to the queen’s friendship and love by stating, “may it please your Majesty graciously to call to mind our love towards you, and that we came into this kingdom for no other reason than to declare the same.”⁴⁸

On April 4, several of her creditors made an appeal to the queen’s Privy Council. There were seven: a butcher, Richard Bramley; a poulterer, Robert Audrey; a grocer, George Saltus; a baker, Davy George; a fishmonger, John Palmer; a brewer, Nicholas Gomporte; and a butterman, Richard Sherman. These “poor orators” said that Cecilia owed

them “sundry sums of money...which long before this time should have been by the Princess paid unto them.”⁴⁹ They further degraded the princess’s name in the matter by stating that they had confronted her about her debts, “yet hath she this day answered by her officers that she will either pay them or leave a pawn, but they dare not trust her thereunto, she hath so often broken promise.” Also, they thought that she was threatening to leave England to escape her due payments, so they asked the council to lend her money to pay off her debts “seeing that her Majesty so princely did entertain her.”⁵⁰ To these tradesmen, their payment meant survival, or at least that is what they represented to the council: “Otherwise, both they, their poor wives, children, and families be utterly undone, and all others discouraged for ever occupying as they have done to them the like favour unto any stranger...are like to have their bodies rot in prison.”⁵¹ Thus, Cecilia’s financial problems and her inability to pay off her debts was transforming into a political issue, much to Cecilia’s chagrin.

On the same day as the creditors’ petition to the Privy Council, Cecilia wrote to Sir William Cecil in a rebuttal. Her letter lists four main complaints. First, she denies the claim made by the creditors that she refused payment and was planning to leave the country. Second, she references the petition where the creditors state that “she hath so often broken her promise” and appeals to her royal status by remarking that “those who have dared to write such things against so great a Princess, deserve rather a punishment than a reply.” Third, she claimed that the creditors had spread rumors that she was planning to depart without paying them—charges she had already vehemently denied and claimed would only hurt her image. Also, Bromley, the butcher, apparently had come into Cecilia’s chambers “with shouts and unmannerly oaths” and had caused such commotion that “her Highness had openly to complain of his insolence.” Her last complaint involved the arrest of her secretary by Ephippiarius, “the report thereof has spread to foreign nations.” Cecilia urged Cecil to act in punishing her creditors and promised him that “her Highness will proclaim to everybody your severity against the delinquents, and will in her turn vouchsafe to hold in grateful remembrance the trouble you have taken on her behalf.”⁵² Cecilia’s complaints hinged on the idea that her name had been damaged by common tradesmen who had no right, because of their status, to criticize her, or even to extract payment from her. As a result, English attitudes, especially among the nobility, began to turn against the princess; they perceived her as an arrogant, spoiled princess.

Cecilia's dispute with the creditors appears on the surface to be a conflict based on bourgeois disaffection toward royalty, and although there may some aspect of that type of class conflict present, on a deeper level, there was an undeniable undercurrent of perceived "foreignness" that factored into the creditors' attitudes. The accusers emphasize the fact that being a foreign princess, she could leave the country at will to escape her debts. This was their great fear, which they emphasize in their complaint. If she left without paying her debts, they would have no legal recourse except through Queen Elizabeth's diplomatic apparatus, which would in all likelihood, do nothing to solve their predicament.

In most situations, it was common for the nobility in England to incur debt without immediate payment and not suffer extreme consequences. A number of nobles during the Tudor era kept meticulous details of their households—one of the more interesting being the household accounts of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester—and spending on credit was common practice. Dudley, who, like Cecilia, had close proximity to Elizabeth, often took large loans, such as a 400-pound loan from the London merchant William Bird in 1556 and another 340-pound loan from William and Robert Bowyer in 1557. These loans may have been taken out to pay off other larger debts.⁵³ There was an attempt to maintain a noble image for many families, which was done, in most cases, through spending extravagantly on luxury items, estates, and food, for example. The Earl of Shrewsbury, by 1580, was in such debt that he could scarcely only pay his interest payment.⁵⁴ Creditors of the English nobility rarely made legal issues of their inability to pay, and only the worst cases were noted in the legal record.

For foreigners, and specifically diplomats and high-ranking government officials, credit was usually not as large of an issue because most had the financial backing of their represented sovereign. Cecilia, however, was not officially representing her brother Erik, and thus her debt ran high. Most of the foreign diplomats in London did not experience the same kind of financial trouble as Cecilia.

Unfortunately for Cecilia, her popularity in England had sunk to such a low level that it was not advantageous for her to remain in the country. She started planning her return trip. To compound her problems, however, Christopher, who had earlier crossed the Channel to Antwerp, returned to England incognito and was arrested and imprisoned in Rochester. Some merchants, apparently, had recognized him, and he was charged for a 5,000-pound loan he had not repaid.⁵⁵ He

was later released through Elizabeth's influence, however, but the damage to his reputation was irrecoverable. He then returned to the continent, this time to Calais, to wait for his wife there. His arrest only affirmed the decision for Cecilia to permanently leave England. According to de Silva, she still owed at this point about 15,000 pounds, and before leaving, she gave them pledges that they would be paid.⁵⁶

On April 27, 1566, Cecilia did leave England. De Silva states that she was "glad enough to get out of this country."⁵⁷ On April 29 she wrote to Elizabeth, thanking her for her hospitality, her issuance of safe conduct, and "for the magnificent body of men appointed by your Majesty, whose presence most brilliantly adorned our company and who performed their duties so well that we had nothing left to wish for,"⁵⁸ a reference possibly to the company that the queen had enlisted to protect Cecilia on her way to the port.

Here the question arises: did Cecilia's experience in England enhance or detract from her friendship with Elizabeth? Most of the available evidence falls into the detraction camp. De Silva reported that "she is grateful, but not very well satisfied with the Queen, who, although she received her well and even helped her with money, did not do so either graciously or promptly."⁵⁹ That Cecilia never returned to England to visit the queen also speaks to her poor experience there. Moreover, her creditors continued to hound her for payment, much to her annoyance and one later episode with John Dymoch became a highly politicized matter. Cecilia long remembered the negative aspects of her trip to England, and in a letter penned by her four years later to King John of Sweden, who had deposed Erik in 1568, expressed her complaints about the country.⁶⁰

Cecilia's unpopularity at her departure, however, is not much disputed. It has often been remarked that Cecilia had overstayed her welcome, but if she had tamed her spending habits, come to England with a suitable amount of capital, and been more careful about people's perceptions about her personality, she very well could have remained in England happily for a longer period. As it happened, though, she fell into disrepute. Seaton advances the idea that the publication of James Bell's memorialization of her in *Queen Elizabeth and a Swedish Princess* had to be postponed because of her unpopularity at her leaving.⁶¹ Also, in contrast to the excitement of her coming into England, there seemed to be an equal excitement about her departure in the letters of many.

All in all, Cecilia's trip to England, which had started so auspiciously, ended in failure. Her initial reception was joyous, with much festivity

and fanfare, and she learned the English language; but later, Cecilia was offended by a presentation of a play she interpreted as a satire of herself and her husband. To further her problems, aggressive creditors began to demand payment, a condition which would eventually precipitate her departure. Once the novelty of her arrival had dissipated, as Cecilia slid ever further in debt, Elizabeth distanced herself from her "friend," and probably breathed a sigh of relief at her departure. Nevertheless, as one of the precious few European royal figures, man or woman, who had the opportunity to get to know Elizabeth personally, Cecilia undoubtedly brought back to Europe what must have been a sensational account of Elizabeth's majesty as well as her perfidy.

Notes

1. Erik had been interested in courting Elizabeth even before she was crowned queen. An embassy was sent in 1557 to propose a possible marriage alliance between Elizabeth and Erik, but this embassy failed in its mission. Later, in 1560, Gustav and Erik decided to send another mission to England, which would include his brother, John, Duke of Finland. This also failed, and there was no hint that Elizabeth had an inclination to accept his proposal. A later, more formal, diplomatic mission was intitated under Nils Gyllenstierna, the Chancellor of Sweden, who resided in England for several months. He, too, was unsuccessful, and by 1563, Erik had given up on wooing Elizabeth.
2. Ingvar Andersson, *Erik XIV:s Engelska Underhandlingar* (Stockholm: H. Ohlssons Boktryckeri 1947), 88.
3. Ethel Seaton, "Introduction" in *Queen Elizabeth and a Swedish Princess* (London: Frederick Etchells & Hugh Macdonald, 1926), 27.
4. "The Princess Cecilia of Sweden to the Queen," November 9, 1562, *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth*, Vol. 5, 445.
5. Most of this work was edited material taken from Thomas Sebastian's *Cosmographia*.
6. "The Lady Cecilia of Sweden to the Queen," January 18, 1563, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 6, 50.
7. Fridholm Ödberg, *Om Princessan Cecilia Wasa* (Stockholm: C. E. Fritzes Kungliga Hofbokhandel, 1896), 57.
8. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 3-4.
9. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 13.
10. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 14.
11. "The Lady Cecilia of Sweden to the Queen," January 18, 1563, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 6, 50.

12. "The Lady Cecilia of Sweden to the Queen," January 18, 1563, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 6, 50.
13. "The Queen to Princess Cecilia of Sweden," March 16, 1563, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 6, 206–207.
14. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 14.
15. "The Lady Cecilia to the Queen," May 23, 1563, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 6, 363.
16. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 59.
17. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 58–59.
18. James Bell, *Queen Elizabeth and a Swedish Princess: Being an Account of the Visit of Princess Cecilia to England in 1565* (New York: F. Etchells and Macdonald, 1926), 48.
19. This is largely the reason that Cecilia requested the queen to add a few lines to encourage her brother to let her come, which was included in her letter of May 23, 1563 to the queen.
20. Bell, *Swedish Princess*, 48–64.
21. Ethel Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 15; "Guzman de Silva to King Philip of Spain," September 17, 1565, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 12 (1898), 209.
22. "Guzman de Silva to King Philip of Spain," September 17, 1565, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12 (1898), 209.
23. "Guzman de Silva to King Philip," *TRHS*, Vol. 98, 209.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 18; The report states that two gentlemen had to walk side-by-side with Brigit Hansdotter Bååt, who was carrying the child in her arms, to safeguard the child because of the weight of the jewelry, gems, and attire on the child.
26. Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 19.
27. *Ibid.*
28. "Guzman De Silva to King Philip of Spain," October 22, 1565, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 210.
29. Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 17–18.
30. Bell, *Swedish Princess*, 43.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. "Guzman De Silva to King Philip of Spain," October 22, 1565, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 211.
34. Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 20.
35. *Ibid.*
36. "The Lady Cecilia of Baden," November 30, 1571, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 9, 567.

37. Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 21.
38. Ibid; The Earl of Arundel warned Dr. Olof to advise Cecilia not to attend the play, "which would indeed be to add sorrow to sorrow and to chafe and aggravate a wound."
39. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 68.
40. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 70.
41. "The Lady Cecilia of Baden," November 30, 1571, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 9, 567.
42. Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 22–23.
43. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 68.
44. "The Lady Cecilia of Baden," November 30, 1571, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 9, 567.
45. Ödberg, *Om Princessan*, 73–76.
46. "Cecilia to Elizabeth," March 19, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 214.
47. "Cecilia to Elizabeth," March 19, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 215; Christopher of Baden had earlier traveled—many English claimed that he left England to avoid his creditors.
48. "Cecilia to Elizabeth," March 19, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 215.
49. "To the Right Honourable the Lords and others of the Queen's Man. Privy Council," April 4, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 215.
50. "To the Right Honourable the Lords and others of the Queen's Man. Privy Council," April 4, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 216.
51. "To the Right Honourable the Lords and others of the Queen's Man. Privy Council," April 4, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 216.
52. "Princess Cecilia to Sir William Cecil," April 4, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 216–218.
53. Simon Adams, "The Dudley Clientele," in *The Tudor Nobility*, ed. by G.W. Bernard (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 210–211.
54. Stephen Kershaw, "Power and Duty in the Elizabethan Aristocracy: George, Earl of Shrewbury, the Glossopdale Dispute, and the Council," in *The Tudor Nobility*, ed. G.W. Bernard (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 268.
55. "John Dudley to his Master, the Earl of Leicester," March 31, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 218–219.
56. "Guzman de Silva to the King Philip of Spain," April 29, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 222–223.

57. "Guzman de Silva to the King Philip of Spain," April 29, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 222–223.
58. "Cecilia to Elizabeth," April 29, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 222–223.
59. "Guzman de Silva to the King Philip of Spain," April 29, 1566, contained in "Narrative of a Swedish Journey to England," *TRHS*, Vol. 12, 222–223.
60. "The Lady Cecilia of Baden," November 30, 1571, *CSPF Elizabeth*, Vol. 9, 567.
61. Seaton, *Swedish Princess*, 6.

CHAPTER 3

THE “SONG ON QUEEN ELIZABETH”: COINS, CLOCKS, AND THE STUFF OF POLITICAL SATIRE IN DUBLIN, 1560^I

B. R. Siegfried

*How great deception is in false coynage;
The plate may be bryght in his shewing,
The metall false and shew a fayre visage,
All is not golde, to speake in playne language*

Giovanni Boccaccio, trans. John Lidgate (c.1554)

*No, they cannot touch me for coining;
I am the king himself.*

William Shakespeare, King Lear (c.1605)

In 1560, shortly after she ascended the English throne, Elizabeth Tudor celebrated her additional claim to the Kingdom of Ireland by issuing a new Irish coinage stamped with her image and erecting three public clocks in the city of Dublin. One clock went up on the newly repaired Dublin Castle, another was added to St. Patrick's Cathedral, and the third was for "the city." The third of the memorials was probably erected at either a central commercial center or at a prominent gate to the two main thoroughfares. The cathedral clock was especially noteworthy, "Which Being a Novelty," wrote Robert Ware in *The Annals of the Affairs of Ireland*, "was very pleasing to the common people."² Later that same year, we are told, "an

Old Poet of those days made the following Ballad, or Song, which, tho' bald enough, was in great esteem then, both in England and Ireland."³

Triumphant Joys may *Ireland* sing,
 Of *Henry* the Eighth our gallant King;
 For He has left us an Off-spring,
 To be the Good Queen of *Ireland*.
 Let Bonfires shine in every place,
 Sing, and Ring the Bells apace;
 And pray that long may live Her Grace,
 To be the Good Queen of *Ireland*.
 The *Gold* and *Silver*, which was so base,
 That no man could endure it scarce,
 Is now New Coyn'd with Her own Face,
 And made go current in *Ireland*.
 She is the Nurse, that still doth rock
 The Cradle of her loving Flock;
 She held the *Diall* and the *Clock*
 Throughout the whole Realme of *Ireland*.⁴

Ware's gloss on the song is instructive: "This Song was made for England, but the People of Dublin changed, and fitted it to Ireland."⁵ Every subsequent major treatise on Elizabethan Irish coinage has reproduced this song, typically asserting it as evidence of the glad reception of both the new coin and the young queen by the city of Dublin.⁶ However, Elizabeth's relationship with Ireland was complicated from the very start. Even within the bounds of the English Pale, her claim to the Kingdom of Ireland could be—and frequently was—challenged, subverted, appropriated, and satirized.

The beginning of Elizabeth's reign was framed by her commitment to the Protestant Reformation and her equally firm desire to avoid provoking the predominantly Catholic powers of France and Spain. Indeed, the majority of her own English subjects were still Catholic upon her accession in 1558.⁷ The case was even more complicated in Ireland where she not only had to deal with the people's suspicion that Protestantism was a foreign Germanic import, but where she was herself alien to the land she claimed to rule. In England, she had the benefit of the public relations boost provided by John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, a work that became immediately popular in its various versions (1563–1583). It argued that due to Spain's influence on Mary Tudor, the old faith of English tradition had been replaced by an imposter religion. The many Protestant martyrs—depicted

both narratively and in remarkable woodcuts—could be construed en masse as a homegrown correction to an international problem.

Foxe's book (and others like it) simply did not have the same widespread persuasive effect in Ireland. Indeed, there was no sense of a unifying English tradition that Elizabeth could have drawn on in the same way she could with her local subjects. Ireland, after all, was a foreign kingdom. Catholic "Old English" lords acknowledged political fealty to England but granted religious authority to the pope. Gaelic princes acknowledged or refuted English sovereignty depending on what was strategically useful and tended to see themselves as part of the old unified Christendom. The recent influx of "New English" settlers and administrators was fiercely Protestant and, in the early 1560s, bent on making permanent the reliance on martial law for dealing with both the Gaelic princes and the Old English Lords. All three groups took advantage of a significant level of inconsistency in the apportionment of jurisdiction between the London and Dublin seats of colonial government.⁸ Attitudes toward English authority were complicated and ever shifting.

In this regard, the preoccupation with coinage was also an argument for authority.⁹ As Kevin Sharpe explains, "if the royal portrait was what guaranteed the coin's value or worth, decline in the market value of a coin might well also debase the royal brand and image, the signs of royal authority."¹⁰ Political theorists of Elizabeth's day certainly thought so. In *The Governor* (1531), Thomas Elyot had explicitly linked the nobility of a ruler to the coin called a noble, suggesting that the signifying power of royal authority depends upon the intrinsic value of the money-piece: "We have in this realm coins which be called nobles; as long as they be seen to be gold, they be so called. But if they be counterfeited, and made in brass, copper or other vile metal, who for print only calleth them nobles? Whereby it appeareth that the estimation is in the metal and not in the print or figure."¹¹ Several decades later, Thomas Smith made a similar assertion, demonstrating the durability of the correspondence between royal sovereignty and sovereign coins. In *De republica anglorum*, Smith asserts that the "goodness of the metal and weight" of a kingdom's coins "affirmed" the "prince's image and mask" stamped on those coins.¹² The royal image authorized the metal's function as currency. In turn, a strong currency made for strong kingship: the sovereignty of reformed sovereigns would, in other words, bolster the positive perception of Elizabeth's royal authority in Ireland and abroad.

Positive perception was crucial, and Elizabeth was canny and careful in structuring her own public representations to this end. The

“Song on Queen Elizabeth” is a useful reminder that for the majority of those living in Ireland, the most public and frequently encountered representations of Elizabeth took the form of practical items such as the coins and clocks the ditty mentions. Indeed, the medium of money and the instrument of time were the parentheses of civic intercourse:



Figure 3.1 Example of Elizabeth's fine shilling, Irish issue, 1561. From the collection of John Stafford-Langan, reproduced here with his kind permission.



Figure 3.2 Tudor clock at York Minster Cathedral showing clock face, royal arms, and mechanical soldiers or jacks. From the collection of the author.

coins circulated among the people even as the traffic of commerce, religious devotion, and legal transactions were guided by clocks.¹³ Like coins, clocks also bore symbolic reminders of the queen (usually bearing her name, coat of arms, or other identifying devices) and were often centrally located at churches, universities, and city gates. Interestingly, clocks and coins smoothed the temporal relations of public intercourse strictly insofar as their symbolic sovereignty gave way to common-place use. That is, these representations of Elizabeth mattered, but they did so precisely insofar as they could be taken for granted.¹⁴ In short, for the majority of her loyal public in the English Pale, the face of the “Good Queen of Ireland” was affiliated with fairly prosaic items. Paradoxically, the symbolic structure of her sovereignty entered material culture at the less-than-exalted level of everyday use.¹⁵

The following discussion examines this paradox in three segments. The first considers Elizabeth’s official proclamation in relation to her concern for her international reputation; it also places the proclamation in the context of Ireland’s potential for strategically leveraging some safety for England into the context of international strife. The second segment takes a glance back at the decades preceding 1560 and elaborates on Ireland’s history in relation to both the coinage and English sovereignty: Elizabeth inherited not only a bankrupt government, but a family name known internationally for the debasement of currency. The last segment gathers up these historical strands in a close reading of the “Song,” giving special attention to symbols and metaphors that, at the very least, suggest a willingness to hazy the new monarch. As the context of the early 1560s makes clear, there was nothing to suggest an uncritical acceptance of Elizabeth’s attempt at image-making in Ireland: in the public sphere of Dublin, citizens humorously interpreted and critiqued the royal message sent with the queen’s proclamations, clocks, and coins.¹⁶

The Queen’s Proclamation

As the *Summarie of certaine reasons which have moved the Quenes Maiestie to procede in reformatiōs of her base and course monies* firmly states, the “honour and reputacion of... this Realme” has “much decayed and dayly growen into infamie and reproche.”¹⁷ While florins, francs, and doubloons held well in international exchange, the English coinage had been so debased under Henry VIII (and later, Edward VI) that perspicacious traders were loath to accept English money in payment for goods. Not surprisingly, the practical matter of bringing the

currency back into scale with other international coinage is couched in the language of moral rectitude.¹⁸

Indeed, the proclamation insists on rectification as a point of honor for the new monarch and suggests that England's reputation on the world stage is twined with justice at home. Relations with "Almayn, Fraunce, Spaine, Flaunders, Scotland, and the rest of Christendom" are explicitly linked to economic justice at home: the term "just value" is repeatedly invoked and set in contrast to "excessive prices." Though merchants are encouraged to embrace the monetary reformation because "forreine commodities thereby also be bought for easier pryses," the thrust of the ethical argument is that the most vulnerable in society bear the brunt of the suffering when money is debased. The poor, argues the new queen, stand to gain the most when currency is refined. "So as the matter well considered," continues the *Summarie*, "the greatest numbre, and specially the poorest shall have mosst commoditie hereby."¹⁹ In other words, the Crown's reputation has "much decayed and dayly growen into infamie and reproche" around the world because the lack of social justice is clearly mirrored in the fault of just value.

It is worth noting that the rectification of the Crown's reputation relied heavily on the help and expertise of the very nations it was hoping to impress. As with the religious Reformation, French and German specialists played a key role in England's monetary reformation. C. E. Challis points out that it was "the Germans who were the assayers *par excellence* in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries . . . Their most obvious and spectacular achievement, of course, was an integral part of the recoinage of 1560–1."²⁰ Moreover, while on the one hand, the English government brought in specialists from abroad to aid in the transformation, on the other hand it almost immediately had to engage in extreme vigilance to prevent the improved coinage from leaving England or Ireland in large quantities, as subsequent proclamations detailed these concerns. England's reformation was an international concern, and success came with its own dangers.

Finally, the proclamation concludes by gathering wealthy merchants and poor laborers into a special republic of "good will" and liberty. The document asserts that to recognize the true worth of coins is to gain freedom from "oppressyon." Since ultimately, the source of political and social tyranny is debased money,

her Majestie trusteth her mooste honorable good meaning shall be imbrased of all her good loving Subjectes, and every person with good

will, will yelde to bear a smal burden for a time, to avoide a perpetuall and endlesse oppressyon, not onley of them selves and their posteritie, but also of the whole common weal.

Individuals and families are oppressed by the debased monies, and the entire “common weal” of England suffers similarly within the broader community of international relations.²¹ Elizabeth and her “loving Subjectes” are to share the burden required to throw off such bondage.²² In short, the desire for enhanced stature in the world, the need for increased economic stability at home, and a sense that the freedoms claimed by the Protestant reformation had to be bolstered by freedom from the “endlesse oppressyon” of faulty money, all fueled the new administration’s willingness to take on the difficult task of reforming the coinage early in Elizabeth’s reign.²³

For the inhabitants of the Pale, it was clear that the new queen really was reasserting English sovereignty by making her image instrumental to the rhythms of daily life in Dublin. While the new coinage was a continuance of her father’s claim to the kingdom of Ireland, the ceremonial placement of the clocks was a pointed indication that the conquest of Ireland—which had slowed during Henry’s reign and come to a veritable standstill during the reigns of his first two heirs—would pick up the pace under Elizabeth’s supervision. The attention to the Irish money was not, moreover, merely another desultory gesture of sovereignty over the neighboring isle. In the first several years of Elizabeth’s reign, attention to Ireland was part of a larger policy of foreign relations, which included shoring up the security of England’s back door. As Sir James Ware so aptly summarized the situation several years later,

Queen Elizabeth had now a hard Task upon Her Hands; what with Francis the French King, and Mary Queen of the Scots; what with Philip King of Spain, and the Pope and his Excommunications, besides her Enemies and Rebels in England and Ireland. Her difficulties were so various and great, that ‘tis to be wondered at, how she waded thro’ the Depth of them.²⁴

The league between Scotland and France marked possible danger to the north and east. Toward the south, Spain’s looming presence signaled similar peril. At England’s western flank, Ireland had the potential to be either a rearguard fortification or an unarmored frame of exposed vulnerability.

However, an aggressive policy for continued legal, religious, and administrative reform in Ireland was made difficult by the fact that Elizabeth had inherited a bankrupt government.²⁵ Without extensive (and expensive) military campaigning, the best strategy for winning allegiance from the various Irish populations was to strengthen the economic power of the Protestant government of the Pale.²⁶ Elizabeth's authority would be more easily acknowledged, it was thought, once the broader barter-based economy of Ireland was more fully integrated into a monetary system based on refined coinage. Although a variety of complications eventually would undermine this strategy, at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, it was one of the best means at hand for attempting a unification that historically had eluded the Tudors.

As a public relations strategy in Ireland, reforming the money might have worked: the case of Shane O'Neill illustrates how good monarchy and good money were intimately linked in the minds of Irish leaders. However, the same case demonstrates a candid (and witty) Irish critique of Elizabeth's attempt at *unequal* reformation in Ireland. As Paul E. J. Hammer explains, the English Crown had refused to recognize Shane as Earl of Tyrone because "he was not the heir of the previous earl according to English law."²⁷ He was, however, recognized as "the O'Neill" by his clan. His letter to Elizabeth in 1561, in which he makes his case for the title before setting out for London, is laced with sarcasm regarding Elizabeth's own status in relation to her Irish coinage. With a rhetorical archness clearly meant to sting, he explains,

Please your Majesty, your Majesty's money here is not so good as your money in England, and will not pass current here. Please your Majesty to send me three thousand pounds of English money to pay my expenses in going over to you, and when I come back I will pay your deputy three thousand pounds Irish, such as you are pleased to have current here.²⁸

Though framed in humorous terms, the barb is pointed: Elizabeth had begun to refine the money in both kingdoms, but maintained Irish money at a lower value of fine-to-base metals than the reformed coin of England. O'Neill's suggested transaction invokes the injustice of the situation by making Elizabeth the dupe of her own system. Just rule requires just terms, and sovereign entitlement, as O'Neill makes clear, is paid out in more than mere words.²⁹

The Coinage of Elizabeth's Irish Inheritance

Whether O'Neill's epistolary wit drew a wry smile or an annoyed frown from Elizabeth we cannot know. There is no question that it underscored the precariousness of claiming Ireland as a kingdom while treating it as a colony. Indeed, for the English in Dublin during the 1560s, the question of how to define kingship in a land full of provincial princes and petty kings was of immediate concern. The previous generation had witnessed in Henry VIII a fading desire to prolong military initiative or invest in creative economic pressure against the Gaelic princes. In fact, the issue of authority was one that Elizabeth's father eventually chose to handle primarily by way of *linguistic* conquest. First, he attempted to woo Gaelic leaders to take English titles; second, he methodically eradicated signs of Gaelic kingship in both bureaucratic and pointedly public depictions of Ireland. The latter strategy is of special interest here and is evident in correspondence on Ireland written shortly after Henry's break with Rome. To understand Elizabeth's emphasis on coins and clocks—and to glimpse the immediate historical context to which the "Song on Queen Elizabeth" alludes—a brief glance back at the policies of her father is in order.

In the 1530s, hoping to cuss out the financial possibilities of Ireland, Henry ordered several assessments of the island to be taken. The report of 1533, entitled *The State of Ireland, and Plan for Its Reformation*, demonstrates a primary concern with the symbolic conquest of Ireland even as it lays out military and economic possibilities for "Reformation." The report describes

more than 60 countries, called territories (regions) in Ireland, inhabited with the King's enemies...where reigneth more than 60 chief captains, where of some calleth themselves Kings, some Kings' peers, in their language, some princes, some dukes, some archdukes...and obeyeth to no other temporal person.

The rhetorical ploy of dismissing as pretentious the Irish titles of "Kings" and "princes," and replacing them with "chiefs" and "captains," is meant to reassure the English government that the Irish, like their language, could be subdued through the imposition of English nomenclature and its attendant customs. Still, the report includes a list of all those holding Gaelic titles, and, in tones indicating some consternation, further points out that there are "more than 30 great captains of the English noblefolk that followeth the

same Irish order."³⁰ In short, the report reveals that, outside the Pale, roughly two-thirds of the people in Ireland were under the rule of native Irish kings, while the final third were under Gaelicized Anglo-Irish rule.

The *Plan* also warned that only in a few walled garrisons on the coast did English legal traditions and practices have real sway: "all the English folk of the said countries be of Irish habit, of Irish language, and of Irish conditions, except the cities and walled towns."³¹ The Pale, a small geographical circumference of the city of Dublin, was the only area that really could be said to function—in any meaningful way—under English jurisdiction. Indeed, while the Gaelic Irish were happy to trade for English-produced goods, they rarely adopted English customs and outright rejected Henrician legal codes. Yet, *most* of the English in Ireland, as this document makes clear, "followeth the... Irish order." This administration's concern with the assimilative success of Irish habit, language, and conditions would be echoed repeatedly in subsequent English documents over the next seventy years. Moreover, the general population's preference for Gaelic practices had economic consequences. As the report goes on to explain, in addition to following Irish structures and traditions of governance, tribute was being paid to native Irish princes rather than to the officials of the English Crown. As Peter Berresford Ellis points out, "[E]ven most of the municipal governments of these cities and walled towns paid tribute to the Gaelic Kings. The inhabitants of Cork city, for example, paid the McCarthy Mór £40 per annum"—a far more substantial sum than the English king would successfully collect.³²

If Elizabeth's claim to the Kingdom of Ireland was complicated by the continuing popularity of the "Irish order"—which was not successfully dismantled during her father's reign, nor during those of her siblings—her claim was made even more tenuous by the precedent of powerful partisans abroad who had, in the face of Henry's claims, formally recognized the provincial fiefdoms of Ireland's various kings. This was not an empty gesture toward Catholic minorities in a colonial state otherwise recognized as being under newly Protestant sovereignty. Rather, distinguished Catholic members of the international community, who considered Henry to have abdicated his role as administrator of what had been deemed for centuries a papal fiefdom, continued to refer to prominent Irish leaders as kings. An exemplary instance is found in Pope Paul's letter of 1538 to the king of Ulster, Conn Bacach O'Neill, addressing the Irish leader

as “Our Most Dear Son in Christ, Conn O’Neale, the Greater, Our Noble King of Our Realme of Ireland.”³³ The pope formally released O’Neill from fealty to England, encouraging him to take on the mantel of high king of all Ireland. Thus, fortified with the formal support of the Church, in 1539, O’Neill made plans to march to Tara and there proclaim his name, the Gaelic manner of coronation.

Although English forces managed to intercept and defeat O’Neill, they were compelled to do so because O’Neill was about to be recognized as high king. Indeed, precisely because the Gaelic tradition of kingship had trumped Henry’s claim to sovereignty in all practical matters, John Allen wrote to the English commissioners in Ireland with new instructions. Similar to the concerns developed in the *Plan*, Allen’s letters further illustrate the Tudor government’s focus on rhetorical tactics. In concert with the continuing practice of replacing formal Gaelic titles of king and lord with “Chief” and “Captain,” Allen explains that it would be better for Henry to be recognized as “King” rather than “Lord” of Ireland (*Rex Hiberniae* vs. *Dominus Hiberniae*). This, Allen further explains, would induce the Irish “as well by their oaths and writings, to recognize the same which things shall be, in continuance, a great motive to bring them to due obedience.” In short, Allen suggests that Henry start the conquest anew by taking a title that will at least appear to be a “continuance” of Irish traditions and practices.³⁴ In 1541, Henry formally exchanged the title “Lord of Ireland” for “King of Ireland.”³⁵ Partly in preparation for this shift, Henry introduced a new Irish groat in Dublin. This inferior money—which was illegal to import to England due to its baseness—featured his own coat of arms and new title (*Rex Hirbniae*) on one side and the Gaelic symbol of kingship, the harp, on the other. If this was an explicit nod to the tradition in which bards and brehans were instrumental in establishing local sovereignty, it was also a gesture of audacious cupidity.³⁶

Given that English monarchs had styled themselves “Lord of Ireland” for over 370 years, the titular change had to be justified by antiquarians who, Jasper Ridley explains, “now produced documents which proved that the Kings of Britain *since before the coming of the Romans* had been entitled to be called Kings of Ireland [emphasis mine].”³⁷ The claim, in short, had to overleap the history of Catholicism in England *and* Ireland and also had to push beyond the bounds of Roman history (since Ireland had never been conquered) to an opaque past from which an ancient English kingship could be drawn. Once the new history was established, the parliament of the

Pale could formally declare that "the king's highness, his heirs and successors, kings of England, should be always kings of the lands of Ireland, and have that name, style, title, and honour."³⁸

Henry's attempt to sidestep the historical claims of the church on Ireland was from the start a rhetorical failure since he had proclaimed his kingship with a debased coin. Arguing with more convincing moral authority, Catholic writers simply underscored his blunder by linking the economic status of England's Irish money to the moral status of England's Irish sovereignty. The culmination of over thirty years of such arguments may be seen in the writings of the Papal Nuncio, Nicolas Sander, who was sent from Spain to Ireland to encourage the Desmond uprising against Elizabeth. As Sander would later explain in his account of the historical situation, Henry's "schism" from the church was directly related to his intentional debasement of the coinage. In both cases, the English monarch had sundered meaningful ethical relation and had shown himself incapable of moral leadership and, via divine justice, became the instrument of his own punishment:

The silver coin hitherto most pure in England, was for the first time turned into brass by the king—a manifest judgment of God for the rapine and the sacrilege committed by him. The wealth taken from the monasteries was so great that even the tenth part thereof might have satisfied the greed of the most covetous king.... He ought therefore to have surpassed every prince in Christendom in his wealth of silver and of gold; but it was not so, for by the just judgment of God it was far otherwise with him, for within a few years after the plunder of the monasteries he was a far poorer man than either he himself or his ancestors had ever been before.³⁹

In Sanders' account, Henry's dissolution of the monasteries did not permanently alleviate the need for taxation, as the king had claimed it would. Rather, it fed his ambition for international conquest, the result of which was debt. Debt, in turn, gave birth to a strategy for raising further treasure by debasing the coinage in both England and Ireland. "For by this trick," Sanders explains, "[Henry] took from every one who had dealings with him in money, not one penny in ten, nor one penny in five, but one penny in fourpence by way of tax. And then when he saw the fraud prosper, he debased the coinage more and more till he filled up the measure of his days."⁴⁰

Should his audience miss the point, Sanders makes the link between debased coinage and false authority explicit: "Christ Himself

has said, he who is unjust in that which is little, that is, in the ordering of the things of this world, is unjust also in the greater, that is in the spiritual things. And the prophet Isaías cries, ‘Thy silver is turned into dross: thy princes are unfaithful, companions of thieves.’” Moreover, this “fraud of Henry passed on to the sole heirs of the schism, as shall be shown further on.”⁴¹ The “heretical” monarchs of England, Sanders insists, were as profoundly in need of revaluation as their coinage, and the Irish were encouraged to reject English sovereignty on the same grounds they spurned the debased money.

Coins and Clocks in Figurative Terms

At this point it is safe to say that when Elizabeth celebrates her claim to the Kingdom of Ireland with newly minted coins and newly raised clocks, few in that kingdom would have seen the occasion as purely celebratory. The context, previously outlined, gives the song added historical significance, and even a cursory glance affords interesting insights into the local response to Elizabeth’s chosen forms of royal self-presentation.⁴²

In the first and second stanzas, seemingly joyful songs and bells ring in Henry’s new heir and a new era:

Triumphant Joys may *Ireland* sing,
 Of *Henry* the Eighth our gallant King;
 For He has left us an Off-spring,
 To be the Good Queen of *Ireland*.
 Let Bonfires shine in every place,
 Sing, and Ring the Bells apace;
 And pray that long may live Her Grace,
 To be the Good Queen of *Ireland*.

Yet, the awkward and ambiguous description of Elizabeth as “*an* Off-spring” [emphasis mine] takes some of the shine off of the bells and bonfires that follow, for it leaves the question of legitimacy salaciously hovering, even as the verse seems to acknowledge her sovereignty in Ireland. In this regard, there is more than a hint of sarcasm invoked with the pun on “scarce” in the third stanza:

The *Gold* and *Silver*, which was so base,
 That no man could endure it scarce,
 Is now New Coyn’d with Her own Face,
 And made go current in *Ireland*.

The play on "scarce" refers to both forms of Henry's issue: his coins and his heirs. Henry's harp coinage had gone through a series of debasements, finally reaching an all-time low of two ounces of silver for every twelve ounces of metal. The ratio of "fine" to "base" metal established a coin's success or failure as a medium of exchange, and as the song notes, the poor quality of Henry's coinage could scarcely be endured. Insofar as Henry could be held at fault for monetary mayhem, the "Song" nicely undercuts the loyal celebration with a reminder of the earlier English monarch's questionable coin. The monosyllabic hissing of "base" and "scarce" add a serpentine frame to Henry's memory.⁴³

The pun's reference to Elizabeth's legitimacy was more explicit than we might at first discern: the minting of coin and the begetting of heirs was already a hackneyed image by the 1560s, having been used repeatedly in the prose and poetry of the previous century. On one level, the song asserts that Henry was the original die for a "gal-lant King" whose image was stamped upon Elizabeth's metal/mettle, making her the newly coined "Good Queen of Ireland." However, since the new coinage reinforced the structure of inheritance by tripling Henry's appropriation of Gaelic icons (on the Elizabethan coin, one side portrays the queen's crowned profile; the other side depicts three Irish harps under that same Crown), the stanza also reminds Ireland that despite what appears to be a positive representation, the Protestant queen might in fact amplify the previous disastrous policies of her father.

The other implied question, of course, is whether Elizabeth's coins were as base as Henry's previous Irish coins.⁴⁴ That is, the metaphorical extension of inheritance and sovereignty through coinage reverberates with broader implications, for "The *Gold* and *Silver*, which was so base, / That no man could endure it scarce" is both coin and heir. Indeed, the analogy between the quality of coin and quality of birth would haunt accounts of Elizabeth well into the next century. Sir Robert Naughton, for instance, asserted that "she [Elizabeth] was... of stately and majestic comportment, participating more in this of her father than mother, who was of an inferior alloy."⁴⁵ Elizabeth took care that the new coinage was of "fine" issue (nine ounces of silver to every twelve ounces of metal) primarily to set England and Ireland on a better economic footing, but also as a conscious effort to remove the stigma of questionable "alloy." Still, by this point in the song, the celebratory images of the queen as "an Off-spring," *and* as the face on a medium of exchange implicated in

debased metals, add unmistakable notes of discordance to the swelling strains of praise.

The weaving of genealogical concerns with economic preoccupations cues the reader to follow the double pun toward further political tensions framing the "Song." In the particular context of the growing tension between Old English lords and New English colonists and administrators, the verse invokes the often expressed hope of the English governors and bureaucrats in Dublin that something other than "base" or mixed metal would become the foundation for English rule in the kingdom of Ireland. In fact, the question of heritage looms large for New English writers in Ireland during the first decades of Elizabeth's reign. The alloyed local heritage was made up of several centuries of intermarriage between the Gaelic Irish nobility and English colonial families. As already mentioned, English lords frequently adopted Irish cultural practices so that much of the population referred to as the "Old English" seemed, to those recently arrived from England, more Irish than English, and in some cases, more Irish than the Irish. The consternation already noted in the Henrician "State of Ireland, and Plan for Its Reformation" of 1533 would be echoed angrily by Elizabeth's Lord Chancellor, Gilbert Gerrard, some forty years later. Dividing the resistance to the new Elizabethan administration between two camps, the "Irishe enymies" and "Englishe rebels," Gerrard expresses outrage at the willing assimilation of the latter. He describes the Gaelicized English as "people of our owne nacion" who are nevertheless "refuzinge Englishe nature." They "growe irishe in soche sorte as . . . not [to] be discerned from the Irishe," he writes, for they "marrye and foster with the Irishe, and . . . imbrace rather Irishe braghan lawes" than the "sweete goverment by justice" provided under Elizabeth.⁴⁶ Similarly, in clear and intentional contrast to the willing assimilation of their colonial predecessors, many of the newly arrived Elizabethan bureaucrats in Dublin hoped to mint an English colony free of Irish admixtures.⁴⁷

The cultural linguistic context of the "Song on Queen Elizabeth" amplifies these political concerns. The term "coin" was, for instance, also commonly used to refer to the cornerstone of an edifice. Paradoxically, it was additionally employed to mean a wedge for prying things apart. In this regard, a line from Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* seems particularly *apropos*: "See you yond coign o' th' Capitol," asks Menenius of Sicinus, "yond cornerstone?" Upon Sicinus's affirmation, Menenius explains that if "it be possible for you to displace it with your little finger," there might be hope of prying their enemies from

ultimately deadly intentions (5.4.1–8).⁴⁸ Here, the pun on coin as both *cornerstone* and *political wedge* bears some resemblance to its range of use in the "Song on Queen Elizabeth." Indeed, Shakespeare's iteration of Plutarch's popular narrative, the result of over four decades of English thinkers' preoccupation with the early Roman republic, was especially relevant to Ireland. The Plutarchan model of a struggle between a polity in some part dependent for its authority on the will of the people, and a government driven by traditional aristocratic privilege, was not only of growing interest to Protestant political theorists in England, but to the local rulers of Irish provinces as well.

In the face of New English bureaucratic attempts at reconquest, Old English and Native Irish alike often saw the Tudor redoubling of colonial efforts in Ireland as an arbitrary interference with what had become a more or less successful equilibrium—a tenuous yet fairly steady balance between the highly assimilated Old English (bearing both foreign and Gaelic titles/ authority) and the provincial Gaelic kings' power via the limited elections of the *tainist* tradition. The song seems to touch on a theme that political propagandists such as Stanihurst and Spencer would develop two decades later: Elizabeth might very well be Henry's last wedge, the figure that could pry the Old English from the Gaelic Irish traditions they had embraced. Since others have commented extensively on the wrenching problem of English political theorists who advanced an ideal of a more representational government at home while advocating severely repressive regimes for use abroad, suffice it to say that Elizabeth's face on the new Irish coinage of 1560 represented not only the newly set cornerstone of England's international power (the coin of trade), but the wedge that would pry apart the popular Gaelic tradition from the English settlers who so frequently assimilated into Irish culture.

In short, while the first three stanzas of "The Song on Queen Elizabeth" invoke the appropriate images of royal accession, the discordant notes of colonial friction that make up its context complicate the celebratory measure. No surprise that in the final stanza, the harsh, heavy-footed rimes of "rock," "Flock," and "Clock" tread upon the mellifluous "Realme of Ireland" with jarring dissonance:

She is the Nurse, that still doth rock
 The Cradle of her loving Flock;
 She held the *Diall* and the *Clock*
 Throughout the whole Realme of *Ireland*.

Here, “Nurse” and “Cradle” are set parallel to “Diall” and “Clock.” We know that such pieces were often sung at public gatherings, or as part of an effort to sell copies, or to earn money for the writer. In a sense, the sound of the song is part of the Irish response to the symbolic representations of Elizabeth recently erected in Dublin. The rifle-like cocks of the rimes stand in stark contrast to the maternal image of “the Nurse,” another means of advancing ironical overtones. Thus, although the stanza first imagines Elizabeth as a kindly facilitator of civic peace and tranquility—one whose feminine position as head of state is more closely aligned with a place at the side of a cradle than at the head of a table—the harsh rime scheme suggests something both humorous and sinister.

Indeed, the “Song” does leave us to imagine Elizabeth rocking a cradle which holds the entire Irish “Flock” while grasping both dial and clock. In the manner of an overburdened servant, she must be rocking the overcrowded cradle with her foot since both hands are occupied. While the blithe jumbling of metaphors is jocular, the emphases on “Ireland,” “Gold,” “Silver,” “Diall,” and “Clock” all key the eye and ear to the larger and more serious issues already discussed. Additional figurative associations, common in the period, provided an even broader cultural framework. In fact, though Elizabeth counted on such symbolic associations as part of her representational argument for authority, the song reminds us that such images were never received passively. While Elizabeth’s clocks and coins might be asserted as the prefigurement of regal power, the same images in the “Song on Queen Elizabeth” worked to anchor the piece in satire even as it playfully celebrated the new coinage.

Clocks, for instance, were routinely associated with monarchy in which the “local motion” of the Sovereign’s policies set the entire kingdom in regulated action, “as one wheel in a clock turns all the rest.”⁴⁹ This monarchy-as-timepiece allowed Protestant thinkers to extend the analogy to theological matters. If monarchy was like a well-regulated clock, that clock, in turn, was a pattern for the divine will. For instance, Philip Sidney’s *Of Christian Religion* famously points out that the solar system is a kind of clock whose movements display the “cunning” of God:

Wee see the Heaven how it moveth round with a continuall moving. Also wee see there the Planets one under another, which . . . have

every one his severall course and moving by himselfe...Doo they move of them selves? Nay; for nothing moveth it selfe, and where things move one another, there is no possibilitie of infinite holding on...As for example, from the hammer of a Clocke wee come to a wheele, and from that wheele too another, and finally too the wit of the Clockmaker, who by his cunning hath so ordered them.⁵⁰

To have her crest on a clock in Dublin was to assert Elizabeth’s place in the divine ordering of space and time.⁵¹

A more material aspect of clocks provided yet another layer of symbolic meaning, one of special import to those in Dublin who advocated for broader military efforts outside the Pale. Public clocks in the sixteenth century were still primarily *auditory* timekeepers (making it possible to know the time without having to see the face or “Diall” at all). Clock “jacks”, which were typically in the form of marionette-like soldiers who struck the bell or chimes with a sword, mace, or other weapon as the mechanism’s design dictated—would strike the hour, half hour, and quarter hour (this endures in a



Figure 3.3 Tudor clock at York Minster Cathedral showing details of weaponry. By kind permission of the Dean and Chapter of York, ©York Minster.

common idiomatic expression: to “clock” someone is to knock him on the head).

Moreover, because the sound could be heard for miles around, the city clock was an apt metaphor for Elizabeth’s government in Dublin: her soldiers made her power felt across the sea though she had never visited those she governed in Ireland.⁵² On some clocks, the monarch was depicted above the soldiers, as with the clock set up in Exeter by Henry VIII. William Starmer describes it as having

three automatic figures. The centre one represents Henry VIII (3 ft. 6 in. high and in a sitting posture), which, on the clock striking the hour, inclines the head at every stroke, marking the time with his sceptre. On each side of him is a soldier in miliary attire and 3 ft. in height, holding a javelin in one hand and a hammer with a long handle in the other. These soldiers strike the quarters by alternate blows on the two bells beneath their feet.⁵³

That is, the material design of clocks often reinforced images of monarchical force even as the clocks provided the timekeeping functions demarcating the hours for the day’s activities. These were no idle symbols. Just four years later, Elizabeth would issue a series of orders that would transform what had been the symbol of force into an actual military campaign meant to set Ireland into clocklike regulation.⁵⁴ “In a chilling turn of phrase,” explains David Edwards, Elizabeth insisted that Sir Henry Sidney “must insure the royal forces stopped at nothing ‘to cleanse’ Laois and Offaly of all dissidents and ‘disordered persons’ whatsoever.”⁵⁵

The mechanism of soldiers hammering upon chimes also recalls the coin-making process. The hammered coins of the period were made by manually striking a coin blank of silver or gold between two hand-cut die. For the song’s audience, clapping in time to the celebratory tune would have recalled the thematic emphasis shared by clocks and coins: the usefulness of each depends upon dealing accurate blows in the name of the queen. Given these points, when the rimer of the “Song on Queen Elizabeth” declares that “She held the *Diall* and the *Clock* / Throughout the whole Realme of *Ireland*,” we are meant to understand that she is holding a spear-shaped dial in one hand (for measuring the hour), and a sword or hammer in the other (for clocking the bell), with Ireland at her foot.

As with the image of the coin, however, the invocation of the clock is tagged with some ambiguity—clocks, after all, were also popular

reminders that the soul ambitious for glory was always, ultimately, reduced to time's fool. Indeed, the figure of a soldier/jack could be used to depict the consequences of royal bungling, as in Shakespeare's *King Richard II*, in which Richard, languishing in the dungeon at Pomfret, says, "[M]y time / Runs posting on in Bolingbroke's proud joy, / While I stand fooling here, his Jack o' the clock (5.5.58–60)." In other words, Elizabeth meant the clocks to represent her ability to enforce English order, but clock jacks were also mindless mechanisms lacking discernment and discretion. We know that the people of Dublin enjoyed having "a Novelty," and that the mechanical wonder "was very pleasing to the common people." In turn, the "Song on Queen Elizabeth" suggests that such people were not uncritical in their understanding of the symbolic relations put forward by such tokens. Above all, the song demonstrates the uncertain status of the Elizabethan administration in Dublin during the first decades of her reign.

For such a short piece, "The Song on Queen Elizabeth" is a surprisingly rich bit of colonial clutter. It alludes to international issues ranging from questions of legitimate rule to economic revaluation, from rhetorical strategies of colonization and Reformation to concerns with the cultural impurities of the Gaelicized English (and the desire for technologies that would somehow solidify the authority of the Dublin administration across the "whole Realme of Ireland"). Elizabeth's Irish coins and clocks were meant to bolster and then spread the possibility of English rule; they were the technologies of practical administration even as they were symbols of spiritual, political, and economic reformation. We cannot doubt that Elizabeth trusted in their representational value. As late as 1600, she was still relying on the political usefulness of such things for she had a special coin struck (to be used by of the East India Company) so that "her name and effigies might be respected by the Asiatics, and she be held as great a prince as the King of Spain."⁵⁶

The song also reminds us that the new queen's monarchical claim had to be made in relation to "Ireland's place in the European world to which it belonged by tradition, history, culture, religion and trade."⁵⁷ Elizabeth's foreign kingdom was in transition, and this would continue to be Ireland's status during the first decades after the new Tudor coinage, when the assimilative possibilities of mixed metals were being weighed against the military prospects of hammering clock jacks.

Notes

1. Special thanks are due to the Kennedy Center for International Studies and the Office of Research and Creative Activities at Brigham Young University who provided the financial support that made this study possible.
2. James Ware, "The Annals of Ireland During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth," *Annals of the affairs of Ireland, from the first conquest by the English... unto the end of the reign of Queen Elizabeth*, trans. Robert Ware (Dublin, 1705), 4–5. Andrew Carpenter cites Ware in his introduction to the poem but does not mention the shared English source. See *Verse in English from Tudor and Stewart Ireland* (Cork: Cork UP, 2003), 49.
3. Ware, *Annals*, 5. As the identity of the "Old Poet" in question has yet to be determined, there is some question as to whether Ware's assumption of derivation is, in fact, correct. While the song may indeed be an English import to Ireland, ballads were circulating back and forth with some frequency between the two islands as Gaelic Princes, Old English Lords, and New English administrators travelled to and from London. It might as easily have been an Irish import to England, especially since Ware has a tendency to ascribe English authorship to documents about which he is in doubt. As a detailed literary analysis of the question is more appropriate for another place and time, suffice it to say that the song's popularity in Dublin and its repeated usage in subsequent histories as an expression of Ireland's reception of Elizabeth are at the heart of the question here. My special thanks go to Steven W. May who brought possible original English sources to my attention. Similar thanks go to Marion Nicholls for examples of disputed English-Irish authorship for several items written in the 1560s. For examples of English poems with similar themes, see Steven W. May, *Elizabethan Poetry*, 3 vols. (New York: Continuum, 2004).
4. Ware, *Annals*, 5.
5. Ware, *Annals*, 5.
6. Simon Snelling is the first modern historian to set the pattern for this (which all subsequent histories on the coinage in Ireland have followed). See *Simon's Essay on Irish Coins and of the Foreign Monies in Ireland* (Dublin, 1810), 36.
7. Evidences of Catholic and Protestant formulations in wills up to and including the year 1660 suggest that no more than ten percent were identified as Protestant even in the most committed regions. For a good summary of the evidence for this and the striking transformation that took place over the course of Elizabeth's reign, see S. Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion, 1558–1603* (New York, 1994) 48–9. See also R. Whiting, *The Blind Devotion of the People: Popular Religion and the English Reformation* (Cambridge, 1989).

8. These divisions are, of course, problematic. Intermarriage between the native Gaelic Irish and the Old English families, who had been in Ireland for over 400 years, meant that many prominent families could claim status in both traditions. In addition, although those who identified as established or "Old" English often allied themselves with the Gaelic chieftans against acquisitive New English colonials, on other occasions Gaelic leaders teamed up with new English adventurers and politicians from London to pry Old English leaders from coveted positions of influence with the English government.
9. As images on coins, representations of monarchs were meant to circulate among the people the way images of Caesar did at the start of another empire. Julius Caesar's distinctive coinage ushered in the Roman Empire; his coins bore his portrait, the first of a Roman to appear on a coin in his own lifetime. Such coins were used either to assert a claim when there was still struggle for control of the government (as when Octavian stamped his coins, "son of the divine [Julius] Caesar"), or as the expression of unchallenged supremacy (as with Julius Caesar after he cemented his authority as supreme head of state). See Edward Allen Sydenham, *Historical references on coins of the Roman Empire from Augustus to Gallienus* (London: Pegasus, 1968) and Harold Mattingly, *Roman Coins from the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Western Empire* (London, 1967). Elizabeth followed this dual pattern closely. In fact, all European nations with colonial interests used coins to convey a government's authority through the use of portraiture; that portraiture on coins was central to the strategy of nations which strove to establish a presence in the Americas, Africa, and the Far East. Moreover, such coins often revealed official attitudes toward these other worlds. The reverse of the coin representing the Spanish King, Charles II, for example, declares in Latin, "One world is not enough" above an emblem of two halves of the globe. Indeed, to some extent, one can trace the international authority of nations through the influence of their coin. From about 1537 onward, the Spanish gold doubloon and the silver reale served not only as coin of the Spanish realm, but as the central currency of international trade. The dominance of the Spanish dollar was overwhelming throughout the sixteenth century (and was still a strong source of currency over the next 150 years). The dollar famously bore the motto *plus ultra* (more beyond) and the pillars of Hercules, signifying the gateway to further wealth. In fact, Elizabeth had a special coin struck in 1600 for the use of the East India Company so that "her name and effigies might be respected by the Asiatics, and she be held as great a prince as the King of Spain." See *A Monetary History*, 186.
10. Kevin Sharpe, *Selling the Tudor Monarchy: Authority and Image in Sixteenth-Century England* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) 155.

11. Croft, *The Book Named The Governor*, II, 36.
12. T. Smith, *De republica anglorum: The maner of Governement of Policie of the Realme of England* (London, 1582), 45.
13. Mario J. Valdés's observation is useful in this regard: "Mountains of facts and opinions do not constitute the historical record. History is above all the mediation that the historian provides between the unwritten flow of life and the scant record that has been received, thereby striving to facilitate the expansion from facts into the record of the living." See "Rethinking the History of Literary History," *Rethinking Literary History: A Dialogue on Theory*, eds. L. Hutcheon and Mario J. Valdés (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 77.
14. Of course, there *were* valuable painted and sculpted representations of the queen in several of the English-dominated regions (mostly in Dublin and around the famously Elizabeth-bedecked abode of her cousin, Thomas Butler, the Earl of Ormond), and a handful of English aristocrats kept miniatures of the queen for their wear when visiting the English court (or embroidered her name on wall hangings near entries where English visitors from the court might pass). However, pondering such elaborate and pointedly political renderings of the monarch was certainly not a frequent pastime for the average citizen in Ireland.
15. In this regard, Elizabeth's Irish clocks and coins—as well as the rime in which they take their linguistic avatars—make up the tailings of what Karl Bottigheimer refers to as "clutter": particular artifacts which cumulatively help to stave off over-generalizations about Tudor expansionism. English endeavors in Ireland, for instance, were distinctly unlike the enterprise undertaken in the New World: "America was remote and unfamiliar. No loyalties were due to its natives. Ireland, by contrast, was cluttered with the remains of previous, uncompleted conquests." K. Bottigheimer, "Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Westward Enterprise, 1536–1660," *The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480–1650*, eds. K. R. Andrews, N. P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978), 61.
16. Shy of what W. J. T. Mitchell has described as the "wild overestimation of the power of spectacle" in our accounts of how Elizabeth was perceived. The following discussion lends more attention to the "humble vernacular images" of everyday life. Doing so augments the materials that make up the puzzle pieces of Elizabeth's role in the culture of Ireland's English Pale and within the broader span of sixteenth-century Irish history. For a good discussion of this issue, see Mitchell's, "Interdisciplinary and Visual Culture," *Art Bulletin* 77 (1993), 540–4.
17. *The summarie of certaine reasons which have moved the Quenes Maiestie to procede in reformatiōs of her base and course monies and to reduce them to*

their values, in sorte as they maye be turned to fine monies, appointed to be declared by her Maiestie, by order of her proclamacion, in her citie of London (London, 1560), 1.

18. Indeed, that ethical framework was reinforced by popular biblical and classical sources. Humanists frequently combined the image of the statue made of multiple metals found in the Old Testament book of Daniel, for instance, with a similar scheme famously adapted by the Greek historian Hesiod: a series of materials declining in value—gold, silver, bronze, iron, and clay—represent a notion of the ages of history which follow a pattern of declining culture and glory. Elizabeth was all too aware that the link between debased metals and fallen kingdoms had a long literary history: a history clearly illustrating the political disarray resulting from ethical decay at the root of uninspired leadership. See Hesiod, *Works and Days* in *Hesiod: The Homeric Hymns and Homeric*, vol. 57 of Loeb Classical Library, trans. H. G. Evelyn-White (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 109–201.
19. *Summarie*, 4. In this regard, the document argues that counterfeiting is not simply the act of reducing the literal value of coin for exchange, it is the theft of goods such as “Wolle, Cloth, Lead, Tinne, Leather, Tallowe, yea and all kind of victual, as Corne, Malt, Beere, Butter, Cheese, and suche lyke.”
20. In fact, “it was a German company which was largely responsible for melting down the old base coin and converting the billon metal it contained into sterling silver.” The English themselves were deeply impressed by this practical alchemy: “So remarkable did this achievement appear in the eyes of admiring contemporaries that Sir Francis Knolles could confidently affirm that [these strangers] ‘did so draw the copper wholly from the silver, that not only the substance, but the very print of the coin remained evident in the silver still.’” Taken from C.E. Challis, *The Tudor Coinage* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978), 37.
21. At this point in the discussion, it is probably worth noting that although we commonly refer to the period in question as “Early Modern” in order to acknowledge the roots of things such as proto-capitalist markets and monetary systems, there is little evidence for an idea of capitalism as such. The concentration of wealth in the hands of a capitalist class, which enrolls labor by paying money meant to divorce the transaction from any sense of mutual loyalty, would not fully emerge for another 100 years. The point of modern capitalism is to separate economic activity from all personal ties and obligations, so that “economic rationality” may rule supreme. Modern capitalists chafe under the attempts of government to impose civic obligations on their economic activity. In the non-secular society

of Elizabeth's England, all parties (merchants, lawyers, government officials, economic theorists) invoked civic obligation and mutual loyalty as the *first* step in establishing workable economies. The fact that hypocrisy often crept into actual practice should not be mistaken for modern capitalist presumptions regarding a "natural" ethics of unfettered markets.

22. *Summarie*, 9. A subsequent proclamation would seek to underscore the sense that foreign perfidy was involved in passing counterfeit coin. "The Queenes Maiestie" warns her "louing subiectes... of certayne forrayne Coynes... beyng much lesse in value both in weight and fynnesse, wherby many of her good subiectes receauyng the same, are dayly deceaued and dammaged. And for that purpose, her Maiestie hath thought very meete to warne al her subiectes to take diligent heede and regarde to these maner of notable deceiptes, entended by euyll disposed persons, in vtterance of the sayde forrayne Coynes." See *By the Queen. The Queenes Maiestie hauyng not long since geuen her louyng subiectes knowledge by proclamation, of certayne forrayne coyne of golde brought into this realme...* (London, 1565), 1. Though foreign counterfeiters were indeed at work, the majority of counterfeit coins were of English derivation. "Foreign" in this sense is a loose term at best.
23. For a good discussion of the coinage issue in relation to the balance between the shifting food demands of a growing nonagricultural labor force in urban/rural manufacture and the available surplus of an agricultural sector of constant or slightly increasing productivity, see Jack. A. Goldstone, "Urbanization and Inflation: Lessons from the English Price Revolution of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *American Journal of Sociology* 89.5 (1984), 1122–60.
24. Ware, 4.
25. Good summary discussions of financial issues early in Elizabeth's reign as they relate to her military options may be found in W. T. MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1558–1603* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), W. Palmer, *The Problem of Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy, 1485–1603* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1994), and S. Doran, *Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 1558–1603* (New York: Routledge, 2000).
26. As Merry Wiesner-Hanks sums up the situation, "In the middle of the fifteenth century, attempts to keep all of Ireland under English control became too expensive. Ireland was unofficially divided into the area around Dublin ruled by the English deputy—known as the Pale—and the rest of Ireland controlled by Anglo-Irish and Gaelic lords. There were many revolts against royal overlordship, including one rebellion in the 1530s led by an Anglo-Irish nobleman, Thomas Fitzgerald... several in the 1560s–1580s in the southern province

- of Munster, led by the earls of Desmond, and another in the 1590s led by Hugh O'Neill... These, combined with Anglo-Irish Gaelic armed opposition to the Protestant Reformation, led to increasing repression on the part of the English. Slowly English common law was imposed throughout Ireland, with Dublin emerging as the most Anglicized and most prosperous area." *Early Modern Europe, 1450–1789, Cambridge History of Europe*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 93.
27. Paul E. J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544–1604* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 74.
 28. Shane O'Neill to Queen Elizabeth, Feb. 8, 1561. Quoted in Patrick Nolan, *A Monetary History of Ireland*, Part II (London: P.S. King and Son, 1928), 189–90.
 29. Michael Dolley explains that the Irish had mastered the niceties of English debasement, and "the very name *bonn geal* (white groat), later anglicized 'bungal,' accorded to the base issues of Henry VIII and his progeny, very probably reflects an appreciation of the irreproducible sheen of high-grade silver among a people with a tradition of craftsmanship in the precious metals extending back over many centuries." See "The Irish Coinage, 1534–1691," *A New History of Ireland*, Vol. 3, *Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691*, eds. T. W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987), 408–419.
 30. *Calendar of State Papers Henry VIII*, vol. 2 (London: 1830–1852), 1–31. Also quoted in Constantia Maxwell, *Irish History from Contemporary Sources, 1509–1610* (London: George Allen, 1923) and Peter Berresford Ellis, *Erin's Blood Royal: The Gaelic Noble Dynasties of Ireland* (New York: Palgrave 2002), 19.
 31. *CSP Henry VIII*, vol. 2, 30.
 32. Ellis, 20.
 33. *Analecta Hibernica*, vol. 1, ed. C. McNeill et. al. 36 vols. (Dublin: Stationary Office of Saorstát Éireann, 1930–1995), 40.
 34. *CSP Henry VIII*, vol. 3, 48.
 35. Because there were always four principal Irish kingdoms with one of those kings acting as a theoretical "High King" to make up a kind of pentarchy, the thought was to advance Henry's kingship as a symbolic unifier, to be followed up with a later conquer-and-regrant strategy. The "High King" was more a precedence of honor than an executive position, essentially a symbol of circumspect harmony. Henry advanced that symbolic gesture nevertheless intending that it would, in fact, be the singular multiplier in a strategy of colonial expansion. No surprise that, considering ongoing boundary disputes among petty-kings and a confidence in their ability to successfully assimilate English "noblefolk," many Irish leaders of varying degrees

- began to acknowledge (as a short-term tactic) Henry—and later Elizabeth—in that capacity.
36. In addition to Bottigheimer's fine article summarizing Ireland's paradoxical status as both "Kingdom and Colony," see also Brendan Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Bradshaw's work details various legal strategies employed by the English in the process of colonial expansion, though his Gaelic sources, which help to define the degree to which the native Irish continued to function outside English constitutional charter, are limited.
 37. See Jasper Ridley, *Henry VIII* (London, 1984), 354.
 38. The *Act* explicitly echoes Allen's rhetoric, for "his majesty and his noble progenitors were justly and rightfully, and of right *ought to be* kings of Ireland, and *for lack of naming them kings* of Ireland according to their just style and title, the Irish had not been so obedient as they *ought*" [italics mine]. See *State Papers of Ireland*, 33 Henry VIII, 101.
 39. See Nicolas Sander, *Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism* (1585), Facsimile Edition of 1877 (London: TAN Books, 2009). Also quoted in Nolan, 123–4.
 40. Nolan, 125.
 41. Cf. Luke 16.10 & Isaiah 1: 22–23, Nolan, 126.
 42. Considering that the Irish may have tweaked an English song for local use, it is also worth special attention for the echo of English dissatisfaction. However, as already mentioned, there is some question as to which "Old Poet" originally wrote the piece—it may have been an Irish import to England, rather than an English import to Ireland.
 43. There may be a third level to the pun as well. As David Edwards explains, "By 1560, from Antrim to Athlone, and Dublin to Nenagh, much of Ireland was either on the brink, or else fully in the throes, of a gathering subsistence/mortality crisis. That food was scarce throughout the Midlands or large stretches of the north and north-east is hardly surprising...but...people were beginning to starve even in the heart of the Pale, the richest and most heavily defended part of the country." See David Edwards, "The escalation of violence in sixteenth-century Ireland," *Age of Atrocity: Violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland*, ed. David Edwards, Padraig Lenihan, and Clodagh Tait (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 77.
 44. As the century progressed, the coin metaphor became so common that Edmund's speech about his own status as "base" in Shakespeare's *King Lear* would reverberate with echoes winding class status more tightly around ideas of intrinsic worth. Similarly, Elizabeth Grymston councils her son by way of the metaphor. Insisting that she will impress her wisdom upon her offspring by marking Bernye's

already high intrinsic worth with the outward sign of fine metal, Grymeston's analogy is especially interesting for the easy slide from coin to book—just as a small coin of fine metal is worth more than a large one of base material, so a short book might be better than a longer one: "Yet remember withall," she writes, "that as it is the best coine that is of greatest value in fewest pieces, so it is not the worst booke that hath most matter in least words." See "To her loving sonne Bernye Grymeston," *Miscellanea, Meditations, Memoratives* (London, 1604), A3.

45. Robert Naughton, *Fragmenta Regalia, or Observations on the Late Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1641), 4.
46. Lord Chancellor Gerrard, *Notes of His Report on Ireland, May 1578*, ed. C. McNeill, *Analecta Hibernica* 2(1931), 95–96.
47. The Old English had become exceptionally generous patrons of bards, genealogists, and translators, the professional custodians of Irish culture. In fact, the Gaelic-identified Old English and their allies frequently found themselves wishing to temper the Tudor reconquest with cultural practices that, in turn, prolonged precisely the political sway the New English colonial government was at pains to destroy.
48. William Shakespeare, *The Tragedy of Coriolanus*, ed. Katherine Eisaman Maus, *The Norton Shakespeare* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 2865.
49. Margaret Cavendish, *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy* (London, 1666), 30. I quote from Cavendish as an illustration of just how firmly the clock metaphor would continue to be associated with monarchy. In this passage, Cavendish has to go out of her way to explain why God's governance of nature *cannot* be like a clock (in contrast to Descartes, who had recently taken advantage of the metaphors' 200-year tradition to neatly dovetail his mechanistic view of the universe with received notions of Deity, thus advancing his more secular view of science without offending believers).
50. Philip Sidney, *Works: The Defense of Poesie, Political Discourses, Correspondence, and Translations*, ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1923), 267–8.
51. Not surprisingly, clocks were also commonly associated with accountability and reckoning, as well as with harmony and spiritual discipline. In *The Monument of Matrons* (1582), for instance, Thomas Bentley explains to the "Christian Reader" that the collection of devotional literature included in his volume is meant to be "a Diall of devotion to direct you by the glorious globe and shine of the bright sunne of righteousness, which enlighteneth all things in the world...at all houres and times of the daie and night continually unto the holie mount." Later in the same volume, a penitent soul

implores, "O holie God, the more our bodies doo increase, the neerer death doth approch, the clocke of our conscience." See T. Bentley, *The Monument of Matrons* (London, 1582), sig. B2v, 129.

52. As those who have heard such clocks know, the chimes are often elaborately musical, made up of mathematical progressions meant to harmonize the loftier rhythms of the spheres with the more mundane humdrum of everyday life. In this regard, Elizabeth's symbolic clocks tied the musicality of timekeeping to the militaristic endeavors involved in empire-building.
53. William Wooding Starmer, "The Clock Jacks of England," *Proceedings of the Musical Association, 44th Session* (London: Oxford University Press, 1918), 1–7.
54. It is worth noting in this regard that the image of death as a clock is another well-worn metaphor by the time the song is in circulation. Accordingly, another clock mounted during Elizabeth's reign (this one in England, at Rye Parish Church in Sussex) bears the inscription, "For our time is a very shadow that passeth away." Shakespeare would later employ the Juvenalian version of the image, spinning out dramatic lines in which time was designated as the clocksetter of human lives (*King John*, 3.1.324), and where time was constantly cheating life of glory or honor (*Henry IV, part one*, 5.4.77–86), making all mortals the fools of both time and fortune (*Hamlet*). The gesture of setting up a clock, then, was meant to reinforce notions of civic order and public virtue, especially in relation to conscience and the prospect of a final judgment.
55. Edwards, 76. See also T. Ó Laidhin, ed., *Sidney State Papers, 1565–70* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1962), 12.10.
56. Quoted in *A Monetary History*, 186.
57. T. C. Barnard, "Crisis of Identity Among Irish Protestants, 1641–1685," *Past and Present* 127 (1990), 44.



PART II

EUROPE



CHAPTER 4

QUEEN ELIZABETH'S REACTION TO THE ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S DAY MASSACRE

Nate Probasco

...that women, children, maids, young infants and sucking babes, were...murthered, and cast into the river, and that liberty of execution was given to the vilest and basest sort of the popular, without punishment or revenge of such cruelty done afterwards by Law, upon those cruel murtherers of such innocents; this encreased our grief and sorrow in our good brothers behalf.¹

These words convey Queen Elizabeth's disgust with King Charles IX of France over the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre in which Catholics murdered thousands of Protestants throughout France. On August 24, 1572, two nights after a lone assassin wounded Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, the leader of the French Calvinist Huguenots, a group of French Catholics finished the job by brutally stabbing, decapitating, and burning him.² Other Huguenots shared his terrible fate; an immense mob murdered men, women, and children and tossed them in the Seine until it ran red with the blood of 3,000 dead Protestant Parisians.³ The killings quickly spread throughout the French countryside, and when they finally ceased in October as many as 10,000 Huguenots lay dead. Understandably, Protestant England was shocked by the government-sponsored killings of their Huguenot brethren across the channel, but Queen Elizabeth had a far more nuanced reaction to the bloodshed.

Both Elizabeth's religious convictions and her astute diplomacy tempered her reaction to the events in France, preventing any straightforward response. David J. B. Trim has argued that

Elizabeth's religiosity significantly affected her foreign policy.⁴ Elizabeth certainly reached out to Protestant Europe after the massacre, which stemmed partially from her sense of religious duty but more so due to her anxiety over Catholic endeavors to restrain Protestantism. According to Susan Doran, Elizabeth's expectation that the traditional Hapsburg-Valois rivalry would collapse in favor of a Franco-Spanish Catholic alliance, thus leaving England diplomatically isolated, forced her to alter her foreign policy early in her reign by allying with continental European Protestant realms.⁵ Indeed, Elizabeth needed all the allies that she could muster in religiously divided late sixteenth-century Europe. The sectarian war between Scottish Catholics and Presbyterians remained unresolved in 1572, while England was in the midst of a five-year trade standoff with Spain. Irish Catholic dissenters continued to foment rebellion in Elizabeth's second territory, and Mary, Queen of Scots, remained the titular head of Catholic rebels during her incarceration in England. Elizabeth also feared Spanish success in their suppression of Protestants in the Low Countries, though the possibility of French intervention and their control of the entire coastline opposite England posed an equally undesirable settlement to the conflict.

The massacre occurred within this context and only further complicated European international and religious relations, but Elizabeth responded quite sensibly by openly displaying her outrage, yet simultaneously reiterating her goodwill so as not to jeopardize Anglo-French amity. Her caustic words for the French crown showed both her grief for the dead Huguenots, whom she viewed as potential allies, and her willingness to actively prevent further bloodshed. Quite akin to her somewhat *politique* diplomatic policy, Elizabeth tended to speak out against foreign Catholics only if they threatened her realm. The prospect of a French invasion even prompted her to muster troops, and she offered refuge to displaced Huguenots as well. Much like her use of courtships to cement political alliances, Elizabeth halted her marriage negotiations with the king's younger brother, Hercule François, the Duke of Alençon, later the Duke of Anjou, to convey her anger for the killings. Diplomatic affairs ultimately overrode her religious concerns, however, as she sought to maintain the recently concluded alliance with France and even briefly attempted to restore Anglo-Spanish amity. The necessity of a powerful Catholic ally drew Elizabeth back to France, because if the Anglo-French rapprochement fell apart while England remained at odds with Spain, there was a very real fear that the two Catholic powers could have easily

united to wage holy war against England. The massacre initially appalled Elizabeth and made her question French intentions, but she desperately needed to avoid diplomatic isolation and accordingly she pursued amicable relations with Europe's Catholic powers.

Elizabeth first displayed her lamentation for the massacre victims in her somber reception of Bertrand de Salignac de la Motte-Fénélon, the French ambassador in England. After receiving word of the killings in late August, Elizabeth immediately suspended her hunting trip in the countryside and returned to her royal manor at Woodstock. Meanwhile, the ambassador hastened west from London to meet Elizabeth en route before any additional uncensored reports could reach her and further implicate the French royal family. Upon his arrival at Woodstock, the queen immediately placed la Motte-Fénélon under house arrest to ensure the safety of her own representative in Paris, Francis Walsingham. Eleven days later, she and her entire court, clothed fully in mourning attire, finally accepted the ambassador in complete silence, almost as if they were attending a funeral.⁶ The French emissary defended his king by claiming that he had uncovered a grand Huguenot scheme that required him to act for the benefit of France. According to him, a group of Huguenots intended to kidnap Charles, queen mother Catherine de' Medici, and various Catholic noblemen in revenge for the failed assassination attempt of Coligny on August 22.⁷ Rather than viewing Charles as the victim, Elizabeth openly challenged the validity of his alleged Protestant plot and anticipated more substantial justification for the killings.⁸

Within days, Charles met her demands by dispatching messengers with a new version of the incident to Europe's major Protestant centers, including Germany, Switzerland, and England. Though these intermediaries relayed the king's remorse for the dead, he essentially blamed the Duke of Guise for assassinating Coligny and inciting the massacre. The king even argued for his own lack of safety during the affair, which forced him to take refuge with the queen mother at the castle of the Louvre.⁹ Elizabeth rejected his explanation that the killings had stemmed from the well-known vendetta between the houses of Guise and Châtillon and alternatively suggested that the French royal family had devised the massacre much earlier.¹⁰ Despite similar statements, which clearly show that Elizabeth doubted Charles's reconstruction of the events and questioned his actual role in the murders, she reiterated to the French ambassador that she desired to maintain peaceable relations with his realm.

In early September, Charles again tested Elizabeth's tolerance, however, when he issued a third set of dispatches claiming

responsibility for the massacre. Although he earned praise from Spain and Rome for blueprinting the killings, he only further alienated Protestant England and its queen. Lord Burghley conveyed Elizabeth's sentiments to this revised report, stating that the circumstances caused her to "charge the king with all manner of dishonor that might touch a Prince."¹¹ When word of forced baptisms and massacres in the provinces reached England months after the Parisian killings, the French ambassador remorsefully informed his king that Elizabeth would no longer accept his vacillating communiqués.¹² She also grieved for the dead French noblemen whose murderers remained at large, and she questioned the king's decision to kill Coligny and his followers, arguing that he should have granted the Protestant leadership a fair trial.¹³ Elizabeth expected Charles to complete his kingly duty by imparting justice in his realm. His inadequacy to do so left her disappointed and strengthened her belief that he was intimately involved.

Elizabeth even briefly considered the possibility that "The Most Christian King" sought to eliminate Protestantism in his realm. Though two years earlier Charles had signed the Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, which ended the third of the French Wars of Religion and granted Huguenots territory and the ability to hold public office, this new bloodshed shattered any hopes of a French religious accord. She feared that the French had joined the Holy League with Spain, the Papal States, and other Italian states "to eradicate and utterly to destroye all such as make profession of the true relligion."¹⁴ Considering the intense ideological divergence that characterized late sixteenth-century Europe, Elizabeth's assertions seem plausible. The massacre gave Catholics the upper hand in France, whereas beforehand French religious supremacy remained divided between the Catholic Guise family and various influential Huguenots vying to influence the crown. Just before the massacre, Charles had even contemplated Admiral Coligny's proposal to invade the Low Countries to aid Protestant rebels, but the king returned wholeheartedly to the old faith following the killings. Additionally, unlike sixteenth-century European Catholicism, Protestantism comprised several antithetic sects in disagreement on doctrinal matters and without a unifying institutional structure. First and second generation Lutherans disagreed doctrinally with early Calvinists while some Protestants indentified with Catholics before other reformed denominations. Had Charles truly wished to wipe out the Huguenots, England and any potential Protestant allies would

have had great difficulty mounting a cooperative resistance effort. While the massacre sparked yet another stage in the religious wars, Elizabeth's fears for the survival of French Protestantism immediately following the massacre remained unwarranted as Charles did not use the attack as a rallying cry to eliminate all Huguenots.

In fact, Charles recognized his mistake in taking responsibility for the massacre and tried to reconcile with Elizabeth on numerous occasions. Less than one month after the killings, he requested that Elizabeth christen his firstborn in her own name, and he exhibited a rare glimpse of shrewdness in his request since securing Elizabeth as godmother would have allied her closely to the Catholic royals, while simultaneously alienating her from the Huguenot rebels. Elizabeth initially refused to be godmother, however, or even allow her trusted advisors, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, or William Cecil, Lord Burghley, to go to France in her stead, fearing for their safety in France.¹⁵ Instead, she sent a lesser noble, William Somerset, Earl of Worcester, to the baptismal ceremony in early 1573, and she used the invitation to further express her dismay over the affair. She complained that the mob had murdered without fear of retribution, while doubting the validity of Charles's Huguenot plot. The queen also wryly questioned Charles's decision to ask her to be godmother, "being of that Religion which he doth now persecute, and cannot abide within his Realm."¹⁶ She only grudgingly consented to lend her name to the young Marie-Elizabeth in order to preserve the Anglo-French alliance. Elizabeth anticipated that her cooperation would suffice to keep Charles content, but her expressions of disillusionment and reluctance to send her royal favorites to France reveal her continued anxiety over the massacre.

After allowing sufficient time for tempers to cool, Charles again attempted to quell Elizabeth's unrest over the massacre by dispatching Albert de Gondi, comte de Retz, to her court in April of 1573. Charles commanded his diplomat to work with Michel de Castelnau, sieur de Mauvissière, whom he had dispatched to London in November, offering the king's final version of the events. The French government placed significant emphasis on the mission, for Retz travelled with great pageantry and received numerous titles for his effort, including Marquis de Belle Isle, Peer of France, Marshal and General of the Galleys, Colonel of the French Horse, First Gentleman of the Bedchamber, and Great Chamberlain to Charles IX. Elizabeth viewed their meeting with equal weight, since she suspended her royal progress in order to personally meet the French

party upon their arrival at Dover. Retz had three objectives: acquire a loan from Elizabeth; block all English aid to La Rochelle, which was the main location of Huguenot resistance; and receive acceptance for Charles's construction of the massacre. He failed on all three counts. Elizabeth did not provide Retz the conciliatory funds that he requested due to her anger over the massacre and her already depleted coffers. She also refused to halt aid to La Rochelle and reiterated that English subsidies flowed unbeknownst to her, even though she personally supported such ventures to the continent. Retz lastly attempted to appeal to Elizabeth's narcissism in explaining the massacre, alleging that Coligny had acted with greater pomp than a king prior to his death, which made him culpable for his own demise. Incredibly, Retz claimed that no women or children had perished during the affair and that only 300 men had died. Unsurprisingly, Elizabeth completely disregarded his statements and refused to condone the general Huguenot slaughter.¹⁷ She may have been so defiant because Retz had helped orchestrate the massacre, and she simply wished to reject all his queries, while her still present anger over St. Bartholomew's Day, now eight months removed, explains her uncompromising behavior as well.¹⁸

Her anger and suspicion of the king's guilt also compelled Elizabeth to disregard her customary hesitancy to offer succor to foreigners, and she provided significant, surreptitious aid to the weakened Huguenots. Despite Charles's irritation over the fleeing Protestants and his demand that all refugees be returned, Elizabeth granted them safe haven at the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey.¹⁹ She considered it natural for them to flee after the general slaughter and refused to return the Huguenots until she deemed France secure.²⁰ Charles expressly asked for the return of Jean de Ferrières, Vidame de Chartres, a prominent Huguenot who had escaped to England during the massacre, even guaranteeing his safety in France, but Elizabeth rebuffed his demand.²¹ She also turned a blind eye to pirates based on the Channel Islands, even though her proclamations of March 1572 had outlawed all pirates from dropping anchor in English ports.²² Charles doubted Elizabeth's continual claims of innocence in pirate attacks and complained that the renewed piracy against French vessels by men like John Hawkins had made him question their recent treaty, but he chose not to risk any further alienation of England and continued to pursue friendly relations.²³

In November of 1572, after Charles began his assault on the Protestant stronghold of La Rochelle for failing to accept his

appointee for royal governor, Elizabeth again clandestinely answered the call of the besieged Huguenots begging for aid.²⁴ She allowed English volunteers to sail to La Rochelle and did not stop her ministers from shipping money, munitions, and other supplies to the Rochelois in January of 1573.²⁵ The French government also petitioned Elizabeth for the extradition of Huguenot refugee Gabriel de Lorges, *compte de Montgomery*, whose splintered lance had ignominiously pierced the eye of French King Henry II during a jousting match in 1559, resulting in his death. The queen ignored their call and instead offered Montgomery seven ships to relieve the siege of La Rochelle.²⁶ In early 1573, his fleet departed behind its flagship, the *Primrose*, a vessel that Elizabeth had sold him for the venture, and his 2,000 sailors, most of whom were English, carried munitions supplied by the queen.²⁷ Elizabeth avoided direct communication with Montgomery, who instead sent his missives to Burghley, which allowed the queen to support her coreligionists without jeopardizing her accord with the French. Though Montgomery retreated after realizing the ineffectiveness of his naval aid, the additional support provided by Elizabeth helped the fortress hold out until June, when Henri, Duke of Anjou abandoned the siege to accept the crown of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.²⁸

In addition to creating thousands of Huguenot refugees in need of English assistance, the massacre also disrupted the political balance in France that Elizabeth desired. Before August 1572, France was split among three primary factions: the crown, the Guise family and its supporters, and influential Huguenots, including Henri I de Bourbon, Prince of Condé; Henry, king of Navarre and later king of France; and Admiral Coligny. Both the Guise family and prominent Huguenots attempted to gain favor with the crown, and just prior to the massacre, Coligny and his following had drawn Charles to their side. This situation benefitted Elizabeth immensely; it prevented the ultra-Catholic Guises from taking outright control, gave Protestants significant influence in one of Europe's great realms, and kept the French government sufficiently occupied to preclude any actions against England. Elizabeth's objectives actually resembled those of Catherine de' Medici, who hoped to play the Huguenots and Guises against one another to prevent either faction from gaining significant power.

The 1572 elimination of the Huguenot leadership disrupted the aims of both women, however, since it put the Guises in a position of authority and drastically weakened their main adversaries. Both

women needed men like Coligny to keep the Guise family in check, but northern France became almost exclusively Roman Catholic after the massacre as the remaining pockets of Huguenots fled south. With the majority of their leaders deceased, thousands of Huguenots also immigrated to neighboring countries or renounced their faith in favor of Catholicism. In September and October of 1572, priests in Rouen rebaptized nearly 300 Huguenots as Catholics, and perhaps as many as 3,000 Huguenots in the city recanted. The Rouennois grand vicars of the cathedral spent so much time administering oaths of abjuration that they missed various church ceremonies during this period, and tens of thousands of Protestants across France recanted in the wake of the massacre as France swung back toward Catholicism.²⁹ The weakening of Calvinism in France did not please Elizabeth, who ruled what some considered a minor Protestant realm on the periphery of Europe, while the prospect of a unified Catholic France also did not bode well for her and her subjects.

In reaction to the pitiable state of Protestantism across the channel, Elizabeth ordered her royal printer, Richard Jugge, to issue a fifteen-page prayer book to placate her population and any Huguenot émigrés. The book, distributed two months after the massacre and deemed “necessarie for the present tyme and state,” continually refers to the event as a lamentable, frightening affair and even includes two specific prayers that ask for protection from those who conspire to “swalowe us up” and “teare us in peeces.”³⁰ It also suggests a host of Bible verses for Anglican ministers to read as their first lessons, including the correspondent chapters of Matthew 24 and Luke 21, which both contain Jesus’s prediction that his disciples will be persecuted by all nations because of Him and warn of those who come in the name of the Lord but attempt to deceive.³¹ These passages undoubtedly speak to the recent events in France, and a prayer entitled, “A thankesgeuyng and prayer for the preservation of the Queene, and the Realme,” suggests that Elizabeth intended to appease her fearful subjects and warn any Catholic rebels roused by the massacre. Yet, Elizabeth also conveys her sympathy for the French monarchy and Huguenot refugees by mentioning Romans chapter 12, [chapter five](#) from Ephesians, and First Thessalonians [chapter four](#), which impart brotherly love and the succor of those in want.³² Over the next decade, Elizabeth continued to commission prayers for those affected by the massacre, including the “French Prayer” that welcomed Huguenot refugees to England and was printed in *Queen Elizabeth’s Prayer Book* between 1579 and 1582.³³ Even

though the queen generally looked out for her subjects before non-English Protestants, her actions and prayers for the massacre victims show that she viewed their protection as her religious duty.

As a result of the rekindled religious upheaval in France, Elizabeth also suspended her budding marriage negotiations with the Duke of Alençon, who began to court her in early 1572. Just prior to the massacre, the nuptial discourse between Elizabeth's coterie and that of the young duke had proceeded rather well. Though the queen had misgivings over her suitor's youth and pockmarked complexion, her favorable correspondence with la Motte-Fénélon, Walsingham, and Catherine reveals her interest in the duke.³⁴ Elizabeth wrote Walsingham on July 27, 1572, informing him that she could overlook Alençon's imperfections and religion and even consent to marriage if he would travel to England and meet her in person.³⁵ In late July, she also welcomed to her court Joseph de Boniface, Sire de la Môle, a nobleman in service of Alençon, who had been dispatched to London to charm her. The duke's ploy succeeded, since his nobleman's conduct pleased both Elizabeth and her court. On the same day that Coligny was wounded, Burghley joyfully informed Walsingham that la Môle's presence persuaded Elizabeth to "come neerer to the matter (the marriage) then I hoped."³⁶ She also disclosed to the French ambassador that she would contemplate marrying Alençon upon the provisions confirmed during her marriage negotiations with his older brother, Henri, Duke of Anjou.³⁷ Despite the outcomes of Elizabeth's previous betrothals and her characteristic capriciousness, members of the duke's retinue nonetheless felt confident of a successful outcome to the negotiations. Less than one month prior to the massacre, some of Alençon's servants believed that once the two sides agreed upon inheritance issues the rest of the marriage negotiations would go smoothly.³⁸ Regardless of whether the queen actually intended to marry Alençon, her acceptance of la Môle, her enthusiasm for the matrimonial discourse, and the optimism of the duke's servants show that the marriage negotiations remained positive prior to the massacre.

The renewed religious breach that the massacre engendered forced Elizabeth to reassess the proposed match with her young Catholic suitor, even though he was not involved in the affair. In his biography of Alençon, Mack P. Holt states unequivocally that the massacre ended "any interest that Elizabeth might have had" in the betrothal, while Doran contends that the killings "swept away all thoughts of a dynastic marriage and closer ties with the French king."³⁹ The queen

relayed her anxiety concerning the marriage to the king's brother in a letter to Walsingham in late September:

And therefore if that Religion of it self be so odious unto him, that he thinks he must root out all the professors of it, how should we think his brother a fit husband for us or how would we think that the love may grow, continue and increase betwixt his brother and us, which ought to be betwixt the husband and the wife.⁴⁰

Elizabeth's secretary, Sir Thomas Smith, affirmed her hesitancy, stating that she now pondered ulterior motives behind both the marriage itself and the impending interview with the duke and his mother, which convinced her to postpone it.⁴¹ Upon word of the massacre, Elizabeth also immediately dismissed la Môle, who had been a favorite of hers during the negotiations.⁴² Alençon hurriedly dispatched a replacement, Jérôme de l'Huillier, seigneur de Maisonfleur, hoping that he could woo the queen as la Môle had done and convince her of his innocence in the massacre. Maisonfleur failed on these counts, and Elizabeth refused to allow Alençon into England, possibly due to his participation in the siege of La Rochelle, a city teeming with massacre refugees.⁴³ In November 1572, the king and queen mother sent their own emissary, the aforementioned sieur de Mauvissière, to express Alençon's continuing loyalty and attempt to calm Elizabeth and explain the course of the massacre.⁴⁴ Though Elizabeth's court received Mauvissière, Smith noted that the massacre had prompted the English populace to look down upon Frenchmen like him.⁴⁵ Despite the continual promotion of the marriage by Catherine and Charles up to the summer of 1573, Elizabeth notified them that the persecution of Huguenots and the continuance of the siege of La Rochelle made such a union impossible.⁴⁶

While the massacre caused Elizabeth to suspend marriage negotiations that eventually failed anyway, it also had a much more profound effect on the queen. The seemingly unprovoked slaying of thousands of Charles's Huguenot subjects compounded the likelihood of a similar French-led attack on Protestants in her realm. After receiving word of the killings, Elizabeth and her advisors immediately pressed Walsingham to ascertain the motive behind French Colonel General Fillipo di Piero Strozzi's presence in the predominately Huguenot southwestern coast of France. Elizabeth instructed her ambassador to discover the purpose of Strozzi's immense naval and martial forces at Bordeaux and La Rochelle, the *de facto*

Huguenot capital, both because she feared for her French coreligionists and regarded the southwestern coast as a preferable embarkation point for the invasion of England and Scotland.⁴⁷ The colonel's lineage and military background likely intensified Elizabeth's anxiety, since he was born to a Medici mother (Laudomia de' Medici, a cousin of Catherine), participated in the siege of Calais in 1558, and fought against the English in Scotland two years later. Though Charles assured Walsingham of Strozzi's inoffensiveness, Burghley and the queen still had "great cause in these times to doubt all fair speeches," and they subsequently dispatched the naval patrols.⁴⁸

Indeed, Elizabeth could not take the massacre lightly, as England had no standing army during the late sixteenth-century whereas France had one of the most powerful militaries in Europe at the time. Accordingly, she set about conscripting men for service, adding to her fleet, and buttressing England's defenses, especially at the strategically significant harbor city of Portsmouth, which the French had sacked four times during the fourteenth century.⁴⁹ On October 29, 1572, officials ordered the Captain of Portsmouth to examine the behavior, nationality, and overall disposition of all persons entering his port prior to consenting to entry. Though massacre refugees comprised the majority of these travelers, the officials of Winchester accused various immigrants of promoting insurrection.⁵⁰ The officials at Southampton acted with equal circumspection; to prevent spies from infiltrating the realm, they required references of all refugees entering the area.⁵¹ By the end of September 1572, various English counties had been called to arms, and the order for the certificate of the general musters spread rapidly to coastal counties such as Devon, Sussex, Dorset, and Cornwall in the south, and Norfolk and Kent in the east. The remarkable detail of many of these certificates reveals the perceived severity of the threat, as they often included various surveys of castles and garrisons, noting any fortifications that required repairs. The authorities even drafted a boat schedule to transfer soldiers to the Isle of Wight upon enemy engagement.⁵² It was not until more than three months after the massacre on December 2, 1572, that Elizabeth finally discontinued the observance of the beacons, a measure designed to forewarn an impending attack.⁵³ Elizabeth's correspondence with Charles and Walsingham eventually reassured her that an invasion was not on the horizon, but her first response to the massacre shows that she perceived it as a *casus belli* and thus prepared her realm for war.

The months following the massacre also marked a watershed for the English military, as Elizabeth and her government revamped their militia to make it comparable to the increasingly professionalized armies of continental Europe. From late 1572 to early 1573, they instituted the “trained bands” system nationwide with the purpose of molding a proficient, defensive militia. Rather than mustering inexperienced men for this unit, as was customary, the government began recruiting an elite group of soldiers with prior combat training. They intended to create a militia whose success rested on the skill of the men rather than sheer numbers, which makes sense considering England’s relatively small population in comparison to other late sixteenth-century European powers. Elizabeth and her government also redefined the term “muster” and increased the frequency of mustering following the events in France. Prior to late 1572, mustering simply denoted the convening and inspection of troops and generally occurred once every few years. However, Elizabeth and her government introduced the regular mustering of soldiers, while the term “muster” transformed to mean both the summoning and training of soldiers. The new Lords Lieutenant called, armed, and trained these men, who came primarily from higher classes and included gentlemen, merchants, and yeomen. Each county gathered their own men, who began learning how to wield both pikes and firearms, which were fairly new phenomena in England. By instituting the regular training of soldiers for the first time and incorporating new weapons into their arsenal in early 1573, Elizabeth modernized her army to meet the standards of continental Europe.⁵⁴

Spain possessed perhaps the strongest army in Europe at the time, and much like the massacre compelled Elizabeth to fear French aggression, it also roused her suspicions of Europe’s most powerful realm. Though the Anglo-Spanish War did not erupt until the 1580s, Spain nonetheless constituted a significant threat to England in 1572, especially considering prior discord. Anglo-Spanish relations began to deteriorate in 1568 following Elizabeth’s seizure of five Spanish treasure ships bound for the Low Countries to subsidize the Duke of Alba, who had been sent there to suppress Protestant rebels. In response, the duke detained all English subjects in Flanders, and Elizabeth reciprocated by seizing all Spanish goods in her territory.⁵⁵ This diplomatic quid pro quo triggered a suspension of trade and a virtual cold war that lasted nearly five years. The privateering missions of Hawkins and Francis Drake directed against the Spanish treasure fleet further compounded problems, while the

Holy League's victory over the Turks at the Battle of Lepanto in late 1571 ensured that Spain could devote more attention to heretics elsewhere. Elizabeth worsened matters less than two months before the massacre by sending 1,100 supposed volunteers under Sir Humphrey Gilbert into the Low Countries to prevent French intervention and to disrupt the Spanish.⁵⁶ With the Duke of Alba still battling Flemish Protestants less than 100 miles from England's southeastern coast at the time of the massacre, Elizabeth had to be concerned for the safety of her realm.

Spanish intrigue and involvement in the affairs of England's neighbors also gave the queen cause for concern. She intensely feared a Spanish presence in already turbulent Ireland, where the Catholic rebel James fitz Maurice Fitzgerald incited various uprisings throughout the early 1570s. She even conjectured that King Philip II and Alba had incited an Irish rebellion led by the sons of the earl of Clanricarde just days prior to the massacre.⁵⁷ Regardless of Philip's intensions in Ireland, Elizabeth also knew that his agents in England had helped hatch the unsuccessful Northern Rebellion of 1569, an insurrection by Catholic dissidents designed to restore the old religion's "ancient customes and usages." It had been blueprinted with the prospect of military aid from the Duke of Alba, but he lacked the money and ships for an invasion. The Spanish ambassador Guarau de Spes and his coconspirators Thomas Percy (seventh Earl of Northumberland), Charles Neville (sixth Earl of Westmoreland), and Thomas Howard (fourth Duke of Norfolk) conspired to place Mary, Queen of Scots, on the throne during this rebellion, but they ultimately failed.⁵⁸ Spanish agents played an even more significant role in the 1570 Ridolfi plot conceived to usurp Elizabeth's throne. The scheme called for Mary and the abovementioned Thomas Howard to seize the English throne and reestablish Catholicism by force with the aid of a Spanish invasion from Flanders directed Alba.⁵⁹ The conspirators again failed, and Elizabeth expelled de Spes at the end of 1571 for his complicity in these plots, which effectively severed the diplomatic ties between the two monarchies.⁶⁰

The threat of additional Spanish insurrections coupled with the massacre's great blow to Anglo-French amity forced Elizabeth to revert to the foreign policy status quo ante of her Tudor predecessors by reconciling with the Hapsburgs and questioning her French alliance. Though Elizabeth wished to remain peaceful with France if possible, she also needed a backup plan in case relations soured. Consequently, Burghley recommended that trade resume with Spain

as quickly as feasible and that all areas of contention be resolved post-haste.⁶¹ In early October, he informed Antonio de Guaras, a Spanish agent living in London, of Elizabeth's eagerness to reconcile.⁶² Guaras himself noted that the massacre had forced the queen and her court to view him as "the instrument of their welfare," whereas before the events they had despised him.⁶³ In November, Elizabeth also recalled Gilbert and his troops from the Low Countries, where they had been aiding Flemish Protestants for less than four months. Gilbert returned in pretended disgrace because Elizabeth had actually supported his excursion to the continent but put on an outward show to mislead the Spanish.⁶⁴ In 1573, she also called off her privateers, who had frustrated Spanish merchants since the 1569 breach, and she forbid all pirates from using England as their base. Elizabeth even agreed to repay Philip for losses incurred due to her seizure of Alba's treasure ships, which amounted to £15,600, and trade with Spain finally resumed after much negotiation during the spring of 1573.⁶⁵

This resumption of commerce did not stem from any loss of profit for English merchants, since they had done reasonably well following the break with Spain. Furthermore, England did not reconcile simply to reopen commercial trade to the valuable markets at Antwerp, Europe's premier center of commerce. For five years, English merchants and the Sea Beggars had argued over the right of free passage to the city, but a naval blockade by the Dutch at the Scheldt River delta had forced English merchants elsewhere before the Spanish trade resumed. Rather, Elizabeth and her government feared a rift in the league with France and hoped that a trade reconciliation would mend relations with England's former Catholic ally. Thus, the massacre had compelled Elizabeth to admit wrong, provide recompense, and alter her policy with Spain.

Elizabeth also had to reassess England's own unstable religious situation after St. Bartholomew's Day. Her contemporaries observed the queen's great agitation over the massacre, which made her "more suspicious than ever, and apprehensive of insurrection on the part of her subjects."⁶⁶ In light of England's religious problems during the late sixteenth century, Elizabeth's trepidation seems justified. The aforementioned Ridolfi plot remained fresh in memory, since the queen did not agree to execute the Duke of Norfolk for his role in the affair until two months prior to the Parisian slaughter.⁶⁷ The government also executed the Earl of Northumberland for his role in the Northern Rebellion on the exact night of Coligny's assassination

attempt, while many other rebels involved in the revolt, including the Earl of Westmoreland, remained at large. The potential return of these English rebels from abroad certainly concerned Elizabeth.⁶⁸ Many English Catholics questioned Elizabeth's legitimacy as queen as well and considered her the bastard daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, which made her position all the more precarious. Pope Pius V's 1570 Papal Bull *Regnans in Excelsis*, which absolved the English from fealty to "the pretended queen of England," further augmented Elizabeth's anxiety. It had also been little more than a decade since her half sister had ruled England as a Roman Catholic monarch and earned the moniker "Bloody Mary" for burning hundreds of English Protestants. Such factors made this latest Catholic atrocity, though foreign, all the more serious for the Protestant queen.

Though Elizabeth's officials did not make any sweeping religious changes in response to the massacre, they did take a few actions against English Catholics. They did not agree with the Anglican clergymen who wanted to execute priests, nor did they intend to wage war against Europe's Catholics like many infuriated English commoners suggested, but a few minor, precautionary initiatives were enacted.⁶⁹ During the autumn of 1572, the Queen's Council instructed England's Anglican clergy to continue to champion Protestantism and discover all papists in their jurisdictions who opposed the reformed religion. They similarly ordered English jailers to heighten their surveillance of Catholic detainees and apprehend those prisoners recently released on bail.⁷⁰ The government attempted to limit the communication of these Catholic prisoners as well, in an effort to prevent any collusion with foreigners.⁷¹ In early September, the council also summoned fifteen Catholics from Norfolk who refused to accept Protestant communion.⁷² Indeed, Elizabeth's government took bolder steps in Northern England to ensure the safety of the population. The old religion remained somewhat stronger there, and the Catholic public was more prone to revolt, as evidenced by the Northern Rebellion just two years earlier. Accordingly, the Council of the North, an administrative body based at York, ordered all Justices of the Peace to acquire the names and addresses of suspected papists under their jurisdiction, especially those that abstained from church services.⁷³ Sir William Drury, in command of a garrison at Berwick, ordered his captains to search their ranks to find any soldier who might be a "favourer of such horrible acts" like the massacre. Somehow, Drury discovered a few such soldiers and wrote Burghley inquiring on how they should be punished.⁷⁴ Though far from instituting a policy of

Cuius regio, eius religio, Elizabeth's government did attempt to suppress dissident Catholics and prevent potential religious upheavals in response to the massacre.

Quite analogous to her increased suspicion of English Catholics, the massacre in France also heightened Elizabeth's fear of her chronic thorn in the side, Mary Stuart. With Mary's Guise cousins as key instigators of St. Bartholomew's Day and with the specter of the Ridolfi plot still looming, Elizabeth took great lengths to ensure that her cousin and heir apparent remained within grasp. Following the events in France, she dispatched twenty-five members of her personal guard to oversee Mary's incarceration and sent direct orders to Mary's gaoler, George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury, telling him "that the queen of Scots was to be very strictly guarded and not allowed to leave the house."⁷⁵ For his own part, Shrewsbury instituted systematic patrols of the grounds around Sheffield Castle and completely quarantined his detainee from outsiders.⁷⁶ The government hastily sent intelligence to "the Queen of Scotland's enemies" as well, warning them that the French might attempt a similar massacre in Scotland or attempt to kidnap young King James VI.⁷⁷ Elizabeth also significantly reduced the number of Mary's personal confidants and servants at her prison at Sheffield Castle, fearing that they might aid in an escape effort. Though four years earlier she had an employ of nearly 150, Elizabeth dwindled that number to just nine following the massacre.⁷⁸ Her worries seem justified, since English ciphers had intercepted a letter from Mary in early August 1572 imploring for aid from France.⁷⁹ Anxiety of a foreign or domestic Catholic attack on England already tormented Elizabeth after the Huguenot murders. Should English Catholics revolt in response to the actions across the channel or should any foreigners attempt to invade, Elizabeth made certain that her rival would not easily be liberated and placed on her throne.

Elizabeth also took more drastic, uncharacteristically sinister steps to eliminate the threat posed by Mary in wake of the massacre. Immediately after hearing of the killings, Elizabeth, Burghley, and Leicester hastily sent Burghley's brother-in-law, Henry Killigrew, to Scotland with secret, verbal-only instructions. He was to explain the massacre to John Erskine, the Regent of Scotland and seventeenth Earl of Mar, and James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton, who were both fighting the Catholic faction in support of Mary, and warn them that Catholics might make a similar purge in their own realm. Elizabeth and her councilors also gave Killigrew additional, weighty

instructions, the significance of which warrants their retelling in full:

uppon a singular Trust yow are now chosen to deale in a third Matter, of a farr gretar Moment, wherein all Secrecy and Circumspection is to be used. . . . It is found dayly more and more, that the Contynuance of the Quene of *Scotts* here is so dangerooss, both for the Person of the Quene's Majesty, and for her State, and Realme, as nothing presently is more necessary, than that the Realme might be delivered of hir; and though by Justice, this might be done in this Realme, yet for certain respects it seemeth better that she be sent into *Scotland*, to be delyvered to the Regent and his Party, so as it may be by some good Meanes wrought, that they themselves wold secretly require it, and that good Assurance may be gyven, that as they have heretofore many Tymes, specially in the Tyme of the Quene's formar Regents offred, so they wold without fayle proceed with hir by wey of Justice; so as nether that Realme nor this shuld be endangered by hir hereafter, for otherwise to have hir and to kepe hir wer of all other most dangerous.⁸⁰

Thus, Killigrew requested that the Scottish Protestant leaders execute Mary without any mention of Elizabeth, which would allow her to stay on agreeable terms with the French and eliminate their need to invade England to liberate the Stuart sovereign. Morton and the bedridden regent yearned to rid their adversaries of their incarcerated figurehead, and they promised that Mary would not live three hours after entering their realm, which would be a "salve for all ther sores."⁸¹ They first requested an English garrison to protect their soldiers in the fallout of the execution, however, and further demanded back-pay owed to their troops by Elizabeth. In turn, Elizabeth wanted noble hostages from Scotland to ensure the prompt execution of the shameful deed.⁸² The two sides remained at loggerheads until Regent Erskine died in late October, which, along with Elizabeth's growing reluctance and realization that a French invasion was not imminent, finally halted the operation.⁸³ Though the plan did not reach fruition, Elizabeth's extreme actions reveal the deep impression that the massacre had on her, since she was ordinarily quite reluctant to execute those of noble blood. Had the scheme not been encumbered by lengthy negotiations or had the queen been willing to offer due compensation, Mary might have been executed nearly fifteen years earlier.

With the potential for religious conflict created by Mary's incarceration in England and with religious unrest across Europe,

Elizabeth recognized the necessity for continued goodwill with France. Notwithstanding her immediate criticism of the massacre and her skepticism of Charles's justification for the killings, Elizabeth desperately needed to stave off diplomatic isolation and maintain amicable relations with her lone Catholic ally. Just four months prior to the massacre, the two realms had signed the Treaty of Blois, designed primarily to unite them in the Netherlands and ensure mutual defense against Spain. The treaty stipulated that neither realm could take part in a cooperative attack with Spain against the other realm and also guaranteed the safety of English Protestant merchants in France. It further secured reciprocal military support within two months of an invasion.⁸⁴ This martial aid was paramount to Elizabeth, who saw impending problems with Spain, Ireland, and Scotland. Should Spain succeed in subduing the Low Counties, Elizabeth also felt assured that Phillip II would turn north to quell English heretics, which would be all the more disastrous if France could join them. England was hardly in a position for an invasion, and her queen consistently opted to remain on the defensive. The treaty also clearly favored militarily weak England, which was isolated and dwarfed by the great Catholic domains. Maintaining an ally with the military capability of France would not only be vital in case of war, but would also likely deter warmongers from engaging England.

Perhaps the most crucial of all provisions in Blois, however, dealt with affairs in Scotland. It stipulated that both English and French garrisons in Scotland would be disbanded and that neither realm could dispatch troops to the area without provocation. The treaty also granted Elizabeth permission to use arms against the Scots to force the return of English rebels.⁸⁵ At the time of the massacre, Scotland was embroiled in a bloody civil war between the pro-Mary Catholic faction, housed in their stronghold at Edinburgh Castle and supported by a French garrison, and the Protestant, Anglophile side in support of the child King James. When Regent Erskine died on October 29, 1572, the Protestants lost one of their most effective leaders, while his death also created a power vacuum and left the young king without a guardian.⁸⁶ These circumstances surely troubled Elizabeth, who saw the prospect of a Catholic-governed Scotland on the horizon. The presence of French soldiers and the renewal of the Auld Alliance in this disunited region must have only further compounded her distress. It is no surprise that Elizabeth yearned to keep the treaty intact considering the proliferation of hostile Catholic factions nearby. It not only eliminated the possibility

of a Scotland-based French assault, but it also prevented France and Spain from allying and gave England defensive support. With the clear advantages that the Treaty of Blois entailed, Elizabeth put her immediate disgust for the massacre behind her and sought to extend Anglo-French rapport. Her benevolence paid off less than one year after the massacre, when an English force under Drury helped topple Scotland's Catholic faction and restore Protestantism.⁸⁷

Elizabeth's cautious foreign policy between 1572 and 1576 was a direct result of the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre. Based upon her actions in late 1572 alone, it is clear that the killings had a profound effect on the queen. From her harsh words for Charles, to her suspension of the Alençon courtship, to her mustering of troops, she took several steps to display her outrage and protect her realm. Despite all of her worries and preparations, Elizabeth realized that her emotions could not outweigh the good of the nation, which led her to shore up relations with Spain and continue her alliance with France. Her reaction to this most infamous of all early modern religious massacres clearly reveals a queen who understood England's position in the world and cared about the well-being of her subjects.

Notes

1. Dudley Digges, *The Compleat Ambassador: Or Two Treaties of the intended marriage of Qu. Elizabeth of Glorious Memory: Comprised in Letters of Negotiation of Sir Francis Walsingham, her Resident in France Together with the Answers of the Lord Burleigh, the Earl of Leicester, Sir Tho: Smith, and others Wherein, as in a clear Mirror, may be seen the Faces of the two Courts of England and France, as they then stood; with many remarkable passages of State, not at all mentioned in any History* (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1655), 298.
2. TNA, SP 70/125, f. 73r; Jean de Serres, *The Three Parties of Commentaries, Containing the whole and perfect discourse of the Ciuill warres of Fraunce, under the raignes of Henry the second, Frances the second, and of Charles the ninth with an Addition of the cruell Murther of the Admirall Chastilion and divers other Nobles, committed the 24. daye of August. Anno 1572*, pt. 3, bk. 10, trans. Thomas Timme (London: Frances Coldocke, 1574), 15.
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CHAPTER 5

THE TSAR AND THE QUEEN: “YOU SPEAK A LANGUAGE THAT I UNDERSTAND NOT”

Anna Riehl Bertolet

In a letter dated October 24, 1570, from Ivan IV of Russia to Elizabeth I of England, the tsar declared his bitter disappointment and anger with Elizabeth's protracted unresponsiveness to his political proposals. This letter marked a climactic point of the epistolary relationship between the two sovereigns. While Ivan's earlier messages to Elizabeth skirted the issue of their different genders, this letter presents it as his principal objection, blaming the queen's reluctance on her lack of authority by virtue of her being a woman:

And wee had thought that you had been ruler over your lande and had sought honor to your self and profit to your countrie, and therefore wee did pretend those weightie affaires betweene you and vs; But now wee perceive that there be other men that doe rule, and not men but bowers and merchaunts the which seeke not the wealth and honour of our maiesties, but they seeke there own profit of marchauntize: and you flowe in your maydenlie estate like a maide.¹

The last statement, “А ты пребываешь в своем девическом чину как есть пошлая девица”² literally means, “And you continue bearing the title of a virgin, being truly a mere (common) maiden.” In its tautological reference to Elizabeth's virginity, this phrasing admits the social elevation that it paradoxically seeks to undo by affirming the suitability of her being a virgin and therefore unsuitability of being a monarch.³ Virginity was for this tsar a sign of political as well as sexual inexperience. Ivan himself was known to have lost

his virginity at the age of thirteen. Therefore, his denigration of Elizabeth's womanhood especially because of her virginity glosses her actions as a lack of authority, independence, and knowledge he believed he possessed as an experienced male.

In its unabashed criticism and reproach, this railing letter is a testimony to the misunderstanding between Elizabeth and Ivan, a difficulty whose causes are hardly accidental but which Elizabeth deliberately cultivated. Unfortunately, Elizabeth's response to Ivan's outburst survives only in fragments of her Latin missive to the tsar; however, the evenness of her tone, in sharp contrast with Ivan's invective, signals the queen's confidence in her ability to gain control over this uncomfortable diplomatic situation. In particular, she assures Ivan that her ambassador Anthony Jenkinson will relate truthfully that "no merchants rule our state, but that we ourselves take care of all state matters, as suitable for a virgin and queen, appointed by the almighty God, and that no other prince receives as much obedience by his subjects than we do by our people."⁴ But even though she restores the dignity of her sovereignty in this declaration by equating queen and virgin as symbols of power, Elizabeth still fails to mollify Ivan's anger: she does not heed his request to turn her attention away from the matters of commerce and toward establishing a political alliance between the two states.

Wrestling with the geographical as well as political remoteness, Ivan made a concerted effort to bridge the gap between Russia and England in a conversation between the two monarchs as equals who put political matters ahead of the mercantile gain. In her correspondence with Ivan, much of Elizabeth's concern was with obtaining and maintaining trading privileges for the Muscovy Company, a London establishment formed in 1555.⁵ Ivan's efforts to widen her interest in Russia as a political ally remained largely unsuccessful. Essentially disconnected from the comparatively remote British isle, Russia was unable to establish a conversation as intense and intimate as Ivan's interactions with the neighboring countries, such as Poland, Sweden, and the German states. The reason for this failure, however, is rooted only in part in England's remoteness. Elizabeth's political stance and particular monarchical style hindered Ivan's hopes and made an alliance with England impossible. Moreover, the two monarchs repeatedly misunderstood each other because their writing was a product of different rhetorical systems.

After an overview of the correspondence between Elizabeth and Ivan, this essay will focus on the elements of visual and verbal rhetoric

used by the two monarchs, pointing out not only how Elizabeth's rhetoric differed from Ivan's patterns of thinking, but also how the difference in customs produced misunderstanding between the two correspondents. I will then explore the implications of Ivan's proposal for an Anglo-Russian alliance, a point of primary contention between the two monarchs. In conclusion, I will juxtapose the rhetoric of their correspondence with that evident in Ivan's letters to the male monarchs such as John III of Sweden and Stefan Batory of Poland and in Elizabeth's correspondence with Sultan Murad III of the Ottoman Empire. This juxtaposition suggests that the strategies in Ivan's and Elizabeth's dealings with other monarchs were modified in their interactions with each other based on their objectives. Ivan mitigated his belligerence in order to establish a friendly relationship with the distant English queen while Elizabeth, whose interest in the intercourse with Eastern states such as Russia and the Ottoman Empire was purely that of trade, had to find a way to keep Ivan's insistent political proposals in check while protecting the interests of her merchants.

Two Monarchs, Two Worlds

As so many discoveries tend to be, Russia's and England's introduction to each other was an accident, or, to be more precise, a result of an error. The two states, of course, were aware of each other's existence well before their representatives came face to face in 1553 when English merchants, on their way to find a passage to the Indies, landed on the coast of Russia instead. As early as 1510, Henry VIII and his courtiers dressed up as Muscovites for the amusement of Queen Katherine and her ladies,⁶ and, likewise, Russia's knowledge of the existence of England predates the 1553 encounter with the English. However, as the interaction between the two nations began, both the people and, even more so, their monarchs, had to base their diplomatic strategies on reported knowledge and, frequently, assumptions about the other side's culture, economy, and political disposition. Although Ivan was significantly more invested in this process than was Elizabeth, both monarchs attempted to impose familiar conventions onto each other's foreignness.

Both the English queen and the Russian tsar had dynamic political personalities. Elizabeth was famous for her charisma, strategic delays, and equivocations as well as occasional flair-ups of hot temper, and Ivan was known for his tyrannical and paranoid tendencies,

cruelty, aggressiveness, and pride. Nowhere are the differences in their character more striking than in their correspondence. The letters that passed between Elizabeth and Ivan from the late 1560s to the early 1580s register a clash between the personalities of the two rulers and also a clash between the entire diplomatic and political cultures each of them represents. The analysis of their letters reveals stark differences in their writing and ruling styles: where one favors direct locution, the other prefers vagueness and obliqueness; where one's strategy of choice is a surprise attack, the other refuses to bypass the stage of lengthy negotiations. As a result, the two writers continuously work at cross-purposes because their primary aims of persuasion are inherently dissimilar. But despite the idiosyncratic elements transpiring in this correspondence, it mirrors the contrasting cultural paradigms of England and Russia. These letters thus make it increasingly difficult to distinguish to what extent each of the monarchs' individual personality is a product of its native political environment and to what extent the epistolary and diplomatic strategies of the two rulers are determined by their individual agency rather than by broader historical and cultural experience.

Language: Communication and Miscommunication

Both Elizabeth and Ivan relied heavily on the effect of monarchical presence that allowed them to impress their audience with their personal charisma.⁷ But the direct diplomatic intercourse between the two monarchs excluded the possibility of such personal influence, conducted as it was exclusively and entirely through language, written language and the voiceless symbols of sovereign power, such as their seals. Causes and symptoms of the fundamental miscommunication between Ivan and Elizabeth were located on a variety of linguistic levels, formal, stylistic, and rhetorical. In the most practical sense, the two monarchs simply lacked a common language. Ivan wrote only in Russian; Elizabeth alternated between Latin and English. In addition, the two states practiced different systems of authentication and thus the two monarchs had dissimilar expectations with the use of seals, titles, signatures, and oaths. These methods of authentication constitute their own language, constructed according to the rules conceived differently by each party. As a result, neither communicated in a manner wholly understood by the other.

Marked stylistic divergences between Ivan's and Elizabeth's letters in part stem from their different attitudes to writing. As Daryl

Palmer points out, Russian culture of the time was predominantly oral, and written expression was considered to be a prompt for meditation: "Writing and reading were preliminaries to the cogitation that evolved in the reader's mind. In foreign relations, writing was viewed as an awkward necessity for managing the mundane."⁸ The dominance of the oral culture in Russian court is evident in Ivan's writing style: scholars note the prominent traces of oral speech in Ivan's letters, concluding that he probably dictated them, thus attempting to approximate a face-to-face encounter with his correspondents.⁹ By contrast, Western humanism valued writing for its enabling of transmission of ideas: "When it came to foreign affairs, the English court thought in terms of letters." However, as Palmer rightly remarks, "an emphasis on letters does not assure an emphasis on communication."¹⁰ Many of Elizabeth's letters, in fact, intentionally withhold information.

With the invention of the printing press and literacy on the rise, England's writing culture was significantly more advanced than writing in Russia. Elizabeth herself was an adroit rhetorician, and the study of her writing in recent scholarship has illuminated the extent of her mastery of language. Ivan's writing style is significantly more cumbersome as Russian literary language was at his time in a very early stage of development. However, one must not underestimate Ivan's talents and originality as a writer. Dmitry Likhachov in his study of Ivan's writings points out the fundamental duality of Ivan's writing style that encompasses a clash between "passionate sincerity—and sinister dissembling; a feeling of superiority to the reader—and an attitude towards the reader as his equal... a tendency to correct and punish by use of force—and a desire to bring round and refute his opponent by using rational argumentation; a solemnity of address—and common expressions and rude vernacular; composure—and impetuosity."¹¹ Ivan's passionate reliance on the force of persuasion¹² comes across in his writing to all his correspondents, Russian and foreign, members of the lower class and the nobility.

Because Ivan and Elizabeth did not understand each other's language, they had to rely on the interpreters who provided them with translations. The linguistic discrepancy has doubled the number of epistolary manuscripts, thereby increasing the rate of the letters' survival, whether in the original or in translation. These translations were not entirely reliable shadow images of the original. In both courts, this situation produced an anxiety of misunderstanding as well as a ready excuse in the argumentative exchanges that ensued.

Thus, in May 1570, the Muscovy Company sent to William Cecil a request that Elizabeth's next letter be written in English and then translated into Russian by Daniel Silvester, the English ambassador. This request is accompanied by a suggestion of reversed translation as a method for verification of accuracy: "And ffor the more certen-tye that hyr ma-ty shalbe well ansewered that Danyell hathe don the same trwly, ther ys one called Normytont and Hatry that may perves the same so shall declare the same agente to your honnour [Cecil] in Inglyshe."¹³ One translator was not sufficient; a second opinion was a necessary precaution against misrepresentation of the letter's content.

This concern with accuracy of the outgoing missives was amplified because of the two monarchs' suspicions about the veracity of each other's meaning. Ivan, in particular, was taken by the urgency of verbatim accuracy. He desired that Elizabeth repeat word for word all the articles of his draft of the Anglo-Russian agreement, a condition he insisted on as crucial to forming a binding alliance between the two states. Ivan's ambassador carrying the draft that postulated the conditions of the alliance announces the tsar's request that Elizabeth's letters

be written in Rouse worde for word as the coppie of the lettre that the emperour sent and that her highnes would sett her hand to the said lettre and take an oath before the emperours ambassadour and to hang the seale to those letters.

The cause whie the lettres should be written in rouse is that the emperour cannott vnderstand anie language but his own.

The emperour would dislike of the lettre if it be not written word for word as that lettre which he sent.

And when the said letter shalbe translated into rowsse that it maie be done in the sight of the said ambassador.

The Russian ambassador's request further suggests that "as the quene doth wryght her hyeghnes letters in rowse so th'emprore will wryght his letters backe agayne in englishe or in lattin and to the same will sett his selle and will kisse the crosse in the presence of the quenes ambassador."¹⁴

Ivan's arrogant acknowledgment that he knows no other language but his own is mirrored in Elizabeth's confession of her ignorance of the Russian tongue. However, she finds a way to counterbalance her lack of knowledge of Russian by highlighting her competence in Latin and Italian. This expectation of Western diplomacy creates a

counterpart of linguistic proficiency to Ivan's somewhat concealed confinement to his own language. Elizabeth writes to Ivan:

...your embassadour the noble person Andrew Gregoriwiche Saviena [Savin]...hath delivered vnto vs certen writings in the Russian tongue, which because we could not vnderstand for lack of knowledg of that tongue, the said ambassadour hath delivered to vs in certen other writings both in the Romane tongue and in the Italian, which are sayd to be the trew translations of the said letters in the Russian tongue: both which (wrytyngs) we do well vnderstand...

After recounting her take on the contents of Ivan's letter, Elizabeth closes with a qualification added in the revision: "... as we find conteyned in your highnes writings *as they ar translated*."¹⁵ Such cautionary reminders of linguistic difference are absent from Elizabeth's dealings with western European powers. In part, these reminders function as a synecdoche for concerns about much larger difference in political culture. Elizabeth's proficiency in languages is, of course, a product of the Western cultural difference where princes trained in humanistic learning were expected to be multilingual.

In the context of the oral ambassadorial negotiations, doubts about accuracy of translation are added to the suspicions about an imperfect mediation of the monarchs' true meaning by their embassies. When faced with Ivan's surprising offer of a mutual asylum, Elizabeth noted this interpretive limitation: she instructed her ambassador to convey her suspicion that Anthony Jenkinson "might [have] misconceau[e][d]" Ivan's words; the queen, therefore, requested that the matter be repeated so she can "know cleerly his intencon."¹⁶ In this letter, Elizabeth's fear of misconception functions less as an actual concern than the rhetorical topos of disbelief, a reaction she chose to convey in response to Ivan's proposal to provide a mutual refuge if one of the monarchs is forced to flee from his or her native country. (Likewise, at a later date, to abate Ivan's frustration with the English fixation on the merchant's affairs, Jenkinson played the (mis) translation card on Elizabeth's behalf, suggesting to Ivan, "either thy ambassador did vntruly enform thy ma-tie, or els thy princely minde, and the true meaning of the queenes highnes her ambassador, for want of a good interpreter, was not well vnderstood."¹⁷) This rhetorical maneuver reflected the strategies typical in Western diplomacy. Elizabeth chose to proclaim that she "could not believe her ears" rather than tell Ivan directly that his request for an asylum means he is an unpopular monarch whose mistakes are likely to produce

a rebellion. Not having access to Western rhetorical tradition, Ivan missed the implications of Elizabeth's oblique message and continued to insist on his original demands.

Together with the lack of a common written language, misunderstanding and friction between the two sovereigns were a result of their different methods of verifying the authenticity of their letters and promises. Ivan was particularly concerned with regulation, frustrated to the point of indignation with what he perceived as Elizabeth's disrespectful inattention to the formalities expected from a royal correspondence in Russia. Chief among those concerns were Ivan's expectations for use of titles, seals, and signatures in the letters, and necessity for ritualistic confirmation of an agreement by an oath and kissing of the cross. Elizabeth did not appear to share these concerns.

Ivan's full title, as recorded, for example, in his message to Elizabeth from May 1582, was admittedly rather lengthy: "The great Lord, king and great Duke John the sonne of Vasili of all Russia, of Volodimir, Moscouia and Nouogorod, King of Casan, king of Astracan, Lord of Plesko, and great prince of Smolensko, of Tver, of Vgor, Perme, Votka, Bolgar, and of others, Lord and great Duke of Nouogorod in the lowe contrey, of Cherneegoue; of Razan, Polotsko, Rostoue, Yeroslaue, of Belozer, Lifland, Vdor, Obdor, Condence, and commaunder of all the land of Seeberia, and of the north partes and others."¹⁸ Elizabeth habitually shortened this cumbersome title and addressed Ivan as "Imperator Moscouitarum etc." (Sept. 16, 1568), or "Emperour and great Duke our good brother" (May 18, 1570), or else "serenissime princeps, frater et amice charissime" (June 19, 1583).¹⁹ Ivan was much aggrieved by these abbreviations, deeming them disrespectful and demeaning. For the English draft of "Articles" in 1569, therefore, he was first hailed as the "great Duke of Muscovia," but this phrase was revised, probably to avoid further wounding Ivan's pride, as the "right high right excellent right mightie prince . . . k. and great Duke of Russia; Volodomere etc and others, her dearest brother and cousin."²⁰ It is obvious that Elizabeth preferred title for Ivan was "Duke" rather than "Tsar," and even when she did refer to him as "king," as in this last example, she used an abbreviation to do so. Such abbreviations were commonplace in Western diplomatic practice, and Elizabeth's own title was frequently reduced to "Queen of England, France, and Ireland, etc." No doubt this truncation of his formal title infuriated Ivan rather than pacified him.

The Russian tsar was additionally offended by Elizabeth's inconsistent use of seals on her correspondence. Elizabeth alternated between the Privy Seal and the Great Seal, and possibly even the Signet, and this inconsistency caused Ivan some suspicion.²¹ In the 1570 letter, he vented, "And how manie lettres haue beene brought to vs hither, and not one lettre that hath beene sealed with one seale, but euerie lettre hath had a contrarie seale, which is no princelie fashion, and such lettres in all places be not credited, but euerie prince hath in his realme one proper seale; but wee did give credit to these lettres, and accordinge to your lettres wee wrought."²² In a subsequent letter where she circumvents Ivan's demand for an oath of allegiance, Elizabeth cleverly used the necessity for secrecy to explain the issue of her inconsistent use of seals:

... the only and chief cawse why wee yealded not to the confirmation of the same by othe grewe of the great respect wee had to have the contents of the sayd league kept secret (a thyng no lesse earnestly by him required, than iudged by vs of it selfe most necessarie consideringe of what importance it was towards him) which with no possibilitie could have been performed with that solemnitie that is vsuall in that behalfe. Ffor the leagues which wee confirme by othe [oath] doe ordinarily passe our greate seale: which can not be done but that the same must runne throughe the hands of so great a nombre of our ministers as in no possibilitie they can be kept secret.²³

Elizabeth's secret letter promising asylum to Ivan was attached, therefore, to her Privy rather than Great Seal. Her European correspondents would have been familiar with the custom of affixing particular types of seals to documents of greater or lesser importance or secrecy, but Ivan was unaware of this practice.²⁴

Another point of contention was the oath of allegiance, a crucial element in Ivan's understanding of the protocol for establishing an alliance. The procedure also involved the kissing of a cross which was a hallmark of Russian Orthodox practice but constituted a problematic gesture for a Protestant queen. Elizabeth diplomatically omitted any mention of the kissing of a cross in her replies to Ivan's requests. She also maneuvered around these requests by repeatedly assuring Ivan that her ambassador would discuss the matters of alliance on her behalf, but Ivan found these conversations frustratingly unproductive. Ivan's impressions are justified since the English queen encouraged her ambassadors to practice the art of evasiveness. We find, for instance, in Elizabeth's instructions to her ambassador

Silvester in May 1575, an order that he should “vse all the perswasions [he] maye to diswade” Ivan from sending his ambassador to require Elizabeth’s confirmation of the league by oath. There is no evidence that Elizabeth ever took an oath that Ivan so ardently demanded.²⁵

Furthermore, the Russian tsar was dissatisfied with Elizabeth’s signature authenticating her letters; because this practice was utterly foreign to Ivan, he interpreted it as essentially fraudulent. In May 1570, Elizabeth concluded her solemn pledge of a refuge to Ivan, should he need to flee his country, as follows: “This wee promise by virtue of these our lettres and by the word of a Christian Prince, in wittness whereof and for the further fortificacon of this our lettre. Wee Q. Elizabethhe doe subscribe this with our owne hand in the presence of these our nobles and counsellors . . . and haue also thereto hanged our priue seale . . .”²⁶ To Elizabeth’s subjects and Western sovereigns, the phrase “by the word of a Christian Prince” would evoke significance too weighty to be dismissed as ineffectual. Neither would they underestimate the value of Elizabeth’s personal signature, which imparted legitimacy not only to her letters, but also to important documents of state, in some cases, as on death warrants, making the difference between life and death.

Yet, in the Russian chancery, the signature of a monarch was not customary. The authenticity of a document was largely demonstrated in its bearing of the only royal seal (the double-headed eagle) and the manuscript’s attractive appearance that conveyed its authorship by a prosperous monarch. Inna Lubimenko describes the originals of Ivan’s letters as “very beautiful; they were written on parchment, the first lines in gold, in a large clear handwriting.”²⁷ It is perhaps indicative of Ivan’s anger that his epistolary outburst in 1570 bears no traces of gilding or other decoration, except for the three bold lines marking the beginning of the letter. Such lines appear in gold on other Russian letters to the English court, but this time they are drawn in plain ink. Ivan’s subsequent letters, however, return to the custom of ornamentation. Elizabeth did not follow suit. While she did issue occasional illuminated charters that, for their detailed beauty, may be esteemed as precious works of art, she apparently did not deem her routine letters to Ivan worthy of artistic embellishment.

The practice of demarcating a document’s importance by decorating it with great care, however, was exercised in the case of the “Articles . . . for a League of Amity.” Sent upon Ivan’s request in 1569, this manuscript was beautifully scripted and gilded—except for corrections hurriedly inserted into the original draft.²⁸ Moreover, for

a major political document like that requested by Ivan from the queen of England, signatures of the royal council would have been expected. Thus, when the talk about the alliance was resumed, Ivan complained that Elizabeth would not “permit her council to sign” the patent and reiterated his request for her to take an oath.²⁹

To the tsar’s means of legitimization by oath and signatures of her council, Elizabeth opposed her own system of verification: her prominent autograph confirming her “princely word.” In the instructions to ambassador Silvester, she charged him to convey to Ivan, “... wee had well hoped that he had conceived so honorably of vs that no othe [oath] could have drawen vs to a more sinceare performance of our promise delivered in writynge signed with our hand, that the great respect wee beare to the mayntenance of our princely word, as in honor wee are bownd...”³⁰ Elizabeth continues: “And as towchyng his mislikyng that the league was not signed by our cowncell, you maye tell him that suche thinges as are signed by our selfe are never signed by our cowncell. Ffor that it is held a kynd of abasement of the state and qualitie wee should to have any ioined with vs in that behalf.”³¹ The choice, then, was between Elizabeth’s singular signature and the signatures of her council. Ivan undoubtedly preferred the latter while Elizabeth deliberately avoided sending the “Articles” signed by the council. Along with the hurried insertions in the final albeit illuminated draft, this choice seems to signify Elizabeth’s reluctance to treat the proposed league as a matter of great political importance. At any rate, Ivan’s sense of Elizabeth’s dismissiveness was not entirely unjustified.

Perpetual Amity and the Merchants’ Affairs

Ivan proposed an Anglo-Russian alliance in mid-1560s. The Russian initiative of extending negotiations with the English from the matters of trade to a political coalition started to take shape in 1566–1567, after about a dozen years of relations between the two countries. In the mid-sixteenth century, Ivan was engaged in a complex program of expanding and securing his power, and in time he came to see the potential for an English alliance as a means to solidify this power as well as create a ready harbor for his personal safety should he need to abdicate. Ian Grey suggests that Ivan was seeking to gain knowledge of Western military technology and therefore looked to England to send to Russia arms and men skilled in warcraft.³² Furthermore, an alliance with a kingdom located at a distance from Russia’s borders

would have provided Ivan with a supporter who would have no claim on his territory.

The main terms of the proposed treaty, in addition to allowing traffic between and within the two realms, included a political union between Russia and England, broadly described as sharing friendship and animosity toward other states by default. Accordingly, friends and enemies of one were to be considered the same for the other, and, in case of a disagreement, one would provide immediate military support against the enemy of the other. Elizabeth revised this binding agreement, interjecting a step for negotiations between quarrels and war; she proposed that, if one party is “iniured and the justice of his cause made manifest[,] the other party shall in most earnest sort and without vnnecessary delayes require the Prince that did the iniury to desist from further offence and to returne to honnorable condicons of peace...”³³ Ivan, however, considered this amendment imprudent, arguing that negotiations would alert the opposition and therefore eliminate the advantages of any surprise attack against the putative enemy. As late as 1583, he once again compelled Elizabeth to defend her strategy. On that occasion, Elizabeth had to remind Ivan of Christian beliefs as well as the “law of nations, and common reason” that it was requisite “not to professe enimity, or enter into effects of hostility against any prince or potentat, without warning first giuen to the party so procuring enimity to desiste from his wrong doing or cause giuing of hostility,” and point out that this “kind of capitulating is vsuall, between vs, and all other princes, be they neuer so remote from vs.”³⁴ But Ivan did not need to be educated in this course of reasoning. In fact, in his 1581 letter to Stefan Batory, the Russian tsar himself advocated the necessity for negotiations as a means to avoid spilling Christian blood.³⁵ He therefore used the same argument when it was convenient, in order to reproach Batory for his surprise attack on the Russians. Yet, in his dialogue with the English queen, Ivan continued to choose the opposite stance on this issue. Ivan’s slyness and heightened aggressiveness while countering Elizabeth’s consistent recourse to reason are especially evident in this contradiction.

Upon a closer look at the “Articles” sent by the queen to Russia in 1569, it is clear that Elizabeth has deliberately tampered with Ivan’s requests for an alliance, and her modifications to his document infuriated the meticulous Russian tsar who, for all his energetic brutishness, was impressively fluent in the subtleties of political matters. The fundamental problem was in the monarchs’ different views on

the value of international commerce. Elizabeth's main interest in correspondence with the Russian tsar was motivated by her investment in the Muscovy Company. A political alliance was only necessary to protect the trade of the English merchants. Conversely, Ivan considered the trade matters essentially beneath his concern. To the "boorish" issues worrying the lowly merchants, Ivan juxtaposed the elevated state matters, and these matters included a plan for forming an offensive and defensive league between Russia and England.³⁶ Elizabeth clearly was not interested in entangling her state in the difficult obligations required by such alliance. In 1568, she charged her ambassador Thomas Randolph to "pass those matters with silence," giving the ambassador a background information that his queen is "not ignorant of the immitie that is betwext [Ivan] and the Empire of Roome, and also betwext him and kings of [Sweden and Poland] others: so as it can not be conveyent for [a] treaty with him, otherwise than to haue som graunts from him for priuilegs to the benefit of our merchants."³⁷ All of Elizabeth's cards are laid open here—not for Ivan's enlightenment, of course, but for her ambassador's instrumental use. This dispatch indeed presents a rare occasion for a glimpse of the precise reasoning behind this queen's notorious delays and evasions. Here, she reveals her prominent interest in economic matters that, for Western states, were becoming political matters as well.

It took several years for Ivan to reconcile himself to the failure of his ambition to form an alliance with Elizabeth on his original terms. However, he quickly understood that his pressing requests on the matters of state were being discounted in favor of the merchant affairs, and he repeatedly pointed out the ignobility of these priorities, reminding Elizabeth that "it is the use of all countries that princes' affaires should be first ended and after that to seeke a gaine."³⁸ Ivan therefore meant to inflict an ultimate offense when he pronounced that, instead of Elizabeth, England is ruled by "other men . . . and not men but bowers and merchaunts," thereby extending the insult to the entire English system of government.³⁹ He finally dropped the matters (as it turned out, only for a time being), noting perceptively that "this business has tarried too long."⁴⁰ The negotiations were revived in 1574, and, still dissatisfied in 1576, Ivan claimed to have formed a similar league with the emperor Maximillian, sending Elizabeth word of the enormity of her loss. If only Elizabeth had taken his politics seriously, Ivan proclaimed, "our whole cuntrye of Russia hadd bene as much at her pleasure as England ys as frelye

to haue sent or commaunded anye thinge thence as out of her owne treasurye or wardrope."⁴¹ This sweeping promise, of course, was not included in Ivan's articles of alliance and was now angled to kindle Elizabeth's regret for spurning Ivan's political propositions. Not surprisingly, after a six-year silence, the echoes of the negotiations about the treaty were heard again, and once more Elizabeth sent Ivan somewhat revised "Articles for the league betwixt Her Majesty and the great Duke of Muscovy" (May 1582), still not entirely satisfactory for Ivan.⁴²

After a decade of wrestling with Elizabeth's verbal evasiveness, Ivan gave a discerning summation of her style, declaring that his dissatisfaction "consisteth in the scruple aunsweres of our systar and in the doubttes and acceptions contayned in them...that she maketh dayntyte to requiar the like of us as our requeste is to haue of her accordinge to the symple and playne meanyng of our demaunds."⁴³ On one hand, the "simple and plain meaning"; on the other, the "doubts and exceptions." These phrases not only pinpoint the polarity of the two monarchs' expressive and political strategies, they also elucidate Elizabeth's privileged position as the one who withholds and circumvents her meaning while having her correspondent's intentions displayed in her open view. In other words, Elizabeth made herself deliberately difficult to read.

In Search of Refuge

In addition to the plans of alliance, Ivan entertained a mutual promise of asylum. He made a secret proposal that "there may be assurance made by oath and faith betwixt the Q. ma-tie and him, that yf any misfortune might fall or chance upon either of them to goe out of their countries, that it might be lawfull to either of them to come into the others countrey for the safegard of them selues and their lyves..."⁴⁴ In her response, Elizabeth charged her ambassador to inform Ivan that the queen feared that Jenkinson "might misconceive[d]" Ivan's words because she had a report of good state of affairs in Russia. She added: "And yet neuer the les for the clearer vnderstanding of his mynde, we haue willed you to repete this matter, therin to know cleerly his intencon."⁴⁵ This way, Elizabeth gave Ivan the benefit of the doubt, strategically employing to her advantage both the difference in language and the possibility of her ambassador's imperfect understanding and conveyance of Ivan's request. Moreover, she incorporated a compliment to Ivan's ability to rule

(although qualified by being received indirectly), followed by an assurance that, “if any mischance might happen in his estate...he shall be friendly received into our dominions.”⁴⁶ Elizabeth ignored or elided the mutual necessity that would imply that she would need to flee her realm.

Two years later, Elizabeth reiterated her willingness to accommodate Ivan, his wife, and his “deare children the princes,” once again omitting a reciprocal request for her refuge in Russia.⁴⁷ One must give Ivan his due for a somewhat uncharacteristic obliqueness of his grievance as he dropped hints in his response to the English queen: “And if you wish for more amity and friendship from us, ponder upon that subject and do that business, by which you may increase our amity towards you.”⁴⁸ In the meantime, Silvester was instructed by Ivan to request that Elizabeth “repeat each article of his, and to require the same to be as firmly yelded vnto and confirmed with like assurance vnto her highnes as of his part he expecteth from her.”⁴⁹ One way or another, it was clear to Elizabeth that those references urged her to ask Ivan for “refuge in case of necessity.” She refused to declare that such necessity would ever be a reality for her.

After seven years of prevarication, the queen finally furnished Ivan with an explanation: “...yf our subiects should never so little conceave that wee grewe into anie doubt or suspicion of anie chawnge or alteration in them towards vs (as wee knowe they would by consentyng to the makinge of suche a request) yt would breed so dangerous a mislikyng in them towards vs, as might put vs in perill of our estate.”⁵⁰ In other words, a provisional request for refuge not only implied a sovereign’s uncertainty in her subjects’ loyalty, but, more dangerously, making such uncertainty known could serve as a cause for rebellion. The relationship Elizabeth cultivated with her people was based on the rhetoric of mutual love, expressed in Sir John Harrington’s famous declaration that “We did all love hir, for she said she loved us...”⁵¹ This rhetoric was based on medieval courtly love ultimately found in Andreas Capellanos but put in practice in the romances and in the governing strategy of Henry VIII, at least as he chose to express it in his “Golden Speech.” In stark opposition, Ivan had a sense of being surrounded by plotting saboteurs while his people lived in fear of the tyrant who once had exterminated the population of an entire Russian city, much of it with his own sword. Elizabeth’s fears of sedition could not possibly match Ivan’s need to secure an exit strategy.

Correspondence with Other Rulers

The tone of Ivan's correspondence with Elizabeth, in the 1570 letter as well as others, however, is put in perspective when juxtaposed with Ivan's epistolary interactions with other European monarchs, those whose politics hit much closer to home and cut the Russian tsar to the quick by encroaching on his territory or thwarting his ambitious plans for expansion. For instance, Ivan's correspondence with the active participants in the Livonian war (1558–1583) is a particularly telling example. Russia waged war against a revolving cast of states (ranging from Denmark and Norway, to Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden) for the possession of Livonia (present-day Estonia and Latvia). Written evidence of the uneasy interactions between the openly unfriendly nations are found in the extant letters from the Russian tsar to Swedish and Polish kings.

Ivan's letters to John III of Sweden are imperiously haughty and full of insults; their tone and contents make his letters to the English queen sound like models of courtesy and self-composure. Ivan used the classic method of undermining his opponent's ethos in an effort to humiliate the Swedish monarch. Ivan's attack was especially bitter in his second missive (1573). He threw a haughty challenge to John III's monarchical legitimacy, bombarding him with unsavory renditions of the origins of the House of Vasa, to which John III belonged. In particular, Ivan pointed out that the founder of the House of Vasa, John III's father Gustav, had "shamelessly" seized the kingdom from Christian II of Denmark. Indeed, Gustav came to power by leading a rebellion against the Danish king, and John III could hardly answer Ivan's mocking questions about the nonexistent kings of Sweden who preceded Gustav. Ivan announced that he had heard of none and wondered if John III's family has "found these kings in their store-room." Without mincing words, Ivan called this family "холопы" (slaves or boors), and John III himself a "boor" and "heathen."⁵² After boasting his own ancient royal blood and evoking the legendary origin of the Russian monarchs from "Augustus Caesar," Ivan voiced his resentment at Gustav's usurpation and John's own encroachment on Ivan's royal power: "But if you want to appropriate the titles and seals of our royal majesty, then perhaps you, having gone mad, may even call yourself the ruler of the universe—but who will listen to you?"⁵³ Ivan called the contents of John's own letter "лай" (yapping), and taunted his correspondent with an utmost rudeness: "But if you, having adopted a canine mouth, would like to bark for amusement, then

it is your boorish custom: it is an honor for you, but for us, a great tsar, it is a dishonor even to stay in touch with you, while there isn't anything more bitter in the world than yapping back and forth with you; and if you'd like to bark back and forth, then find a boorish slave just like you are a boorish slave, and yap back and forth with him."⁵⁴ This letter encapsulates Ivan's diplomatic concerns with power and legitimacy. He adopted such an antagonistic position against an enemy because he sought to wrest power from him. Elizabeth's lineage also included an usurper in her grandfather, but Ivan made no mention of her family with such disdain because he needed to secure England as an ally.

Likewise, Russia's hostile interactions with Poland were reflected in the reproachful and mocking tone of Ivan's correspondence with Stefan Batory. In relation to the fight for the Livonian territory, Ivan insisted on the necessity of a redistribution of land rights and reconfiguration of the borders in response to the political changes as well as military conquests. Ivan accused Batory of demanding the land that belonged to Poland "over a hundred years ago, whereas during this time many rulers have died and appeared before the eternal judge.... Soon you will demand even what was lost in the time of Adam!"⁵⁵ Again, Ivan's tone is hostile, and the tsar is not proposing a reciprocal request as he asked of Elizabeth.

Of course, Batory and John III were not only rulers of the states neighboring Russia, but they were also males and thus elicited a particularly aggressive approach from their Russian correspondent. In fact, Elizabeth was the only female ruler with whom Ivan had to reckon in his political activities; his account of the Russian-English relations during the reign of Elizabeth's sister Mary indicated that he took comfort in Mary's marriage to Philip that allowed Ivan to deal with them as a joint entity. As an unmarried female monarch who was open to advice from her Privy Council and had to take into account the opinions of her Parliament, Elizabeth presented a puzzle to Ivan, who highly valued his position as an absolute ruler who did not engage with women politically.

Elizabeth's gender, nevertheless, was of less importance to Ivan than her ability to make independent political decisions. As mentioned in the beginning of this essay, Ivan allowed himself to comment on Elizabeth's womanhood only once, in his most outspoken and indignant letter of 1570. Although it is known that none of his seven wives participated in matters of state, and although the tsar was not above physical violence toward women even in his own

family,⁵⁶ the notion of a successful female ruler was by no means alien to him. Growing up, he witnessed not only some influential and ambitious women trying to hold their own in Russian court (his grandmother Anna and his beloved nanny Agraphena Cheliadnina, for example), but also his own mother Elena Glinskaya who ruled successfully for five years after the death of Ivan's father Vasili III. Among her accomplishments were a monetary reform, strengthening of the Russian borders against invasion, reshaping the structure of the local government, winning the war against Sigismund of Lithuania, and successful negotiations with Gustav Vasa of Sweden and Tatar Khanates of Kazan and Crimea. As Natalia Pushkaryova points out, Elena was definitely in charge of the state: she "herself led the negotiations with their envoys and made the decisions."⁵⁷ Ivan seems to have learned from his mother's cunning and domineering ways, but also developed a distaste for powerful women in his private life. Hence, his handpicked wives tended to be meek and nonimposing. The tsar's personal preferences, however, do not indicate his inability to take a female monarch seriously, and it is telling that he brought up the gender issue only once and even that in the moment of utmost displeasure with Elizabeth's reluctance to accept his political agenda.

As a contrast, Elizabeth's own correspondence with Sultan Murad III provides an enlightening counterpoint both to her communication with Ivan and the latter's letters to other European rulers discussed above. Anglo-Ottoman relations opened in 1579 and concerned explicitly the matters of trade. Jonathan Burton analyzes this correspondence for its "strategic use of religious rhetoric to provide ideological support for what became an infamous arms trade."⁵⁸ Burton points out that, in Elizabeth's letters, the Ottoman Turk "is treated as a respected equal" and, while the Turks are treated as "infidels" in Mendoza and de Germigny's letters, in Elizabeth-Murad letters, "religious difference is muted as doctrinal identity is emphasized." Murad, for example, "often left out his traditional Islamic epithet in his letters to Elizabeth" while he used Islamic invocations in his dealings with the Catholics. Likewise, Elizabeth "emphasizes what sameness she can find—doctrinal and political—in Islam and Protestantism," transforming "Catholicism into Christianity's principal threat while rendering the Turks as a valuable ally."⁵⁹ Consequently, while the religious and cultural gap between England and the Ottoman Empire was significantly wider than the differences between England and Russia, the Anglo-Turkish relations were not

subject to serious misunderstanding and frustration because both sides had a shared vision of the purpose to which their relationship was formed. That purpose was trade and, for England, it was the same as in the intercourse with Russia.

Conclusion

The correspondence between Elizabeth and Ivan spans over two decades. One may argue that among this queen's fellow monarchs, Ivan was the most passionate in his desire to bend her to his will in search of political alliance, and yet he was the one who understood her the least. For this reason, his eagerness and frustration result from his imaginative and false concept of Elizabeth, and this queen's strategies of withstanding the imposition of Ivan's demands add to our understanding of her ability to articulate her female power in the arena of masculine politics. However, when the Russian tsar considered putting to rest his hopes for an effective political alliance with England, it was in part because he came to know his correspondent so well, and learned to read in the "doubts and exceptions" in her letters some important messages of their own. Thus, he told the English ambassador that he interpreted "a kind of haughtynes in our systar moved tharto by th'abasyng of our selfe toward her in that we purpose that with her which she nothings lesse accompteth of."⁶⁰ And yet, Ivan's thoughts were drawn to England till the last days of his reign.⁶¹

It was, therefore, Ivan's individual vision, heavily medieval in its emphasis on alliance for purposes of military conquest rather than emerging interest in commerce as a "golden chain" linking one state to another,⁶² that created the enormous tension in Anglo-Russian relations. Consequently, the communication between Russia and England became simpler and smoother immediately after Ivan's demise in 1584. His son Fyodor and his eventual replacement Boris Godunov did not harbor political plans involving England and were content with a commercial relationship between the two states. Elizabeth's correspondence with the new Russian ruler Godunov was consequently more business-like and amiable, more direct and certainly less dramatic than her difficult conversation with Ivan.

As to Elizabeth, one may well ask if the experience of her correspondence with the Russian tsar has contributed to her decision, a year after Ivan's death, to initiate a personal epistolary exchange with James VI of Scotland with an offer of a "contract of amity."⁶³ As Janel

Mueller has demonstrated, Elizabeth created, in her correspondence with James, a bond of “friendship-in-kingship,”⁶⁴ a relationship that she could never form with Ivan because (to rephrase Shakespeare’s Hermione slightly) she spoke the language he understood not.

Notes

I am grateful to John Watkins, Craig E. Bertolet, Carole Levin, Thomas Herron, Charles Beem, and the audience of the 2008 South-Central Renaissance Conference for their perceptive comments on this chapter.

1. Yurii Vasil’evich Tolstoi (ed.), *The First Forty Years of Intercourse between England and Russia* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1969), 114. All quotations from Elizabeth-Ivan correspondence are from this edition.
2. *Ibid.*, 109.
3. When Ivan reopens political negotiations with Russia after a cooling period, his concept of Elizabeth as a maiden figurehead implicitly lingers in his demands for her councilors’ signatures. It also appears that the English Parliamentary system explained to Ivan in Elizabeth’s letter from September 16, 1568, not only caused the Russian tsar a bitter resentment, but convinced him in Elizabeth’s lack of personal authority.
4. June 2, 1571. Tolstoi, 119–20 (translation from Russian mine).
5. For information on the operation of the Muscovy Company (also referred to as the Russia [or Russian] Company), see T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company* (Manchester: (Manchester University Press, 1968).
6. See Daryl W. Palmer, *Writing Russia in the Age of Shakespeare* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 1–2. For a survey of western perceptions of Russia in the early modern period, see Marchall T. Poe, “*A People Born to Slavery*”: *Russian in Early Modern European Ethnography*, 1476–1748 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). It is likely that Sigismund von Herberstein’s popular book, *Rerum moscoviticarum commentarii* (Vienna, 1549), [*Notes on the Muscovites*], formed the basis of knowledge about Russia in Elizabeth’s realm.
7. Palmer, 52; D. S. Likhachov, “The Style of Grozny’s Works and the Style of Kurbsky’s Works (The Tsar and the ‘Royal Traitor’),” 186, 196, in *Correspondence of Ivan Grozny and Andrei Kurbsky*, eds. Ya. S. Lur’e and Yu. D. Rykov (Leningrad: Nauka, 1979).
8. Palmer, 60.
9. Likhachov, 187, 201.
10. Palmer, 60.
11. *Ibid.*, 184.

12. Ibid., 185.
13. Tolstoi, 82.
14. May 6 1570. Tolstoi, 85.
15. Strictly speaking, this correction was made by William Cecil (it is made in his handwriting). May 18, 1570. Tolstoi, 90.
16. June 26, 1568. Tolstoi, 44–45.
17. March 23, 1572. Tolstoi, 131.
18. “Instructions of the Emb-rs of Russia, to be pronounced by their interpreter,” May 1582. Tolstoi, 190.
19. Tolstoi, 49, 90, 225. For an informative study of the history of titles of Russian rulers, see Aleksandr Il’ich Filiushkin, *Tituly Russkikh Gosudarei* (Moskva: Al’ians-Arkheo, 2006). See also Isabel de Madariaga’s review of Filiushkin book in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 8.3 (Summer 2007): 651–660.
20. Tolstoi, 74.
21. Both seals were used, for instance, for the documents sent to Russia with the embassy of Thomas Randolph in 1568. Among William Cecil’s papers, there has been preserved a list of these documents “signed by the Queen,” “distinguishing those to be passed under the Privy Seal and under the Great Seal respectively” (June 16 1568). *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury, Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire*. Ed. S.R. Scargill-Bird, Vol. 1:1306–1571. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1883. *State Papers Online*, Gale, Cengage Learning, 2009, entry number 1175.
22. Tolstoi, 111.
23. May 1575. Tolstoi, 164.
24. For the account of conventions used in English and European diplomatic correspondence, see Pierre Chaplais, *English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages* (London: Hambledon and London, 2003). See especially 94–102 for the use of seals in English diplomatic correspondence. For Elizabeth’s customary use of the three seals, see Felix Pryor’s *Elizabeth I: Her Life in Letters* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 11–12.
25. Tolstoi, 163–164.
26. May 18 1570. Tolstoi, 97–98.
27. Lubimenko, 527.
28. Tolstoi, 74.
29. Tolstoi, 158.
30. May 1575. Tolstoi, 164.
31. Ibid., 164–165.
32. Ian Grey, “Ivan the Terrible and Elizabeth of England,” in *History Today* 12 (1962): 649.
33. 1569. Tolstoi, 75.
34. May 1583. Tolstoi, 203.

35. "Letter to Stefan Batory, King of Poland" (1581), 392. In *Послания Ивана Грозного (Letters of Ivan the Terrible)*, eds. D.S. Likhachov and Ya. S. Lur'e (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Nauk SSSR, 1951).
36. October 24, 1570. Tolstoi, 112.
37. June 26, 1568. Tolstoi, 45.
38. June 20, 1569. Tolstoi, 73.
39. October 24, 1570. Tolstoi, 114.
40. May 1572, Tolstoi, 147.
41. January 29, 1576. Tolstoi, 185.
42. Tolstoi, 197.
43. January 29, 1576. Tolstoi, 184.
44. November 1567. Tolstoi, 39.
45. June 26, 1568. Tolstoi, 44–45.
46. Ibid., 45.
47. May 18, 1570. Tolstoi, 97.
48. August 20, 1574. Tolstoi, 158.
49. 1574. Tolstoi, 159.
50. May 1575. Tolstoi, 165.
51. Sir John Harington, *Nugæ antiquæ: being a miscellaneous collection of original papers, in prose and verse; written during the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Queen Mary, Elizabeth, and King James* (J. Wright: London, 1804), vol. 1, 360.
52. "The Second Letter to John III, King of Sweden," 346, 342, 340. In *Послания Ивана Грозного (Letters of Ivan the Terrible)*, eds. D.S. Likhachov, and Ya. S. Lur'e (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Nauk SSSR, 1951).
53. Ibid., 347.
54. Ibid., 350.
55. "Letter to Stefan Batory, King of Poland" (1581), 408. In *Послания Ивана Грозного (Letters of Ivan the Terrible)*, eds. D.S. Likhachov and Ya. S. Lur'e (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Nauk SSSR, 1951).
56. The most horrific example of Ivan's domestic violence is his assault in 1581 of his pregnant daughter-in-law, Elena Sheremeteva, who miscarried as a result. When her husband Ivan, Ivan's elder son and heir, interfered, the tsar gave him a mortal blow with his iron scepter.
57. Natalia Pushkaryova, *Women in Russian History: From the Tenth to the Twentieth Century*, translated and ed. Eve Levin (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 66–67.
58. Jonathan Burton, "Anglo-Ottoman Relations and the Image of the Turk in *Tamburlaine*," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 30.1 (Winter 2000): 131.
59. Ibid., 131, 134, 136, 137.

60. January 29, 1576. Tolstoi, 183.
61. In 1582, Ivan began to pursue a plan to acquire an English bride, an unsuccessful project that was finally thwarted by his death in 1584.
62. Shortly after Elizabeth's death, Thomas Smith celebrated the continuing trade and travel between Russia and England as follows: "Traffike is the golden chain concatenation, that ties kingdoms together in mutual amitie: it is the very cement that conjoins the hearts, the hands, yea the souls of nations different in shapes, disagreeing in manners, in speech, in religion, with nerves not to be broken." *Sir Thomas Smithes Voiage and Entertainment in Rushia* (London, 1605), Fol. B1r.
63. Elizabeth's letter to James VI of Scotland, August 1585. *Elizabeth I: Collected Works* eds. Marcus, Mueller, and Rose (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press), 264.
64. Janel Mueller, "To My Very Good Brother the King of Scots': Elizabeth I's Correspondence with James VI and the Question of the Succession," *PMLA* 115.5: 1066.

CHAPTER 6

ELIZABETH AMONG THE PIRATES: GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF PIRACY IN THOMAS HEYWOOD'S *THE FAIR MAID OF THE WEST*, PART I

Claire Jowitt

In the first part of *The Fair Maid of the West* (published in 1631, but probably composed between 1596–1597 and 1603), Heywood's character Bess—short, of course, for Elizabeth—is, on one level an allegory of Elizabeth I.¹ Jean Howard has argued that Bess “owes much to representations of Elizabeth I,” since the problems Bess experiences—she is both desired by and threatening to the male characters in Heywood's text—are precisely identical to the oscillating and anxious representations of Elizabeth produced in the last decades of her reign. But she is “*not* simply a screen for Elizabeth”: her epithet fair maid “of the West,” according to Howard, associates her with a “particular region of the country, not with the court” suggesting “a form of nationalism that defined itself in relationship to the land of England and its distinct regions...as an alternative to the monarch-based ideologies of dynastic statehood.”² Howard is absolutely right to signal the importance of this section of Bess's epithet, but this essay reads “of the West” rather differently. In the late sixteenth century, the English West Country was particularly associated with piracy and its legitimate twin, privateering—Elizabeth's seadogs Raleigh, Drake, Hawkins were all from the region.³ Bess's connections with seaborne crime and how it links with her allegorical role as an avatar of Elizabeth I are explored here in order to understand more fully the significance and implications of her swashbuckling behaviour in the play.

In Part One of *The Fair Maid of the West*, the tavern maid Bess Bridges takes to the seas to bring back the body of her fiancé Spencer who, she believes, has been killed at Fayal in the Azores, and embarks on a voyage of plunder in her private man-of-war against the Spanish and later, “the barbarous Turk.”⁴ The play is set during England’s war with Spain, specifically on the eve of “the Islands Voyage” to the Azores of August 1597–October 1597 when the English naval commanders the Earl of Essex, and Raleigh, as rear admiral, lead an Anglo-Dutch naval expedition against Spain and raided the island of Faial (Fayal).⁵ The fleet, which consisted of seventeen Queen’s warships, forty-three smaller men of war, ten Dutch vessels, and fifty or so smaller ships, is shown at the beginning of the play collecting in the West Country prior to departure. Despite the excitement and anticipation the expedition generated—the play opens with soldiers and gentlemen anticipating the “golden spoil” to be plundered from Spanish “carracks... deeply laden”—it achieved very little in the way of advancing the English cause in the war or gaining prizes or other bounty, and its leaders, Essex and Raleigh, quarrelled.⁶ The representation of both the Islands’ Voyage and Bess’s seaborne exploits in the play—both of which might be seen as the legitimate actions of war and, simultaneously, might also, in some quarters, be called “piracy”—is significant for understanding the larger politics of Heywood’s adventure text. Bess’s expedition is far better led and more lucrative in achieving its aims than the Islands’ Voyage, and this chapter considers the reasons behind her success and her male subjects’ failure, and how the play’s links between a female character and successful piracy should be understood politically.

Counterbalancing Heywood’s apparent championing of female agency through connections to piracy, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the links the play draws between Bess and the despotic and libidinous Mullisheg, the King of Fez, in the last Act. Fez, on the North African coast, was ruled between 1578 and 1603 by Ahmad I al-Mansur, an expansionist, militarily successful ruler, and Heywood’s Mullisheg is undoubtedly indebted to him.⁷ To the English, the Barbary States, of which Fez was one, were known for both their endemic piracy and Islamic beliefs.⁸ Hence, the essay will explore whether the connections Heywood establishes between Bess and Mullisheg in Act V alter the play’s apparent championing of Bess and her piracy earlier, since it shows where such behaviour might lead.

Part I: Piracy, Gender, and Genre

Part One of *The Fair Maid of the West* includes the most extensive treatment of piracy in Elizabethan drama,⁹ but the depiction's closest literary kin is, perhaps, a surprising one: Philip Sidney's *New Arcadia* (1590). Other Elizabethan plays do include pirates—for instance the anonymous *The Famous Historye of the Life and Death of Captain Thomas Stukeley* (published in 1605, entered in the Stationers' Register in 1600, and thought to have been acted in 1596 and 1597) contains a piratical episode when a Spanish grandee calls Stuckley a pirate even as it shows the grandee plundering Stuckley's goods. Several of Shakespeare's plays written before the death of Elizabeth—most prominently *Twelfth Night* (1600–1601) and *Measure for Measure* (1601–1606)—also either contain pirates, or references to pirates and piracy that serve important functions.¹⁰ However, Elizabethan prose romance in particular also regularly included pirate characters, with a growing sophistication apparent in the genre's use of the “meme.” Sidney's *Arcadia* is a case in point: written around 1580, it was revised at some point (most likely between 1582 and 1584) before Sidney's death in 1586, but was not available until 1590 when his friend and executor, Fulke Greville, published the revised incomplete version as the *New Arcadia*. The later version, but not the original *Arcadia*, is packed full of pirates and episodes with pirates, and their deployment is far from incidental. Even the text's hero Prince Pyrocles turns pirate, fighting in support of brigands and, as his friend Musidorus puts it referring to what he sees as Pyrocles's metaphorical as well as actual piracy through his strange and distracted behaviour: “thy selfe is the Pirat that robbes thy selfe of me.”¹¹

In the 1580s, the influence of Greek romance—particularly *An Aethiopian History* by Heliodorus—introduced new elements to English romance such as shipwrecks, exotic settings, far-flung quests, and pirates.¹² *An Aethiopian History* was only rediscovered in 1526 and in the late 1580s there was what William Sherman has neatly termed “a Heliodoran moment,” referring to the way the generic innovations offered by the Greek romance and its translations influenced Greene's *Mamillia* (1583) and *Menaphon* (1589) as well as *New Arcadia*.¹³ Recent criticism has shown the continuities between these prose fictions and dramatic romances, generally understood to refer to plays from the 1570s and 1580s and the revival of the form by Shakespeare and his contemporaries in the first decades of the seventeenth century: these connections can also be seen at work in *The*

Fair Maid of the West, Part One.¹⁴ According to Mary Ellen Lamb and Valerie Wayne, “performances of plays now lost, such as *Theagenes and Chariclea* (1572) and *Queen of Ethiopia* (1578), would suggest, Greek and specifically Heliodoran romance was rapidly adapted to the early modern stage.”¹⁵ Early modern drama repeatedly included the meme of the pirate because these figures and their activities addressed cultural dilemmas of the time concerned with ideas of an expanding world, and anxieties about England’s position within it, and the changing models of Christian manhood required to undertake overseas adventure. And, in particular, I suggest *The Fair Maid of the West*, Part One, draws on the model offered by Pyrocles’s piracy in Sidney’s *New Arcadia*.

Despite piracy being outlawed behavior in Elizabethan England, in *New Arcadia* seaborne crime and those that commit it are treated sympathetically. From the opening pages, it is apparent that pirates will be important in *New Arcadia*. Book One [Chapter One](#) includes an encounter with pirates: Pyrocles is saved from shipwreck by them after the fishermen his friend Musidorus, has commandeered for the rescue fail to scoop him out of the sea. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, with Pyrocles onboard the pirate ship, Musidorus’s previously hostile attitude toward the pirates diminishes, since when they immediately engage in fierce battle with another vessel he begins “to wish well to the pirates.”¹⁶ For Musidorus here, piracy and pirates per se are not condemned outright; his attitude, like that of Elizabeth I, is a flexible one. If the pirates can be serviceable to his cause then he supports them, similar to the way England’s queen was able to accommodate, either through the semiofficial nature of the enterprise or the retrospective issuing of letters of marque, the men who returned with valuable commodities wrested from their victims by acts of extreme violence at sea.¹⁷

Furthermore the text’s representation of pirates participates in the contemporary debate over whether “epic” or “romance” patterns of behavior were most suited to achieving English imperial, territorial, and financial ambitions in an expanding world. Epic and aristocratic values were expressed by direct action in adventure narratives, especially as martial prowess; “romance” values, by contrast, emphasized characteristics such as wily duplicity, mendacity, and commercial venture. According to Barbara Fuchs, with its “pleasurable multiplicity [romance is] opposed to the single-mindedness and political instrumentality of epic”: in other words, “whereas epic is most often associated with stories of effective quests, corporate achievement,

and the heroic birth of nations, romance challenges these narratives by privileging instead the wandering hero, the erotic interlude, or the dangerous delay.¹⁸ Where romance crosses, transgresses and, in effect, undermines the idea of fixed boundaries, epic explores, constructs, and maintains political, dynastic, and territorial networks and borders. As a result, the ideological contrasts between the two literary forms mean that antiestablishment and transgressive acts of piracy, as well as the actors in this theater, pirates, are particular apposite subjects for romance.

Akin to *An Aethiopian History*, which relates piratical events from more than one perspective and at separate points in the romance, in Sidney's text the same encounter with pirates is described on more than one occasion. Pyrocles's version of his meeting with pirates—which is not narrated until Book One [Chapter Eight](#) when he and Musidorus are finally reunited—further confirms the ambivalent attitude to piracy already glimpsed in the earlier account.

There you missing me, I was taken up by Pyrates, who putting me under boorde prisoner, presentlie sett upon another shippe, and mainteining a long fight, in the ende, put them all to the sworde. Amongst whom I might heare them greatlie prayse one younge man, who fought most valiantlie, whom (as love is carefull, and misfortune subiect to doubtfulnes) I thought certainly to be you. And so holding you as dead, from that time till the time I sawe you, in trueth I sought nothing more then a noble ende, which perchance made me more hardie then otherwise I would haue bene. Triall whereof came within two dayes after: for the Kinges of *Lacedaemon* having sett out some Galleys, vnder the charge of one of their Nephews to skowre the Sea of the Pyrates, they met with us, where our Captaine wanting men, was driven to arme some of his prisoners, with promise of libertie for well fighting: among whom I was one, and being boarded by the Admirall, it was my fortune to kil *Eurileon* the Kings nephew: but in the end they prevailed, & we were all taken prisoners:¹⁹

In terms of the morality of their actions, the pirates appear no worse than any other group of fighting men. On his capture by the King of Lacedaemon, Pyrocles is thrown in jail, but is released during a rebellion by the “popular sort of that town” who join with the Helots, and through his martial prowess becomes their leader. Pyrocles's tale of triumph by direct action would seem to make the pirates just one more band of martial band for whom he is prepared to fight. Indeed, believing Musidorus to be dead, he recounts that “in trueth I sought

nothing more than a noble ende” by which he means death in battle; fighting on behalf of the “pirates” is here represented as compatible with a “noble ende,” again demonstrating an adaptable attitude to what constitutes “piracy” akin to the policies toward violence at sea followed by England’s queen. Aristocratic terminology and epic prowess associated with direct action and martial chivalry can accommodate pirates as they appear to be capable of epic heroism.

Initially, especially in terms of plotline, it might seem that Sidney’s text expresses the official government line of hostility to piracy, since seaborne crime interrupts and delays the Prince’s journey. The way the chronology is broken up in the narrative and the emerging similarity between the princes and pirates, however, complicates the view that this text expresses an attack on seaborne crime. As Barbara Fuchs and David Quint have suggested, the emphasis in romance writing on the hero’s adventures on the way rather than getting to a particular destination further indicates that encounters with pirates—who interrupt journeys and present challenges to be overcome—changes the way *New Arcadia*’s representation of piracy should be interpreted overall.²⁰ Pyrocles’s Heliodoran-indebted piracy in *New Arcadia* represents a blend of values from different genres as epic martialism and romance indirection come together in the figure of the pirate. In other words, “epic” activities, such as martial prowess, and “romance” behavior, which favors wily duplicity and commercial venture, are united by Pyrocles’s piracy.

One further component of Pyrocles’s behavior, which is important in relation to Bess’s piracy in *The Fair Maid of the West* Part One is the trope of cross-dressing. Here Sidney’s model was not Heliodorus, who did not feature cross-dressing in *An Aethiopian History*; instead his precedents were *Amadis de Gaule* (1508), the *Mirror of Knighthood* (1562), and Barnaby Rich’s *Farewell to Military Profession* (1581), which all included cross-dressed heroes.²¹ Yet Pyrocles’s cross-dressing as the Amazon Zelmane, like his piracy, can be seen to create a hybrid figure. His assumption of female clothes create a mixed form of male and female, which links with the way piracy is represented in the text as a blend of active and passive qualities and of the genres of epic and romance. Bess’s cross-dressed piracy is clearly indebted to Pyrocles’s behavior, but where Pyrocles is a pirate-prince who must temper his martial and epic actions with female characteristics of passivity and mendacity associated with romance, Bess’s transformation works in the opposite direction. As we shall see, her femaleness means that

generically and ideologically the movement her piracy and cross-dressing in male clothes allows is from romance to epic.

At the beginning of the play, Bess is positioned by her gender as a passive observer of male preparations for the Islands' Voyage. As the men excitedly look forward to the expedition ahead, Bess is trapped in a gender-proscribed role: she is a heroine in a romance, the passive object of competing male attention. Fittingly for a heroine circumscribed by the generic conventions of romance, a fight occurs between rivals for Bess's attentions in which her favorite, Spencer, kills a man who has been harassing her, and Spencer and Bess become engaged. Yet Bess's situation, and the literary customs which surround her, swiftly alter. The men depart from Plymouth on their glorious, epic adventure, but news quickly arrives that Spencer has been killed at Fayal, and Bess responds by fitting out a ship to rescue his body herself. It is through this action that her epithet "Fair Maid of the West" becomes particularly resonant. The West Country ports of Bristol, Plymouth, and Fowey, located alongside one of the major trade routes of Europe, had for centuries been associated with seafaring and trade, with the line between authorized transactions and piracy, always faint, frequently breached. Many of Elizabeth's most famous sailors came from the West Country—including John Hawkins and Francis Drake who, like Bess, were both from Plymouth; John Davis, who hailed from Dartmouth; and Walter Raleigh from East Budleigh in Devon—with generations of their families involved with "discriminating piracy" as privateering was sometimes called, as well as piracy itself.²² As a result, Bess's actions associate her with a region that linked plunder with patriotism and Protestantism. Women were even known to take lead roles in these activities: Lady Mary Killigrew, for instance, plundered in 1582 a Spanish ship sheltering from bad weather in Falmouth harbor, steering herself the boat to attack it from the shore.²³

The events of *The Fair Maid of the West* capture the flavor of the Islands' Voyage since it achieved very little either in advancing the English cause in the war or in prizes or other bounty. The fleet was dispersed by storms and, when it did manage to reunite, having wasted considerable time hovering off the coast of Spain, it spent the rest of the time cruising off the Azores in the hope of intercepting the Spanish silver convoy. Finally, in Essex's absence, Raleigh attacked and captured the Island of Fayal, the expedition's only success; on arrival, displeased with Raleigh's success in taking the town without him which he saw as presumption, Essex gave the order to

sail for home, disembarking in Plymouth to discover that he was out of favor with the queen since, while away with the majority of the fleet, England had been under threat from a new Armada.²⁴

In the play the representation of both the Islands' Voyage and Bess's seaborne exploits—which both might be seen as the legitimate actions of war—"discriminating piracy" and, simultaneously, might also, in some quarters, be simply called "piracy"—is significant for understanding the text's ideological and generic coordinates. Bess's expedition is far better lead and more lucrative in achieving its aims than the all-male Islands' Voyage, and it is important to consider the significance behind the text's depiction of her success and her male counterparts' failure.

The English attack on the Spanish garrison at Fayal—an important strategic site, since it was a stopping-off point for the bullion the Spanish transported home to finance the war from the South American colonies—is referred to in the course of the play on several occasions. Even though it is an important event in terms of plot development, there seems to be some confusion concerning the identity of the leaders of the attack. The English soldiers' talk of "the general's command"—the "general" referring elsewhere in the play to Essex—in the moment of assault on Fayal is somewhat misleading since Essex was not actually present during Raleigh's initial attack. Later, not naming the attack's leader, the Spanish describe "the spoil by th'English done" at Fayal as the motivation to seize the English merchant ship bound for Mamorah in Barbary upon which Spencer is a passenger.²⁵ Later when Bess, in her ship the *Negro*, intercepts a Spanish fishing trip, she asks for news of the town and fort and is informed by name of, specifically, Raleigh's initial victory:

Since English Raleigh won and spoil'd it first,
The town's re-edified and fort new built,
And four field pieces in the blockhouse lie
To keep the harbor's mouth. (IV. iv. 31–4)

The textual inconsistency over whether Essex or Raleigh should have credit for the victory—and the way that the issue reflected the larger rivalry between them for the queen's favor—is also reflected in the argument between the soldiers concerning who deserves recognition for bravery in the aftermath of the attack.

2 Captain. When we assaulted Fayal,
And I had by the general's command

The onset, and with danger of my person
Enforc'd the Spaniard to a swift retreat
And beat them from their fort, thou when thou saw'st
All fear and danger past, mad'st up with me
To share that honor which was sole mine own
And never ventur'd shot for't or e'er came
When bullet graz'd...
I Captain. I'll prove it with my sword
That though thou had'st the foremost place in field
And I the second, yet my company
Was equal in the entry of the fort.
My sword was that day drawn as soon as thine,
And that poor honour which I won that day
Was but my merit. (II. ii. 19–36)

When Spencer intervenes to stop the duel, he is badly wounded, claiming to be “hurt to death” (II. ii. 50) and, as a result, sets his affairs in order. Though his fears turn out to be mistaken, Goodluck is unaware that his friend survives and leaves for England to inform Bess of the death which, in turn, results in her expedition to reclaim his body. It is apparent from the soldiers’ argument about honor that there are problems in command, leadership, and discipline on Fayal, which may be intended to reflect the rivalry between Essex and Raleigh for glory on the Islands’ Voyage, and comment on the potentially tragic consequences—Spencer’s “death”—which result. The Islands’ Voyage is viewed with more than a degree of cynicism in the play. The characters—the soldiers and captains—that flock to serve on it are a lawless, feckless lot, more interested in plunder and duelling than disciplined campaigns. In fact when Bess arrives in Fayal in search of Spencer’s body, Raleigh’s success in taking the island has merely resulted in greater fortifications now defending the island (“the town’s re-edified, and fort new built, / And four field pieces in the blockhouse lie / To keep the harbor’s mouth” (IV. iv. 32–4) and an increasingly bitter conflict between English and Spanish men, since “Spencer’s” body has been exhumed twice, and finally burnt.

It is also the soldiers’ vainglorious desires that results in Bess’s expedition to recover Spencer’s body in her private man-of-war. Such voyages were, of course, standard practice in times of war. As Kenneth Andrews catalogues “[w]ell over two hundred vessels made reprisal voyages in the three years 1589–91” and the number is unlikely to have fallen in the later years of the war since, in 1599,

Thomas Nashe commented “voyages of purchase or reprisals . . . are now grown a common traffic.”²⁶ Of course, the distinction between plain piracy and semiofficial enterprises of war was not always easy to see; both activities could be identical, except that a captain of a ship on a semiofficial enterprise had a commission from a recognized authority to take action against a designated enemy, which a pirate did not. Indeed whether a particular act of violence at sea would be seen as legitimate and to be rewarded, or as a crime to be punished, by the Elizabethan state was difficult to predict: “[a] captain without letters of reprisal would not be treated as a pirate so long as he confined his attentions to Spanish commerce, though a properly commissioned man might be indicted for piracy if he spoiled an English or neutral vessel.”²⁷

Bess’s exploits on *The Negro* should be viewed against this context. The purpose of her voyage to recover Spencer’s body is initially kept secret from her crew, but it is clearly one of reprisal since, even before she announces her exact intentions, she attacks and defeats Spanish shipping: “Oh, this last sea fight / Was gallantly perform’d! It did me good / To see the Spanish carvel vail her top / Unto my maiden flag” (IV. iv. 2–4). It is also apparent that Bess has no official or even semiofficial authorization for her voyage, it is purely a privately financed undertaking; in other words, she is clearly acting as a pirate, though as Andrews’s comments indicate, this status could be overlooked provided she only attacks appropriate—that is, enemy—targets. Certainly, the text makes it clear that she is, unlike Essex or Raleigh who missed the Spanish caravels on the Islands’ Voyage, highly successful in gaining plunder from the “rich Spaniard and the barbarous Turk,” while sparing “the French and Dutch” (IV. v. 7–8). Hence, just as Pyrocles’s cross-dressing and piracy represented a beneficial intermingling of active and passive qualities and features from epic and romance, so too does Bess’s. Cross-dressed as a pirate she is liberated from the romance conventions that threatened to stifle her at the beginning of Act I, and is able to embrace active, male and epic patterns of behavior with spectacular results.

There is, of course, a clear political message intended here: praise of Elizabeth I, since Bess is, on one level, representative of the English queen.²⁸ In the play when Bess discovers from the Spanish that Spencer’s body has been moved to nonconsecrated ground, and then dug up again and burnt, she redoubles her vows of revenge (IV. iv. 52–55; IV. v. 140–152) against the “tyrants” that have “wrong[ed] the dead” (IV. iv. 44–45). Yet, despite her outrage, Bess is consistently

forgiving and kind to the Spanish she encounters. Despite plundering them unmercifully—and far more effectively than the men on the Islands' Voyage—the meetings end amicably enough, with Bess releasing them unharmed exhorting them to pray first for “Bess Bridges” (IV. iv. 59) or “English Bess” (IV. iv.120) and to “speak well o'th'English” (IV. iv. 59). Disguised as a sea captain, the Spanish of course fail to realize that she is asking them to pray for her. In fact the Spanish captain who captured Spencer thinks she means “your queen, Famous Elizabeth” promising to report that “She and her subjects both are merciful” (IV. iv. 121–123). As an avatar for the English queen, Bess is far more competent amphibiously than either the men who serve her—Goodlack, Roughman, Clem and Forset—or indeed the ones who went on the Islands' Voyage—the two Spencers, Goodlack, the vainglorious Captains—these last two being, perhaps, avatars of Essex and Raleigh. In other words, out of the two groups of English “pirates” Heywood describes in *The Fair Maid of the West* Bess is by far the most successful, and her clear resemblance to the Elizabeth I in the play might be read as a celebration of England's queen at the expense of her principal naval commanders. Piracy here is associated with patriotism and epic prowess, and Bess's wealth accumulation through violence at sea was championed as the best way to further the nation's foreign policy.

In *The Fair Maid of the West* Part One piracy is also glamorized; it becomes a vehicle for female empowerment as it allows Bess to move from the confines of what appears to be a romance plot to the altogether more rewarding role of swashbuckling national heroine in an adventure text. Bess's pirate role model of Prince Pyrocles is a suggestive one since his seaborne adventures and cross-dressing also explored the boundaries of gender and genre. His royal status further adds to the appropriateness of Bess's indebtedness, as it enables the text to emphasize and celebrate the connections between piracy and monarchy.

Part II: “Race,” Gender, and Piracy

The final section of this essay focuses on the play's last Act, which introduces a new character, Mullisheg, the king of Fez on the North African coast, who becomes sexually enthralled by Bess and attempts to seduce her. Bess and Spencer are not reunited at this point since when Spencer is rescued from captivity in a Spanish ship, the lovers fail to recognize each other: Bess thinks Spencer is a ghost, and to

Spencer Bess is a male pirate. It is only at the end of *The Fair Maid of the West* that Spencer and Bess finally do identify each other, and Mullisheg withdraws his attentions to allow them to marry. This last section considers whether the links the play creates between Bess and the despotic and libidinous Mullisheg in the final Act counter-balance Heywood's apparent championing of female agency through connections to piracy established earlier in the play. Connecting Bess with the eroticized and tyrannical Mullisheg in the notoriously propiracy city-state of Fez in Morocco undermines both Bess and piracy as it reveals where Bess's behavior might lead.

In the first four Acts of the play, Bess has consistently been shown as far more able than the men that surround her, demonstrating more prowess in the diverse roles of swordsman, politician, pirate, and diplomat than any man. Whilst at sea in Act Four, for example, Bess is considerably more accomplished at swashbuckling than either Spencer or Goodlack. Spencer has been humiliatingly incarcerated in a Spanish vessel. Goodlack, despite being in charge of "the manage of the fight" (IV. iv. 86) against the Spanish and trying to stow Bess away from the danger ("Fair Bess, keep you your cabin" (IV. iv. 90)), is so seriously injured in the fray that he can "no longer man the deck," leaving Bess to lead the assault ("Advance your targets, And now cry all, 'Board, board! Amain for England!" (IV. iv. 104–105)). Bess here demonstrates a good deal more military prowess than Goodlack who, in a sexual pun, finds himself, according to Roughman, "shot i'th'thigh" unable to "rise to greet your victory" (IV. iv. 107–108).

There are, however, consequences of Bess's epic prowess. Her skills are so impressive that there is always the potential that she might "unman" the men before her by undermining the sexual integrity of her male subordinates. Not only is she powerfully eroticized but, simultaneously, she is capable of provoking a crisis in the sexual performance and identities of her male subjects. As Howard has usefully argued, the emphasis on Bess's sexuality, which seems to "magically overcome . . . the divisions and antagonisms internal to the body politic of England", also reveals her to be "a figure of crisis" since she "continually evokes men's fears of women's power and sexuality."²⁹

These fears are most graphically played out in Act Five of Part One of *The Fair Maid of the West*, when Mullisheg's eroticized court (IV. iii. 27–34), functions as a mirror of Bess's alarming sexuality since, as Jean Howard argues, "the Moorish King . . . actually *displays* the rapacious sexual appetites so feared in Bess."³⁰ For instance, in response to Bess's white beauty (she abandons her cross-dressing to appear in

female clothes again) the sexually predatory king becomes effeminized himself. In effect, he functions as a mirror, or displaced version, of the gender and sexual anxieties previously solely focused on Bess. He is unable to turn down any of her demands: "We can deny thee nothing, beauteous maid" (V. ii. 78) since he is so enthralled by her sexually explicit, wanton, behavior "Tis no immodest thing / You ask, nor shame for Bess to kiss a King" (V. i. 65–66). Anxieties about the consequences of Bess's sexuality on the men around her also surface in Spencer and Clem's threatened castration (V. ii. 86–100, 126–131), which is to be inflicted as a sign of Mullisheg's favor (Spencer "shall have grace and honor . . . He shall be our chief Eunuch" (V. ii. 91–93)), and in the way that the Englishmen are scattered and peripheral to the action between Mullisheg and Bess. In fact it is Bess, rather than any of the men, whose intervention saves Spencer's testicles from Mullisheg's "cutting honor" (V. ii. 131). Her intercession only succeeds because she distracts the king with flirtatious promises, offering "what I have" to him and requesting that the king "Leave naught that's mine unrifled" if only he will "spare me him" (Spencer) (V. ii. 96–97). In other words Bess's aid, which saves Spencer's manhood, simultaneously threatens to unman him, and fears about her rapacious sexuality emerge both in her wanton flirtation with the king and now in Clem's threatened castration.

The portrayal of the king of Fez from the Barbary Coast in North Africa as first threatening to unman Englishmen, though later himself effeminized, also possesses other layers of meaning regarding English interactions with the Muslim world and vis-à-vis piracy. The figure of Mullisheg of Fez is, as Nabil Matar suggests, resonant of that of Mulay al-Mansur, also known as Ahmad I al-Mansur, king of Morocco, who in the 1590s entered into a diplomatic alliance against Spain and trade treaty with Elizabeth I.³¹ The negotiation of this relationship was a delicate, protracted and tricky business—and it provoked considerable anxieties amongst English commentators concerning the wisdom and implications of establishing a close relationship with a culturally and technologically sophisticated non-Christian nation—and the conclusion to Heywood's play can be seen "to celebrate the success of his monarch in dealing with Mulay al-Mansur."³² Furthermore, the play's earlier positive attitude to piracy comes under renewed scrutiny in Act Five. It is clear from the speech by the Chorus, which ends Act Four, that Bess lands in Fez since it was pirate-friendly: with a well-established reputation as a pirate ("her fame grows great in all these seas" (IV. v. 9), she is "forc'd for want

of water / To put into Mamorah in Barbary," (IV. v. 10–11) because, presumably other ports were not open to her. It swiftly becomes apparent that Mullisheg's regime not only encourages the presence of pirates, but also is rapacious in its dealings with merchants and others who anchor there. In contrast to Bess, who was selective in her choice of prey, attacking Spanish and Turkish shipping but sparing that of France and Holland, Mullisheg appears indiscriminate. Two merchants—one French, one Italian—have fallen foul of Mullisheg's regulations for, they claim, minor infringements, and, as a result, their goods are sequestered or their crews sentenced to the galleys (V. i. 132–155). In response, both bribe Clem to urge Bess to intervene on their behalf, which she successfully does, and for a "Christian preacher" sentenced to death for attempting to convert "Moors . . . to a new belief" (V. ii. 73–74), she kneels to beg mercy from Mullisheg. Bess intervenes in all three cases without being paid for her troubles; the last case, that of the Christian preacher, serving to further highlight *her* disinterest. However, this disinterest is not maintained by Clem, the merchants, or by the king of Fez himself. It is clear that the court of Mamorah is a corrupt one; pirates and other dubious foreigners are welcomed, but once landed it emerges that this tolerance is intended to allow Mullisheg tyrannical sway over them. In the world of the play, there is no recourse to the law in Mamorah: Mullisheg's word is final and the conventions, duties, and responsibilities of legitimate trade are ignored by the pirate-state.

The character of Mullisheg and his court thus serves simultaneously to embody several threats; the anxiety concerning the potential of the Muslim world to "unman" Europe through subordination, the consequences of female power upon male potency, and the costs of allowing piracy to take place unchecked. On one level, these dangers appear averted at the end of the play: the Englishmen's masculinity seems assured as the men take charge in the last few lines. Spencer, Goodlack, and Roughman finally manage to regroup and successfully persuade Mullisheg to embrace "an heroic spirit" (V. ii. 118), and release *them* unharmed with Bess. Once the Englishmen take charge, Bess and Mullisheg's influence immediately wanes, but the aggressive sexuality of both the Moorish king and the "maid of England" who appears "like a queen" (V. ii. 7) had, until the few lines of the play widely threatened the integrity of English masculinity. Both characters are also linked by their support of piracy. This text, then, in its representation of queen-like Bess's sexuality and piracy, reveals the anxieties of Elizabeth's rule. In the character of Mullisheg we have articulated

fears about the aggressive, castrating potential of queenship as it is capable of rendering Englishmen literally impotent. Furthermore, Mullisheg's court represents a warning about the consequences of no longer distinguishing between legitimate mercantile transactions and acts of piracy and thievery. The threats are finally overcome, and Mullisheg and Bess appear tamed. However, this conclusion does not fully disperse the risk that both these monarchical, but "female" characters represent to the integrity of English manhood, or they ways that, taken to excess, piracy might undermine, it is implied, even the foundations of English trade and commercial venture.

Notes

1. Jean Howard, "An English Lass Amid the Moors: Gender, Race, Sexuality, and National Identity in Heywood's *The Fair Maid of the West*", in *Women, "Race" and Writing in the Early Modern Period*, Hendricks and Parker, eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 101–117. On the dating of *The Fair Maid of the West Part I* see Robert K. Turner, "Introduction" *The Fair Maid of the West Parts I and II* (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), xviii; George Bentley, *The Jacobean and Caroline Stage*, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 568–571; see also Andrew Gurr, *The Shakespearean Stage, 1574–1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 222; Andrew Gurr, *The Shakespearian Playing Companies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 416–436. For arguments in favor of a later composition for Part I, see Melville Clarke, *Thomas Heywood: Playwright and Miscellanist* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1931), 110–112.
2. Howard, "An English Lass Amid the Moors", 107.
3. On the connections between the West Country and maritime plunder see John C. Appleby, *Under the Bloody Flag: Pirates of the Tudor Age* (Stroud: The History Press, 2009), 23–24; Peter Earle, *The Pirate Wars* (London: Methuen, 2003), 17–35.
4. Thomas Heywood, *The Fair Maid of the West Part I*, IV. v. 7; in Robert K. Turner, ed., *The Fair Maid of the West Parts I and II*. All references are to this edition.
5. For discussion see Jan Glete, *Warfare at Sea 1500–1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe* (London: Routledge, 2000), 162–163.
6. *The Fair Maid of the West Part I*, I. i. 15–16.
7. See Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary 1589–1689* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2005), 33–36.
8. For discussion see Jacques Heers, *The Barbary Corsairs: Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1480–1580* trans. Jonathan North (London: Greenhill, 2003).

9. For discussion see Claire Jowitt, *The Culture of Piracy 1580–1630: Literature and Seaborne Crime* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 111–135.
10. For an overview see Lois Potter, “Pirates and ‘Turning Turk’ in Renaissance Drama”, in Jean-Pierre Maquerlot and Michèle Willems (eds.), *Travel and Drama in Shakespeare’s Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 124–140.
11. Fulke Greville, *The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia, written by Sir Philippe Sidnei* (London: Printed by John Windet for William Ponsonbie, 1590), Book One, Chapter Ten. For discussion see Claire Jowitt, “‘Et in Arcadia Ego’: The Politics of Pirates in the *Old Arcadia*, *New Arcadia* and *Urania*,” *Early Modern Literary Studies* 16.3 (October 2007). <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/emls/si-16/jowiarca.htm>
12. See Mary Ellen Lamb and Valerie Wayne, eds., “Introduction”, *Staging Early Modern Romance: Prose Fiction, Dramatic Romance, and Shakespeare* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1–20.
13. See in particular Steve Mentz, *Romance for Sale in Early Modern England: The Rise of Prose Fiction* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 47–122.
14. See Lamb and Wayne, *Staging Early Modern Romance*, 1–20.
15. Lamb and Wayne, “Introduction” *Staging Early Modern Romance*, 5.
16. Greville, *The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia, written by Sir Philippe Sidnei*, Book One, [Chapter One](#).
17. For discussion see Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Appleby, *Under the Bloody Flag*.
18. Barbara Fuchs, *Romance. The New Critical Idiom* (New York, 2004), 66. Thus, for example, Ludovico Ariosto’s *Orlando Furioso* (1516), though indebted to the martial epic associated with the *matière de France*, counters this material with satiric and erotic plots derived from the romance tradition. As Fuchs puts it “Ariosto’s poem addresses the incompatibility of romance and epic” since “the conventions of the former . . . are precisely about evading the latter”; for example, there is a contrast between “the easy mobility of romance” where men and women pass through permeable geographic borders, religious and racial groups, with epic’s emphasis on “the separation and difference of the emerging early modern states.”
19. Greville, *The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia, written by Sir Philippe Sidnei*, Book One, [Chapter Eight](#).
20. Barbara Fuchs, *Romance*, 66; David Quint, “The Boat of Romance and Renaissance Epic”, in Kevin Brownlee and Marina Scordilis Brownlee (eds.), *Romance: Generic Transformation from Chrétien de Troyes to Cervantes* (Hanover, 1985), 178–202. See also John J. Winkler, “The Mendacity of Kalasiris and the Narrative Strategy of Heliodoros’ *Aithiopika*,” *Yale Classical Studies* 27 (1982): 92–158.

21. See Steve Mentz, *Romance for Sale in Early Modern England*, 91; on cross-dressing in *New Arcadia* see also Helen Hackett, *Women and Romance Fiction in the English Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 101–115; Jennifer Vaught, *Masculinity and Emotion in Early Modern Literature* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 115–135.
22. For discussion see Kenneth R. Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering during the Spanish War 1585–1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).
23. For details see Patrick Pringle, *Jolly Rodger: The Story of the Great Age of Piracy* (New York: Dover Press, 1953), 31–32.
24. See N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 1660–1649* (London and New York: Norton, 1997), 286–288.
25. Thomas Heywood, *The Fair Maid of the West Part I*, II, ii, 19–23; IV. i. 1. Essex arrived at Fayal the morning after Raleigh's success and did participate in its burning.
26. Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering*, 4–5.
27. Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering*, 5.
28. See Howard, “An English Lass Amid the Moors”, 101–117; Claire Jowitt, *Voyage Drama and Gender Politics 1589–1642: Real and Imagined Worlds* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 39–54.
29. Howard, “An English Lass Amid the Moors”, 109.
30. Howard, “An English Lass Amid the Moors”, 115–117.
31. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, 33–36.
32. Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, 33.



PART III

ISLAM



CHAPTER 7

ELIZABETH THROUGH MOROCCAN EYES

Nabil Matar

In November 1592, Queen Elizabeth I visited Oxford, where Sir Henry Lee (1533–1611) commissioned a painting of her that has come to be known as the Ditchley Portrait.¹ According to Sir Roy Strong, the portrait, “the largest surviving image”² of the queen, showed her as the “imperial virgin . . . to whom fame and empire are promised,” standing “as an empress of the world, her feet planted on her realm of England.”³

These words have resonated in postcolonial scholarship about Elizabethan England’s imperial glory under the virgin queen. However, during her visit to Oxford, Sir Henry did not recognize any imperial achievements (nor potential) in his queen. As the National Portrait Gallery caption states, the theme of the painting was forgiveness: Sir Henry had been living with his mistress, Lady Anne Vavasour, and had thereby angered the queen. By visiting him, Elizabeth was indicating that she had forgiven him. Sir Henry was, of course, well aware of the state of England’s international affairs and knew that there were no imperial ventures afoot. That the queen’s feet in the painting were on the realm of England, Oxfordshire in particular, was quite appropriate; she had protected England against the Armada. In the gulf near Devonshire, there is a ship that appears to be sinking, perhaps recalling one of the Spanish galleons. But Sir Henry would have wondered about the queen being thought of as empress of the world.

So, too, would the Moroccan potentate Mulay Ahmad al-Mansur, inside the most fabulous palace in North Africa, *al-badee’*, some thousands of miles away in the royal city of Marrakesh.

This chapter will trace the history of relations between Queen Elizabeth and Mulay Ahmad in Arabic-Moroccan sources. It will show how much, in al-Mansur's eyes, the imperial virgin was not imperial at all. Elizabeth built a mythology around herself during her life, which poets and panegyrists celebrated; it was a mythology that proliferated after her death, raising her to semidivine heights of Marian veneration.⁴ In Morocco, the queen was always praised and admired, but she was not seen as the "Gloriana" of contemporary and later English chroniclers. Rather, she was a monarch who was ever in need of Moroccan gold and saltpeter, and whom al-Mansur manipulated for his own end of reconquering al-Andalus.

Al-Mansur saw Elizabeth as insular, and without a mind for empire⁵ because she had never left her island during her life. He, on the other hand, had traveled far and wide beyond the borders of Morocco. He had sailed with the Ottomans, visited Istanbul, and taken part in sea battles that extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Aegean Sea. With the advent of the new (*hijri*) millennium in 1591, he had also developed a vision of himself as the supreme leader of the Muslims, the *mahdi* (the messiah prophesied to appear at the world's end and establish a reign of peace and righteousness) who would use all means available to fulfill his mission of defeating Catholic Spain and establishing a Muslim empire across the Atlantic. While Elizabeth was fearful for her island, al-Mansur was aggressive for the world; and while he had a vision of the future that included the Christian queen, she had no similar world vision that included Islam.

Numerous letters from al-Mansur to Elizabeth have survived, along with an account by his court scribe/historian, Abd al-Aziz al-Fishtali (1549–1621). These Arabic sources provide the only study of Queen Elizabeth from outside the Anglo-centric and Euro-centric parameter. Indeed, they are the only detailed commentary about a European ruler in non-European sources of the sixteenth century. Through both the royal correspondence and al-Fishtali's writings, the relationship between al-Mansur and Elizabeth can be reconstructed, revealing the first deep friendship between a Muslim and a Christian monarch in the early modern period. It also reveals a very different view of the queen from the Anglo-European perspective.

* * *

Upon acceding to the Moroccan throne in August 1578, after victory in the battle of Wadi al-Makhazin (Alcazar), Mulay Ahmad al-Mansur

did not pay Queen Elizabeth any special attention. Actually, he looked askance at her since an English and Irish contingent of Catholic soldiers had joined Portugal's king Sebastian and fought against him in battle. Furthermore, the queen's coffers were not as replete as they needed to be to make England a power with which to reckon. When the English ambassador arrived in Marrakesh to congratulate al-Mansur on his victory and accession to the throne, he brought presents that were seen as so insignificant compared with the Portuguese presents that they were not even mentioned by al-Fishtali. The Portuguese "magnificent present was beyond calculation," wrote the scribe, "and people wondered at the one who gave it. The present was brought into the gate of Fez on coaches and carriages... People flocked to see the present like butterflies."⁶

But as soon as al-Mansur found himself having to maneuver between the Ottoman and Spanish superpowers that were trying to conquer his kingdom, he turned, just as his predecessors had, to countries such as France, Holland, and England for assistance. They were all enemies of Spain, and they needed some of the natural resources that Morocco could export—chiefly sugar and saltpeter (potash). None proved more cooperative than England, whose queen found herself confronted by the formidable power of Spain. In the dangerous years after 1570 and until the very end of her reign, Elizabeth was much in need of an ally such as al-Mansur, especially since she saw before her a determined adversary, Philip II, whose vast American resources of gold and silver were matched by his antipathy to the Protestant heresy.

On June 23, 1580, al-Mansur sent Elizabeth a letter that he opened with five lines of honorific titles, praising her as the greatest among those who follow the "religion of Christ." Al-Mansur wrote with eloquence and flattery, insisting on the "evident love" (*al-hubb al-sarih*) between him and "sultana Isabel": she was "the majesty in the lands of Christ, the sultana Isabel, may God grant her all good and continue her good health." Al-Mansur promised that English merchants in his dominions would receive all the help they needed: "As you are doing the best to facilitate our affairs there [in England]," he continued, "so will we do the same for you here."⁷ Such friendship became crucial for Elizabeth soon after Philip II annexed Portugal a few months later (September 1580), and after Don Antonio, who had proclaimed himself king of Portugal on August 26, 1580, fled to England seeking her support. Elizabeth realized that tensions with Spain would mount since Philip II could not look kindly on her

harboring of the Portuguese claimant. Al-Fishtali, monitoring the situation from Marrakesh, commented on the flight of Don Antonio to the queen and confirmed the queen's need for al-Mansur. The Portuguese claimant, he wrote, had "fled to the queen of the lands of England, Izabeel, where he was well received, and she rolled up her sleeves to help him. But then she realized that she could only rebuild what had been destroyed, and repair what had been damaged, with the help of the Prince of the Faithful"/al-Mansur, who extended his support from across the sea.⁸

Both Elizabeth and Antonio realized that the support of the newly enthroned Moroccan ruler was crucial for confronting Spain—a support that al-Mansur was not unwilling to extend. Promptly, the Moroccan ruler called for expanding trade and diplomatic cooperation with England so much that by 1583, when Lord Burghley advised the Queen about her political options in the face of Spain, he told her that an alliance with Morocco could well "serve your Majesty."⁹ The queen had already alienated France, after turning down the Duke of Anjou's suit of marriage, which eventually led France to mend its fences with Spain. Elizabeth knew that she needed extra-European support, and in July 1585, she granted the letters patent for the establishment of the Barbary Company to coordinate trade with the North African coast in the manner of the Turkey Company to the Levant.¹⁰ Morocco was emerging as a desirable market, and the queen was eager to strengthen ties, especially since her forces had failed to defeat the Duke of Parma in the Netherlands, leaving the Spanish army just a channel away. She was in such danger that in February 1587, she had Mary Queen of Scots executed for plotting against her, thereby inviting revenge upon England by Philip II who was building a large fleet. With dangers besetting her, Elizabeth turned to al-Mansur and dispatched the Portuguese Matias Becudo to Marrakesh to try to convince him to cooperate with her. Accompanied by the English merchants resident in Marrakesh, the Portuguese envoy asked al-Mansur to grant the English a seaport in Morocco in order for them to divert Spanish ships from their intended attack on England.¹¹ Al-Mansur refused to do so and bided his time, waiting for the moment when the Euro-Christian balance of power would change.¹²

Meanwhile, Don Antonio was growing disenchanted with Elizabeth, who was not proving effective in helping him recapture his throne. Since the queen needed the help of al-Mansur, Don Antonio decided to appeal directly to the Moroccan "emperor." Having placed one of his emissaries in Morocco years earlier, Antonio

asked al-Mansur to intervene on his behalf with the queen, while at the same time pondering a journey to Istanbul to ask help from "Turquia."¹³ Al-Mansur sent his reply to Don Antonio in April 1588, addressing the Portuguese contender as "Sultan Don Antonio, son of the great and glorious sultans and kings who have perfect fame and renown."¹⁴ With the honorific titles that he heaped on Don Antonio (not, however, as many for a deposed ruler as for the reigning English queen), al-Mansur was signaling his willingness to cooperate with him and confirming his recognition of him as a worthy interlocutor: "As for what you have asked me in your recent letter, of communicating with the Sultana, the Queen of Anglateera, and recommending you to her, we have proceeded to advance your request, and to convey your hopes, and we have prosecuted it to your farthest hopes and desire."¹⁵ Since he held the upper hand over Don Antonio, al-Mansur delayed offering help, waiting to see how the tensions between Spain and England would be resolved.

England's victory over the Spanish Armada in the summer of 1588 prompted al-Mansur to view the queen as a viable military and diplomatic ally. He could now identify the role she would play in his plans for the reconquest of Spain and in Euro-Moroccan cooperation. To him, Elizabeth was a means to an end: while she fought Spain to defend her island, she opened up the possibility for him to liberate al-Andalus from "the tyrant of Castile," as he called Philip II. With such a goal in mind, al-Mansur's scribe recorded, they nearly conquered.¹⁶ He also strengthened his fleet, his *marakib jibadiyya* ("ships of jihad") for the "conquest of the land of al-Andalus." His plan was to "cross to al-Andalus by sea with the soldiers of God and Islam to re-establish the roots of faith and to liberate it from the hands of unbelief."¹⁷ As far as al-Mansur was concerned, Elizabeth had opened the door and he was ready to step onto the European stage.

In such an anti-Spanish, pro-English mood, al-Fishtali addressed a letter to the people of Sus, on whose "tribal elements" al-Mansur's army relied strongly.¹⁸ In the letter, al-Fishtali shared with them the happy news about the Spanish naval defeat, described the English victory under the "sultana Isabel," and then presented the advantages, which the Anglo-Spanish conflict had brought to al-Mansur, to Morocco in particular, and to the Muslims in general. The letter shows that al-Mansur and his scribe were well informed about the religious cause of the conflict between England and Spain, the piratical attacks by England on the Spanish New World

fleet, and events before and during the Armada attack. Despite living in landlocked Marrakesh, al-Mansur knew exactly what the queen had achieved, and how that achievement could serve his own goals:

The enemy of religion, the infidel (may God increase his sorrow and weaken his hold), the *taghiya* [tyrant],¹⁹ of Qishtala [Philip II of Castile] who is today against Islam and who is the pillar of polytheism [*shirk*] and the one against whom both sword and destruction should, by religious duty, be wielded... [He sent his] fleet against the lands of England, breaking the waves, and seeking glory and celestial ascent [*m'iraj*]. Once the fleet drew near to her [England] and made ready for battle, and lay in wait at the end of her island and the borders of her land [Land's End?], God sent a sharp wind [*reehan sarsaran*] against the fleets of the *taghiya* that broke up their formation and pushed them onto the enemy's lands, bringing down their flags and banners. God closed upon the tyrant his circle of evil, and brought upon him what He has wrought, clipping the wings of his armies, and destroying his power. These actions were, thanks be to God in this dear matter, the harbingers of success and conquest, and a sign for him [al-Mansur] to fulfill his awaited promise, in taking possession, by God's will, of his [tyrant's] lands and territories, and in confronting him with the victorious soldiers of God on his own turf.²⁰

Al-Fishtali's attitude toward Christian infighting is noteworthy. The letter proclaims God to be on the side of England's queen: the difference between her Christianity and Spain's was known to him and its relevance understood (but not perhaps the theological details). Also, the scribe was well informed about the course of the sea battle: how a storm had first ravaged the Spanish fleet, after which the English fell on it and destroyed it. What was important for al-Fishtali and the Marrakesh court in all this European religious and military rivalry was that the queen was worthy of praise, despite being a Christian. God, who for al-Fishtali and his audience, was the God of Muslims, had helped the Christian/English queen against the Spanish tyrant. It is important to note the Qura'nic phrase that Fishtali used: *reehan sarsaran* (41:16). The phrase describes the furious wind that God sent on the sinful people of Aad to destroy them. Interestingly, the people of Aad had been known to be a seafaring people (supposedly in the southwest corner of the Arabian peninsula) and great builders—much

like the Spaniards. As God had punished the people of Aad, so had He punished the Spaniards. For al-Fishtali, religious difference (with England) was less important than political, ideological, and military cooperation. Indeed, God Himself seemed to support such cooperation—for He had supported Elizabeth against Philip—for the benefit of al-Mansur's Islamic goal.

Toward the end of that year, 1588, al-Mansur received an ambassador from Don Antonio who "asked the King of Fez for 300,000 crowns."²¹ Al-Mansur was now willing to join the Anglo-Portuguese alliance against Spain, but as a "hostage or surety," he asked for Don Antonio's son—as indeed Queen Elizabeth herself had suggested in August of that year.²² Don Antonio agreed and sent his son, Don Christobal, who left England on November 10, 1588 "with four ships of war and six merchant men and a large household of Portuguese and English—over 40 persons. He takes several musical instruments, and rich household appointments, Don Antonio having spent 30,000 crowns in his embarkation. The officers of his household are splendidly fitted."²³ Such a vast entourage made Moroccans aware of their power over Anglo-Portuguese potentates who had sent a prince and heir as a hostage to their king's court. As al-Fishtali wrote:

Don Antonio saved himself by fleeing to the queen of the land Nigaleetra, Abdhil. She welcomed him and gave him shelter and rolled up her sleeves to help him. But then he looked around and saw that only the hand of the Prince of the Faithful could build what had been destroyed and mend the cracks...and that he [Don Antonio] could not build his fort without him who gave him pickaxes. He needed [al-Mansur's] imamate swords and spears, so he wrote to him, and stretched his hand of need from behind the seas, and sent his son from the lands of Langalteer, imploring and begging.²⁴

To welcome him upon his arrival in Morocco in January 1589,²⁵ Mulay al-Mansur ordered his son Abu Faris to meet the Portuguese hostage. Abu Faris sent the most senior (Portuguese) renegade under his command, al-Caid Mahmood, who led Don Christobal and his entourage from Asila via Fez to Marrakesh, where great festivities were held in his honor.²⁶ (It was quite ironic that Don Christobal landed in Asila, for it was there that Don Sebastian had landed ten years earlier on his fateful journey to defeat and death.)

The son of the Portugal *taghiya* was in Marrakesh, wrote al-Fishtali, seeking help from “our swords, made triumphant by God, to regain his lost kingship; . . . although our imamate swords with their sharp blades had earlier destroyed the edifice of his kingship [in the battle of Wadi al- Makhazin/Alcazar, Don Christobal knew] that only with our hands would he recover it.”²⁷

But once al-Mansur had his hostage, he procrastinated. As months passed, the queen grew frustrated and demanded the return to England of Don Christobal, who had become like a captive in Morocco (as he described himself in a letter to Lord Burghley on May 25, 1590).²⁸ The attack on Lisbon the year before, which the queen had hoped would replenish her coffers, had failed to do so. Elizabeth thus addressed a letter to the Moroccan king, revealing, perhaps inadvertently, her helplessness: she was bitter that al-Mansur had ridiculed (“con mucha honra y humildad”) her letters and had not even listened to her; she further complained that he had not sent her the money she needed to defend herself against Philip II, and that he was ignoring the friendship between them. Nor had he released British captives in his kingdom (two of whom had already died). Unable to force his hand, and without any tempting prospect that she could dangle before him, Elizabeth strangely thought she could threaten him. Should he continue to prevaricate, she wrote, she would tell the Grand Signor in Istanbul about him. She could do nothing else but try to frighten al-Mansur with the mighty Turks: “If you would not grant us what we so reasonably ask from you, we will have to pay less attention to your friendship. We know for sure also that the Great Turk, who treats our subjects with great favor and humanity, will not appreciate your maltreatment of them in order to please the Spaniards.”²⁹

Elizabeth was helpless. For years, she had been consolidating her relations with the Ottomans so much that it was reported in Scotland that “no Christian Prince ever had in the Turk suche great estimation.”³⁰ Unfortunately, that consolidation had not translated into the naval assistance for which the queen’s ambassador in Istanbul had constantly pleaded. On June 23, 1590, al-Mansur replied to the queen’s letter by assuring her of his love, opening with pompous honorific titles to “the firm-footed, of celestial light and knowledge, the great *sultana al-asila*, *al-mathila*, *al-athila*, *al-khatira* [true-blooded, exemplary, high-born, great], the famous, the possessor of England, sultana Isabel”—titles that al-Mansur applied to Muslims, too. For him, the Christian queen was as valued as a Muslim ruler,³¹ and the

praise he heaped on her was intended to assure her that he was preparing to send an envoy to her with the money promised to Don Antonio. However, al-Mansur wanted to make sure that Elizabeth was serious about supporting the anti-Spanish claimant and establishing a league with him. If you extend the military help you promised Don Antonio this year, he continued, we shall send our envoy as soon as the “happy action” of conquering Sudan is finished. You and I, he concluded, share the same goals.³²

The praise that al-Mansur used in his letter was part of a rhetorical tradition that characterized Moroccan royal correspondence.³³ Indeed, the honorific titles that al-Mansur used in his official addresses to both Muslim and Christian potentates indicated exactly how he viewed them. In all communications with the Ottomans, al-Mansur refused to use any title for them other than “sultans”; on rare occasions only did he address them as “kings.” Much as he may (or may not) have respected the Ottomans, they did not have the caliphal status for which he alone was designated: they were rulers whose authority derived from worldly power and not from the lineage of God’s Prophet, as his did. In the case of Elizabeth, and since he wanted to honor her, he sometimes called her *malaka* (queen); and at other times, he called her *sultana*. Don Antonio was addressed in the same honorific formula as Sultana Isabel—at the same time as the Songhai Emperor, whom al-Mansur would soon defeat, was addressed as the mere “leader of Kaghwa and its great one, its administrator and keeper” in the letter in which al-Mansur threatened him with invasion.³⁴ Christian monarchs who were cooperating with him received more honor than Muslims seen to defy him. Significantly, throughout his correspondence with Queen Elizabeth, at no time did al-Mansur change his attitude toward her: she was always honored with the highest titles possible to a ruler—any ruler, Christian or Muslim.³⁵

Al-Mansur continued his maneuvering with Elizabeth and Antonio, irking thereby the Ottoman Sultan for pursuing a policy independent of the Sublime Porte’s and for manipulating Mediterranean conflicts for his ends. In January 1591, Sultan Murad wrote to the queen expressing his disaffection with al-Mansur, “the faithless Prince of Fez.” He then added that he was “forwarding strongly worded despatches insisting on the return of the son of Don Antonio to Our most happy and exalted Porte.”³⁶ He assured the queen that his messenger would free Don Antonio’s son from Morocco, bring him back to the Sublime Porte, and free all English

merchants held captive by al-Mansur. However, there was only one crossing a year (in the spring) between Istanbul and Algiers (and then to Tetouan and then by land to Marrakesh), and then another season before the return crossing could be made. Al-Mansur was well aware of that limitation and realized that neither Don Antonio nor Queen Elizabeth was in a strong position. The only threat he feared was that of the Ottoman navy in Algiers and the fleet that the Ottoman sultan was preparing.³⁷ Until that threat became real, though, he could very well dictate his terms to Elizabeth.

At this juncture, al-Mansur turned to the venture that had been part of his imperial vision for a decade: the conquest of the Niger region ("Sudan") and the seizure of its gold-rich mines, which would give him the financial independence not only to buy whatever he wanted from European countries, but also to dictate more forcefully the course of Anglo-Portuguese affairs. On February 28, 1591, a Moroccan army reached Niger across the Sahara, 135 days after leaving Marrakesh. The 2,000 musket-wielding combatants who survived the ordeal had been instructed by al-Mansur to conquer the city of Gao, where the king of the Songhai, Askia Ishaq, had assembled an army of 80,000 men and 8,000 cavaliers, armed with lances and javelins. The battle took place on March 13, 1591 and ended with the slaughter of the Songhai army by the superior weaponry and discipline of the Moroccans. The "Sudan"/Land of the Blacks subsequently submitted and would henceforth send an annual tribute of 100,000 pieces of gold and 1,000 slaves to Marrakesh. While Elizabeth was invoking the Ottomans for help, the Sa'dian ruler had blazed a new trail of empire.³⁸ The hand of the Prince of the Faithful, wrote al-Fishtali in bombastic praise of al-Mansur, was now prevailing over all the peoples of the world—*ruum*, Persians, and Copts.³⁹ Indeed, if an anonymous Spanish source is to be trusted, al-Mansur had not only prepared an Andalusian army to march against Sudan, but also had attracted "a large body of European soldiers, not *'ilij* [renegade] Muslims but unconverted Christian mercenaries" to take part in the campaign.⁴⁰ European soldiers/mercenaries had flocked into Morocco to serve in the armies of the great "Xerifo."

The wealth that al-Mansur gained from the invasion immediately attracted European traders. As the Portuguese captive António de Saldanha reported, Marrakesh soon teemed with English, French, Flemish, Italian, and Spanish merchants, each seeking al-Mansur's favor and approaching him with requests for monopolies.⁴¹ The queen swallowed her pride and wrote to ask him to help her build

a front against Spain and to remind him that she had sold him the tents and the heavy weapons for the invasion of the Sudan.⁴² Having not replied to her earlier letter, and having delayed her messenger for two years, sometime between January and March 1592,⁴³ al-Mansur wrote to Elizabeth assuring her that he paid the closest attention to her needs and interests “both great and small,” but he ignored her demand both for money and for Don Antonio’s son “whom you had sent to us.” Instead, he explained that he had not been able to help because he had been conducting the invasion of “*al-mamlaka al-sudaniyya*” (the Sudanese kingdom).⁴⁴ He then told Elizabeth that she had to fulfill her part of the deal in assisting Don Antonio—and that if she found herself unable to “give the ayde, then send us wourde.”⁴⁵ Either the queen would cooperate or the whole agreement between her and al-Mansur over Don Antonio would collapse.

In another letter sent later that year, Mulay Ahmad promised to return Don Christobal to England, assuring the queen that he was ever attentive to diplomatic relations with her, and telling her that his conquest of “Sudan” would increase his strength as well as hers and would prove beneficial to England. As he had viewed her victory over the armada as beneficial to him, so did he now tell her that the gold of Sudan would be beneficial to her—because the gold would enable him to finance the conquest of al-Andalus, “to re-take the region from the hands of infidelity and to return the word of Islam to its youth and vigor.”⁴⁶ His wealth would help him defeat her chief enemy. The initiative for action was in his hands. Elizabeth had no choice but to wait and visit Ditchley. Seemingly overnight, al-Mansur had begun building an empire after having conquered a large expanse of western Africa. He had also become the richest monarch among her allies and friends. Now not only England, but also Holland and France began to court him and seek military alliance with him against Spain. Al-Mansur was now so wealthy that his own people started calling him al-Dhahabi, the golden. Further, he proclaimed himself the *mahdi* and began describing himself in language that was almost heretical as he appropriated epithets that were exclusive to the Prophet Muhammad: “The prayer and peace of God be on His prophet Ahmad al-Mansur.”⁴⁷ The jurist Ahmad bin Muhammad bin al-Siddeeq wrote a treatise exclusively on the *mahdi*, presenting a hundred arguments in support of the mahdism of al-Mansur.⁴⁸

As tensions mounted between England and Spain, after a break in peace negotiations, Elizabeth knew, as did al-Mansur, that she would need his assistance in case of fighting in the Mediterranean

or the Atlantic theaters. Her fleet would have to victual in Moroccan ports. Therefore, when the queen authorized preparations for an attack on Cadiz, the Privy Council determined that “Sir Edward Hoby should be sent to Morocco in case help in galleys, men, or victuals should be needed from there.”⁴⁹ In early July 1596, the English fleet attacked Cadiz, “the heart of Spain,” as the Venetian ambassador called it.⁵⁰ Al-Mansur seized on the English attack as another Christian means to his Muslim goal. Having sent some ships to participate in the attack,⁵¹ he viewed the whole enterprise as the realization of a Moroccan goal by Anglo-Moroccan means. It was he, al-Mansur declared to his subjects, who had prodded the queen to attack by providing her with the necessary metals for building cannons and preparing gunpowder. It was he who had turned her against Philip; it was he who was now wreaking vengeance on Philip. As Philip had invaded Morocco by means of an-Nasir the year before,⁵² al-Mansur was now invading Iberia by means of Elizabeth. This explained why English traders were clandestinely providing him with all the “ores for gallies, launces, muskettes, muskett arrowes, caleveres, poldaves, cordage for gallies, sorde blades, gret shott and such like.”⁵³

Once again, al-Fishtali seized the opportunity to write about the attack, showing how carefully English affairs were monitored in Morocco:

the sky darkened with dissension against the tyrant of Qishtala, and the kings of the nations of the Christians attacked him like wild dogs. The most ferocious against him, and the one most daring in attacking his kingdoms and tightening the noose around him, was Isabella the sultana of the kingdoms of the lands of England. For Mulana the prince of the faithful [al-Mansur], had lured her with his support and had sharpened her will against him [Philip II]: he showed her his willingness to help confront him [Philip II] by supplying her with copper to use in cannons, and saltpeter for ammunition[gunpowder] which he permitted her to buy from his noble kingdoms. He also supplied her with metals, which were not found in her lands. With God helping him, he pitted her against the enemy of religion and, with God’s help, and because of his[al-Mansur’s] decisiveness,] capable organization, and deep caution, he kept her focused on [Philip II], both on her own and with his help.

Al-Fishtali confirmed that al-Mansur, “may God be with him, prepared for *jihad* against the enemy of religion to punish him for

what he had done to Islam.”⁵⁴ He then praised his master for sending other ships against the Eternal Islands/the Canaries and engaging the Spaniards in battle: “He continued, God support him, his attacks on the lands of infidelity and *shirk*, taking captives and goods from the Eternal Islands, which [his] fleet mangled with its teeth.”⁵⁵ Many observers had been convinced of Morocco’s collusion in the attack on Cadiz while the detailed information that al-Mansur possessed helps explain why he felt that he could manipulate events to his own end. With the weakening of Spain, the wealth of the western Sudan, and England’s need to use his ports, al-Mansur was confident that the “swords” of Islam could now begin the conquest of al-Andalus.⁵⁶ So well was he recognized around the Mediterranean that in December of that year, 1596, a French delegation arrived in Morocco to negotiate with him about military and financial cooperation against Spain.⁵⁷

Al-Mansur never fulfilled his goal of conquering Spain, although a year after the attack on Cadiz, a reporter in Brussels still feared that the English would equip 200,000 Moors from Barbary to “descend upon Spain.”⁵⁸ Actually, after the 1596 Treaty of Greenwich among England, France, and Holland against Spain, the Moriscos of Aragon tried to forge an alliance with Henri IV of France, while Moriscos in al-Andalus sought an alliance with England and Holland.⁵⁹ In July 1596, the Venetian ambassador in Spain reported that the Moors were boarding English ships that were cruising near the coast of Spain.⁶⁰ By May of the following year, there was still fear that with the support of Elizabeth, a large army of Moors would attack.⁶¹ In June, Spaniards feared a joint attack by “English and Moors.”⁶² Later that year, an anonymous memo addressed to Robert Cecil expressed the hope that the “King of Moroko” would send “som of his Mores to burne and spoyle the Spaniards corne adjoyning to their fortts and garrisons in Barbarie.”⁶³ Throughout those tense years, and as rebellion in Ireland festered, Elizabeth realized that any attack against Spain, which was supporting the Irish Catholics, would need al-Mansur since, on her own, she could not muster enough military might. The Irish rebellion of Hugh O’Neill was draining her military strength and the Earl of Essex who had been sent to quell it had not been successful. Although plague devastated Morocco in the summer of 1598, in May 1599, the Dutch States General turned to England to try to effect the release of Dutch captives there. The Dutch recognized the ties that bound the two countries and the

“creditt,” as Elizabeth wrote to al-Mansur, “which they suppose the correspondency that hath long ben betweene you and us doth cause us to have with you.”⁶⁴

Such credit was known to English playwrights as well as to the general populace. Thomas Heywood confirmed in his play, *The Fair Maid of the West, Part I*,⁶⁵ that Florentine and other Italian merchants recognized the “creditt” and turned to English Bess (as in reality they turned to Elizabeth) for help with the Moroccan ruler. There was wide recognition of the power and wealth of the Moors into which England had managed to tap. The play shows an English virgin, Elizabeth (with evocation of the virgin queen Bess), arriving in Morocco, enchanting the Moroccan ruler, and then staying with her sweetheart, Spencer, in the kingdom. The couple is married in Fez by the English cleric whom Bess had presumably saved from death for traveling to Morocco to preach Christianity. Then they are given a magnificent dowry by the Moroccan ruler. In this respect, the play depicts the first English immigrants to North Africa, presenting a couple settling, not in Roanoke, but in the wealthy and attractive kingdom of Morocco. At the end of the Elizabethan period, Thomas Heywood was certain that his country’s trading and settlement future lay in North Africa, not in North America. His play was the first to present Moors not drawn from Italian or Spanish sources, as many other plays about North Africa did; even the name of the Moorish ruler was derived from contemporary history,⁶⁶ unlike the names of previous Moors in Marlowe or Peele or Shakespeare. Heywood was observing the course of English navigation and expansion and may well have drawn inspiration for his picaresque plot from the actual adventures of his countrymen (and women?).

Heywood knew who his queen’s potential allies were. During the visit of the Moroccan ambassador to London in 1600–1601, al-Mansur had secretly proposed to the queen a joint operation to seize the Spanish possessions in America. The queen was not interested in building an empire, but was in need of well-trained troops to help her against Spain. She tried, quite underhandedly, to steal his elite force of Morisco warriors by enticing them to come to England and serve on her fleet. This desperate move on her part is known through a copy of a letter from Mulay Ahmad to her that has survived in a collection of Arabic letters in the National Library of Rabat. In the letter, al-Mansur angrily threatens her, telling her that he has discovered her plot, and that she had better be cautious. There were numerous English merchants and traders settled in his kingdom who could

well pay for their queen's imprudent indiscretion.⁶⁷ In another letter of May 1, 1601, he states to Elizabeth that he will underwrite a joint military venture with her only if the goal is not just to fight Spain but also to colonize America. Al-Mansur wanted assurances that after defeating the Spaniards, Moroccans would populate the land—to the exclusion of the English. In a moment of imprudent exuberance, al-Mansur outlined his goals—that Islam would prevail in America and the *mabdi* would be proclaimed from the two sides of the ocean. To ensure cooperation, al-Mansur informed the queen that such a venture would bring her vast benefits that would help her launch an imperial venture:

And your high estate shall knowe that, in the inhabiting of those countries by us and yow, yow shall have a great benefite: first for that those countries of the East are adjoining to many Kinges Moores and infinite nations of our religion; and further, if your power and command shall be seene there with owre armie, all the Moores will joyne and confederate themselves—by the help of God— with us and yow.⁶⁸

Elizabeth did not help al-Mansur, whereupon he became convinced that she was useless for his grand schemes. On July 3, 1602, he sent a letter to the queen in which he repeated his honorific praise of her and expressed his continued admiration and eagerness for cooperation.⁶⁹ However, in his address to her, he was not completely sure of her status: to “the Sultana Isabel,” he wrote, “whom we *like [to think]* that her station is still recognized among her religious community” *al-lati nuhibu an la yazalu qadruha mu’tamadan* (emphasis added). A few months later, in October, he signed an agreement for military cooperation with Spain against his arch enemy, the Ottoman Empire. After negotiating with the queen for nearly two decades, he had found that she never put her troops where her mouth was, nor allowed him to put his troops where he wanted. On her side, Elizabeth knew that she needed al-Mansur more than he needed her, and that his gold, armies, natural resources, and antipathy to Spain were crucial for the defense of her kingdom. In her last letter to him, just before her death on April 3, 1603, she informed him of the release of Moorish captives who had been held in England (and asked for the release of Cornelis Jansz, her subject, born in Flushing). She then signed the letter as she had been signing since 1598: “Vuestra hermana y pariente segun ley de corona ye

ceptro,” your sister and relative according to the law of crown and scepter.⁷⁰

* * *

Elizabeth and al-Mansur were two of a kind. Both lived in a highly charged religious context: Protestant Elizabeth feared Catholic Philip in the same way that Maliki Ahmad feared the Hanafi Ottoman Sultan, Murad III. Both were highly opinionated rulers, expecting obedience and flattery, but also relying on the insights of a small coterie, the Privy Council and Majlis al-Shura. Both were consolidating the national identity in the face of outside danger, and both were strapped for money: Elizabeth sent her sea-dogs after the gold of the Spanish galleys while al-Mansur sent his Morisco army into the western Sudan in quest of gold and conquest. Both feared the plots and schemes of their kin who were supported by Spain: Elizabeth had to contend with Mary Queen of Scots until she executed her in 1587, and al-Mansur had to contend with his nephew who was defeated and killed after his attempted invasion from Spain in 1595. Both monarchs wrote repeatedly to each other and frequently exchanged envoys and ambassadors. To no other European monarch did al-Mansur write more letters than to Queen Elizabeth.

Their correspondence shows how staunchly they were aware of their different religious identities. Still, they were willing to go beyond their identities toward realizing a mutual goal. Perhaps the fact that Protestant Elizabeth was fighting Catholic Spain attracted al-Mansur, since he found Protestantism more appealing than the “idolatry” of Rome. Al-Fishtali mentioned both Luther and Calvin in *Manabil al-safa*, and the changes they had effected in Christendom, upon which al-Mansur would have looked favorably. In an age of religious persecution and bigotry, it is striking that neither monarch tried to subvert the other theologically or viewed cooperation as a venue toward conversion. Furthermore, al-Mansur repeatedly praised Elizabeth as a Christian and used letter openings that were not exclusionary: instead of invoking God and the Prophet Muhammad, he opened his letters with an invocation of God and all His prophets—which would include Jesus. Al-Mansur was not anxious about dealing with a Christian *sultana* because relations were not overshadowed by Muslim weakness or fear as would happen a century later. In the absence of fear, religion was safe and al-Mansur did not need to defend, promote, or force it.

That Elizabeth was a woman and queen never bothered Mulay al-Mansur in the manner that it drove John Knox to near insanity. It is important that al-Mansur allowed her name to be mentioned in his presence and read in the correspondence. Just over a few decades later in the Mughal court, Sir Thomas Roe discovered that any mention of his king's name constituted an insult to the Indian potentate who thought very little of James I. But much as al-Mansur seemed to have respected Elizabeth, he never viewed her as a sister, nor did he view himself as her (big) brother. He never reciprocated the filial titles, perhaps because he viewed her queenship above her womanhood in a manner that she did not. While to her own countrymen she wanted to have the fortitude of a man, as in her famous speech before the Armada attack, to Mulay Ahmad, she wanted to be a sister in royalty and a sister who needed the support of a brother. Al-Mansur did not view Elizabeth through gendered eyes. She was a *sultana*, less than he in majesty not because of womanhood but because of pedigree. She was admired and never vilified (at no point was she addressed as a *taghiya*), but she was not his equal.

To the English theatergoers in London and around the regions where theater groups traveled, al-Mansur appeared as a formidable figure, commanding respect for his wealth and exuding military strength and political acumen. It is not surprising that between 1588 and 1603, the year in which he died, numerous plays were performed in England with powerful male Moorish protagonists. At no time after the Elizabethan period would the Moor play as important or complex a role as he did in *The Battle of Alcazar*, *Titus Andronicus*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *Lust's Dominion*, *Othello*, and *The Fair Maid of the West*.⁷¹ Peele's *The Battle of Alcazar* ends with al-Mansur, who is one of the protagonists, standing victorious over the bodies of the English and the Portuguese invaders, while Heywood's Mullisheq resembles al-Mansur, about whom the English playwright fantasized. At a time when al-Mansur was dictating conditions to Queen Elizabeth, it was helpful to reverse the situation on stage and show the Moroccan ruler doting on English Bess and obeying her every wish and whim.

For decades, and well into the eighteenth century, English and Moroccan envoys, rulers, and writers looked back at the cooperation between the two rulers and remembered them as monarchs who had been able to go beyond religious polarization toward mutually beneficial diplomatic and military cooperation. Both printed and archival material provides numerous examples of an enduring memory. In the first letter from al-Mansur's successor and son to King James on

November 5, 1604, Mulay Zaidan hoped that cooperation between them would continue “as it had been between our mulana the sultan, may God bless him [rest his soul] and your sister.”⁷² In 1609, the author of *A History of Barbary* recalled how al-Mansur had written many letters “to that worthy Lady of happie Memorie, and his Embassage sent unto her, Anno 1601.”⁷³ In 1610, the Spaniard Jorge de Henin mentioned how a Moroccan envoy to England reminded King James of the amity between Elizabeth and al-Mansur.⁷⁴ The Moroccan historian (and contemporary) of al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn al-Qadi, recalled that during his reign, al-Mansur was sought after by many European monarchs, including the English queen.⁷⁵ Soon after King Charles I succeeded to the throne, he turned to the affairs of the Mediterranean, where his merchant fleet and sailors were threatened by the Barbary Corsairs. Eager to diffuse tension and ensure cooperation, he wrote to Mulay Zaidan to invoke the “greate amyty and correspondacy betwene your father Mully Hamet, and the late Queene Elizabeth, of famus memory; which the Kinge our father, for his part, hath bin very desirous to continewe.”⁷⁶ In the eighteenth century, the memory of cooperation between the two monarchs still lingered. In 1704, Jezreel Jones reported how Mulay Ismail had told him that he “desired to have the same correspondence & amity with her Majesty [Queen Mary] that Muley Hamet Dhehby had with Queen Elizabeth.”⁷⁷

The Moroccans had long memories of the Christian potentate who had tried to reconfigure alliances beyond religious differences. Nevertheless, Elizabeth was the last sister that a Muslim potentate ever had, and she was only a sister, not an imperial queen.

Notes

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2. Elizabeth W. Pomeroy, *Reading the Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1989), 64.
3. Roy Strong, *The Cult of Elizabeth* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 154.

4. For a survey of the development of the image of Elizabeth, see Julia M. Walker, *The Elizabeth Icon, 1603–2003* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
5. The queen herself admitted to that. See *Elizabeth I, Collected Works*, ed. Lea S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 329. As David Armitage succinctly stated: “The impress of Empire upon English literature in the early-modern period was minimal, and mostly critical where it was discernible at all... Post-colonial studies have generated proto-colonial studies, and recent scholarship has found the literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to be deeply, because necessarily, inflected by the ‘imperial’ experiences of racial difference, irreducible ‘otherness,’ assertions of hierarchy, and national self-determination. However, to apply modern models of the relationship between culture and imperialism to early-modern literature and Empire demands indifference to context and inevitably courts anachronism. It is therefore necessary to be as sceptical about post-Imperial demystifications as it once was about mid-Imperial complacencies. David Armitage, “Literature and Empire,” *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. I, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford, 1998), 102.
6. Abu Faris Abd al-Aziz al-Fishtali, *Manabil al-safa’ fi ma’ather mawalina a-shurafa’*, ed. Abd al-Karim Karim (Rabat, 1974), 49.
7. State Papers, Public Record Office, The National Archives (henceforth, SP). SP 102/4/20.
8. Al-Fishtali, *Manabil al-safa’*, 101.
9. Quoted in J. N. Hillgarth, *The Mirror of Spain, 1500–1700, The Formation of a Myth* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 366.
10. Henry de Castries, *Les Sources Inédites de L’histoire du Maroc... Archives et Bibliothèques D’Angleterre* (Paris, 1918–1936), 1: 455–457; 468–475.
11. António de Saldanha, *Crónica de Almançor, Sultã de Marrocos (1578–1603)*, edited by António dias Fariha and translated by Léon Bourdon (Lisbon, 1997), ch. 47.
12. Still, in March 1588, he issued a royal edict to protect all English traders, travelers and residents in his kingdom. Castries, *Les Sources... d’Angleterre*, 1: 490–491.
13. Henry de Castries, *Les Sources inédites de l’Histoire du Maroc, Dynastie Saadienne, Archives et Bibliothèques de France* (Paris, 1909) 2: 150.
14. Castries, *Les Sources... d’Angleterre*, 1: 493.
15. Ibid., 1: 494.
16. Al-Fishtali, *Manabil al-safa’*, 96.
17. Ibid., 170.
18. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 211.

19. See the discussion of this term in De Castries, *Moulay Ismail et Jaques II* (Paris, 1903), 9, n. 3.
20. Abdallah Guennun, ed., *Rasail Sa'diyya* (Tetuan, 1954), 152–157. For a full translation of this and the next letter by al-Fishtali, see Nabil Matar, *Europe through Arab Eyes, 1578–1727* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
21. *Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth, January–July 1589*, ed. Richard Bruce Wernham (London, 1950), 23:17. Al-Mansur's promises were treated as realities by European observers: in November 1588, it was reported from Antwerp that Don Antonio had actually been given by the Barbary king “100 ships,” *The Fugger News-Letters, Second Series*, trans. L. S. R. Byrne, ed. Victor von Klarwill (London, 1926), 183.
22. Pierre de Cenival, *Les Sources... Saadienne*, 2: 151–153.
23. *Calendar of Letters and State Papers relating to English Affairs... Archives of Simancas Elizabeth 1587–1603*, 4: 486.
24. Al-Fishtali, *Manabil al-safa'*, 101.
25. He had left by 10 November 1588: *Fugger News-Letter, Second Series*, 182.
26. *Manabil al-safa'*, 101.
27. *Rasail Sa'diyya*, 165.
28. De Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2:34–39; *Calendar of letters and State Papers relating to English Affairs... Archives of Simancas*, 4: 580–581.
29. Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2:36, 38: “Si no quisierdes conceder lo que contanta razon os pedimos, allende que nos tendremos occasion de hazer tanto menos caso de vuestre amistad, sabemos tambien de cierto qu'el Gran Turco, el qual usa de mucho favor y humanidad con nuestros vassallos, no tendra a bien que los maltrateys por dar contento a los Españoles...” Thanks to Anna Montoya for the translation.
30. *Calendar of Scottish Papers, Ad 1589–1593, James VI*, 10: 404, ed. William K. Boyd and Henry W. Meikle (Edinburgh, 1936). See also Francis Bacon, *Observations on a Libel*: “...he saith England is confederate with the great Turk,” *Works*, eds. James Spedding et al. (London, 1890), 8: 204.
31. See al-Fishtali, *Manabil al-sfa'* 187, where similar titles are applied to the sultan of Mecca.
32. Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2: 18–20.
33. Not much research has been conducted on the rhetoric of Magharibi letters. See the brief discussion by al-Tahir Muhammad Tuwat, *Adab al-Rasa'il fi al-Magbreh al-Arabi* (Rabat, 1993), 258–269.
34. Quoted in Muhammad al-Gharbi, *Bidayat al-bukm al-Maghribi fi al-Sudan al-gharbi* (Baghdad, 1982), 667.

35. At this point in time, al-Mansur felt superior to Philip II. In the first letter al-Mansur had sent to Philip after the Moroccan victory at Wadi al-Makhazen, in March 1579, he had addressed the Spanish king as "the great sultan of status and place, of ancient blood and great deeds, the king of the Christian denomination and its great one, the center of that circle, who has praiseworthy qualities, sultan don Philip son of the great sultans, known for their majesty"; after all, Philip had become king of Portugal and its colonial possessions, too, Dario Cabanelas, "Ortas Cartas del Sultan de Marruecos Ahmad al-Mansur a Felipe II," in *Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos* 7 (1958), 13–14. But, by the late 1580s, with Spain in decline after the defeat of its armada, Philip II became the *taghiya*, as al-Fishtali confirmed.
36. *Fugger News-Letters, Second Series*, 216–217.
37. Richard Bruce Wernham, ed., *List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth I, July 1590–May 1591* (London, 1969), 2: 459.
38. See my study of this invasion in "The Maliki Imperialism of Ahmad al-Mansur: The Moroccan Invasion of Sudan, 1591," in *Imperialisms*, ed. Elizabeth Sauer and Balchandra Rajan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 147–161.
39. Abdallah Guennún, *Dhikrayat Mashahir rijal al-Maghrib* (Beirut, n.d.), 49.
40. Quoted in Weston F. Cook, Jr., *The Hundred Years War of Morocco* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 258.
41. Saldanha, *Crónica de Almançor*, ch. 96.
42. Ibrahim Harakat, *Al-Siyasah wal-Mujtama' fi al-Asr al-Sa'di* (Al-Dar al-Bayda', 1987), 82.
43. Hopkins has January (J. F. P. Hopkins, *Letters from Barbary, 1576–1774*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 5; De Castries has March. It is not clear whether the month was Jamadi I or II.
44. SP 102/4/30.
45. Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2: 70.
46. Al-Fishtali, *Rasail Sa'diyya*, 59.
47. *Ibid.*, 52.
48. *Ibraz al-Wahm al-Maknun min Kalam Ibn Khaldun aw al-Murshid al-Mahdi li-rad ta'an Ibn Khaldun bi Ahadith al-Mahdi*, National Library of Rabat, MS Dal 1878.
49. R. B. Wernham, *The Return of the Armadas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 108.
50. *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts... Venice, 1592–1603* (London, 1897), 9: 216.
51. The Fugger informant stated that al-Mansur had sent "five galleys from Barbary" to assist the English and had also given permission to the English fleet "to put into Barbary and obtain provisions and

other military stores" (*Fugger News-Letters, Second Series*, 278). Another report alleged six thousand Barbary soldiers with Don Antonio (Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2:94 n.). Actually, al-Mansur had sent three galleys which reached Cadiz on 25 June 1596: although they did not take part in the military action, they provided the English fleet with provisions and ammunition Castries (*Les Sources... Saadien ne... France*, 2:229, n. 3.).

52. An-Nasir bin Ghalib had escaped to Lisbon after the defeat of his father, Muhammad al-Mutawakkil, in the battle of Alcazar. In early 1595, an-Nasir crossed to the Spanish controlled port of Melilla on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast with an army consisting of Morisco mercenaries and a number of political refugees from Morocco. The invasion proved unsuccessful: after two battles between an-Nasir and al-Mansur's son, ash-Sheikh al-Ma'mun, the invader was defeated and killed.
53. Castries, *Les Sources... d'Angleterre*, 2: 103.
54. Al-Fishtali, *Manabil al-safa'*, 187.
55. *Ibid.*, 197.
56. The Venetian ambassador in Spain reported the rumor that the English fleet carried arms to "supply the Moreschi of Andalusia, who are ready to make a rising, and that, in order to support them, the English may very likely have opened communications with the Schereef [al-Mansur]," *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts... Venice, 1592-1603*, 9: 216.
57. De Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2: 106.
58. *Fugger News-Letters, Second Series*, 295.
59. Juan Regla, *Estudios sobre los moriscos* (Barcelona, 3rd ed. 1947), 195-218.
60. *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts... Venice, 1592-1603*, 9: 220.
61. *Ibid.*, 9: 270-271.
62. *Ibid.*, 9: 275.
63. Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2: 121.
64. *Ibid.*, 2: 137.
65. *The Fair Maid of the West, Parts I and II*, edited by Robert K. Turner. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967).
66. As Warner G. Rice pointed out, Heywood's Mullisheq could have derived from the names of any of three men who went by that name: "The Moroccan Episode in Thomas Heywood's 'The Fair Maid of the West'," *Philological Quarterly* 9 (1930), 131-140.
67. For a study of this letter, see my *Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 27. See also Nabil Matar and Rudolph Stoeckel, "Europe's Mediterranean Other: The Moor," *The Arden Critical Companions*, gen. eds., Andrew Hadfield

- and Paul Hammond (London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2004), 230–252.
68. Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2: 208–209.
69. *Ibid.*, 2:210–211.
70. *Ibid.*, 2:221, see also 131.
71. For a study of the Moor on the Elizabethan stage, see my discussion in chapter I of *Britain and Barbary*.
72. SP 102/4/34.
73. *Purchas His Pilgrimes* (New York, 1965, reprint), 6: 60.
74. *Wasfal-Mamalik al-Maghribiyya*, trans. Abd al-Wahid Akmir (Rabat, 1997), 130.
75. Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Qadi, *ʿadhwat al-iqtibas* (Rabat, 1973), 115.
76. Castries, *Les Sources... Angleterre*, 2: 566.
77. SP 71/15/101r .



CHAPTER 8

ELIZABETH I AND PERSIAN EXCHANGES

Bernadette Andrea

Recent scholarship on English relations with the Islamic world during the Elizabethan era has focused on exchange as a way to counter two persistent fallacies: the first, based on medieval anti-Islamic polemics and brought forward into modern “clash of civilization” diatribes, posits an unbridgeable gap between “East” and “West”; the second, drawn from anachronistic applications of the postcolonial critique epitomized by Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, assumes the West has always dominated the East.¹ Seeking to remedy both views, Lisa Jardine’s influential cultural history, *Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance* (1996), situates Constantinople, renamed Istanbul after the Ottoman conquest of 1453, at the hub of a global network of exchange that constituted the European Renaissance in its cultural, as well as its mercantile, aspects. As she asserts, “in the panorama we are surveying of emerging influences on European culture, the cultural as well as the political might of the Ottomans plays a vital part.”² With Jerry Brotton, she expands this focus in *Global Interests: Renaissance Art Between East and West* (2000), whose opening chapter, “Exchanging Identity: Breaching the Boundaries of Renaissance Europe,” examines the Islamic influences on the Renaissance man’s self-fashioning.³ From this perspective, the Ottoman empire and other Islamic powers no longer seem absolutely “other” to western Christendom nor does the West invariably hold “the relative upper hand” in relation to them.⁴

The most recent wave of literary and cultural critics engaging Anglo-Ottoman relations during Elizabethan era—roughly, the second half of the sixteenth century—have followed suit in focusing on exchanges with the Islamic world as fundamental to the formation

of an emerging national, and even protoimperialist and protoorientalist, identity. These exchanges cover mercantile activities, imaginative literature, diplomatic politics, and religion, with an emphasis on conversion.⁵ Examining Queen Elizabeth's correspondence with members of the Ottoman dynasty, especially the *valide sultan* (mother of the sultan), I have engaged this body of criticism by showing how the cultural logic of "the exchange of women" was similarly constitutive of Anglo-Ottoman relations during the 1580s and 1590s.⁶ However, for the most part, prior Tudor encounters with the Safavid dynasty (c. 1501–1722), based in the traditionally Persianate regions of Iran and extending into Central Asia, have been neglected.⁷ Yet, the voyages of the English merchants attempting to circumvent the Iberian monopoly on global commodity exchange that defines the early modern period first turned northward, ostensibly to discover a new route to "Cathay," but actually finding themselves in the expansionist Russian empire, the contested Central Asian borderlands, and the Safavid domains.⁸ While these voyages spanned multiple Tudor sovereigns, with the first launched under Edward VI (1547–1553) returning to report to Mary I (1553–1558), most of the ventures occurred under the tutelage of Elizabeth I (1558–1603).⁹ Elizabeth's initial correspondence with Muslim sovereigns therefore addressed the Persian court rather than the Ottoman.

These ventures continued for the next two decades under the leadership of Anthony Jenkinson, who began his career as an agent of the Russia Company and became the queen's ambassador to the courts of Ivan IV of Russia (1547–1584) and Tahmasp I of Persia (1524–1576).¹⁰ Famously, Jenkinson carried letters from the newly crowned queen to the Persian shah on the first official English mission to a Muslim sovereign since the Middle Ages, where he was dismissed as an infidel.¹¹ Subsequent missions had a better reception, again carrying letters from the queen.¹² Jenkinson's voyages across Central Asia also gained a Tartar girl for Elizabeth's court, along with bales of Persian silk and other goods.¹³ As previously indicated, only after Persian relations stalled, primarily due to renewed war in Central Asia, did Elizabeth shift her attention to the Ottoman empire, largely at the behest of the merchants of the Levant Company.¹⁴ These negotiations, which led to the lucrative Anglo-Ottoman trading capitulations of 1580,¹⁵ hinged on a series of letters from Elizabeth to members of the Ottoman dynasty, including Sultan Murad III (1574–1595) and the *valide sultan*, Safiye.¹⁶ This correspondence, which has not hitherto been examined in the context of the earlier letters to the

Persian shah, shows how Elizabeth learned the rhetoric of empire from her exchanges with these Muslim sovereigns, who for the most part deemed her kingdom insignificant and herself a supplicant. Moreover, as with the later letters to Safiye, which were accompanied by gifts of clothing from the *valide sultan* in exchange for portraits of Elizabeth and other items, the earlier correspondence with the Persian shah is enmeshed with the exchange of cloth, the primary commodity that concerned the English merchants, and other goods, including human chattel.¹⁷ My analysis of the queen's Persian exchanges proceeds through each node in this network, from the letters entrusted to Jenkinson, to the "Tartar girl" he brought (and perhaps bought), to the portrait of the "Persian Lady" long thought to represent Elizabeth.¹⁸ That the trade with Persia was never realized, the Tartar girl's fate remains inscrutable, and the ascription of the Persian Lady has been mooted is part of the "the so-called inarticulate" story of early modern English relations with the Islamic world.¹⁹

"The Queenes Maiesties Letters" to the Emperors of Russia and Persia

The first volume of the second edition of Richard Hakluyt's *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1599–1600), often overshadowed by the final volume on the Americas in contemporary criticism, features "the worthy Discoveries, &c. of the *English* toward the North and Northeast by Sea," extending into Russian, Persian, and Ottoman domains.²⁰ It includes Elizabeth's correspondence with their sovereigns and shows her increasing awareness of the politics of positioning during an era when England was a "comparatively minor" player in the great power politics of the region.²¹ Because the balance of power favored Islamic empires such as the Ottomans and their rivals, the Safavids, Elizabeth did not—and, indeed, could not—take an orientalist stance in her correspondence.²² Instead, she had to finesse Muslim sovereigns' perceptions of her as a supplicant and of her kingdom as a potential tributary. Later in the century, this eastern trade became more propitious for several reasons, including England's post-Reformation isolation from Catholic Europe, which led the queen to make strategic alliances with Muslims as like-minded iconoclasts and monotheists. Still, in negotiating this double-edged stance as defender of the Protestant faith, Elizabeth sought to conceal her

efforts from domestic audiences, not only through secret diplomatic negotiations, but also through distancing the crown from this trade by delegating it to joint-stock companies.²³

Prior to Elizabeth's unlikely accession to the throne in 1558, English merchants quietly sought a foothold in the expanding empire ruled by Ivan IV (b. 1530), who was named Grand Prince upon the death of his father in 1533 and finally crowned tsar in 1547.²⁴ The first voyage, led by Hugh Willoughby and Richard Chancellor, left English shores in 1553 aiming for "Cathay" via the northeast, but instead veering through the White Sea where Chancellor "learnt from some natives that the country he had reached was called Russia, or Muscovy, and that Ivan Vassilivitch was their king."²⁵ Despite this "discovery," the results of the voyage were mixed.²⁶ Willoughby froze to death with his crew for lack of knowledge about how to survive extreme northern winters. Chancellor was charged with conveying "*Osepp Gregoriwicke Napea*," the first Russian ambassador to England.²⁷ He drowned when his ship wrecked off the coast of Scotland; fortunately, the ambassador washed ashore relatively unharmed. After some haggling with the Scots over his lost goods, Napea rode to the English capital, where he was received by the reigning sovereigns, Mary and Philip, and feted by the Russia Company. During his stay in London, Mary died and Elizabeth was raised to the throne, "providentially" in the view of the Protestant party, which favored the Russian trade.²⁸ It was during this transition to Elizabeth's reign that the renowned traveler Anthony Jenkinson, after an apprenticeship in the Mediterranean wherein he gained a "safe conduct or priuiledge, given by Sultán Solymán the great Turke . . . in the yeere 1553," focused his attention northeastward.²⁹ Having been appointed "Captaine generall" of a fleet of four merchant ships bound for "S[t]. Nicolas in Russia," Jenkinson, in addition to his instructions from the "companie of the Marchants aduenturers," bore two royal charges: Osep Napea, whom he was to return safely to the Russian court, and a bundle of gifts and letters for the Russian emperor from the new English queen.³⁰ He discharged both duties successfully, with Napea assisting him in later trade negotiations and Ivan ultimately preferring him as the queen's representative. Among the highlights of his northern career, Jenkinson and his companions, Richard and Robert Johnson, are deemed the first Englishmen to have explored the Caspian Sea, traditionally considered the boundary between Europe and Asia to the north, which Jenkinson mapped.³¹ Famously, he was the first Englishman to be received at the court of a Safavid shah—the

forementioned Tahmasp, son of the founder of the dynasty, Ismail I—with the Sherley brothers in the early seventeenth century serving Tahmasp's grandson, Shah Abbas I, after a break of two decades in formal Anglo-Persian relations.³² In total, Jenkinson made four expeditions through the Russian empire and beyond, retiring in 1572 with the hope, in his words, of taking “my rest in mine owne house, chiefly comforting my selfe in that my seruice hath bene honourably accepted and rewarded of her Maiesty and the rest by whom I haue been employed.”³³

The document from 1568 granting his coat of arms recognizes Jenkinson's extraordinary service, acknowledging his travels “not onely of Europe... But also of bothe Asias and of Afrique.” This list through three continents culminates with the accolade: “and northwards hath also saylid on the frosen seas many dayes wthin the Artick circle, and traveylid thourough owt the ample dominions of the Empero^r of Russia and Muscovia and the confynes of Norway and Lapyia over to the Caspian Sea, and into dyvers countreys there abowt, to the old cosmographers utterly unknowne.” It then highlights his most rousing achievement: “in a secound iourney to mare Caspian, sayling over that Sea an other waye, and landing in Armenia at Darbent, a city of Alexander the greate his buyldinge [now in the modern nation of Uzbekistan], and from thence traveyling thourough dyvers countreys over to the courte of the great Sophy [the Safavid shah], he delyverid letters vnto him from the queens ma^{tie} [majesty] that now is [Elizabeth I], and remaynid in the said Sophy[’s]... court the space of viij [eight]... moneths.”³⁴ In the preface to the 1589 edition of *The Principal Navigations*, Hakluyt praises Jenkinson, along with William Burrough, as “gentlemen of great experience, and obseruations in the north Regions”; in the preface to the 1599 edition, he lauds him as “that valiant, wise, and personable gentleman.”³⁵ Jenkinson thus becomes central to what was later dubbed the “great prose epic” of the English nation.³⁶

Around the same time, William Warner in *Albion's England* (1602), another “nationalist epic,” elaborated Jenkinson's contributions to England's “Commerce and Fame” in over 200 lines of labored verse.³⁷ Even more interesting for our purposes is Warner's bracketing of “our Queen *Elizabeth* her letters” with hyperbolic representations of “Pluralitie of wiues” among Persianate Muslim rulers far in excess of the bare ethnographic details of Jenkinson's company reports.³⁸ Warner likewise embellishes the number of concubines: “sixe score” in one instance; “fifteene score” in another.³⁹ Moreover, to this

accelerating “economy of *jouissance*,” a core feature of the western fantasy of despotic “oriental” regimes, he adds a significant detail not contained in the company reports.⁴⁰ Describing the entertainment Jenkinson received “before King *Obdolowcans* [Abdullah Khan’s] Throne” in Shirvan [now in Azerbaijan], Warner entices his reader to imagine: “Scarce *Cleopatras Anthony* was feasted with more cheere/ Of varied Meates and spice Conceits than *Ienkinson* was heere.”⁴¹ This evocation of a suspect queen, whom Shakespeare enshrined in *The Tragedy of Antony and Cleopatra* (1606–1607) as an “Eastern femme fatale,” joins with the emphasis on excessive female sexuality to undercut the seemingly neutral reference to Elizabeth’s letters.⁴² The conclusion of this encomium to Jenkinson, where Warner declares, “The Maiden Empresse, and her Knights, their Enterprises rare,/ Which now haue pearst [pierced] through euerie Pole, of all admired are,” does not necessarily correct the more degrading associations in the rest of the poem.⁴³ This is a tension we shall see developing in the course of the queen’s correspondence with the Russian and Persian emperors, as they are called in the salutations of her letters from the 1560s and 1570s.

Before analyzing Elizabeth’s first letter to the Persian shah or “Great Sophy of Persia,” which Jenkinson carried on his voyage of 1561, we must examine the prior letters conveyed north-eastward from Edward, Mary and Philip, and Elizabeth, as their terms framed Jenkinson’s voyage across Central Asia to the shah’s court.⁴⁴ The letter Chancellor carried with him on his inaugural voyage is fittingly vague in its address, which Hakluyt titles, “The copie of the letters missiue, which the right noble Prince Edward the sixt sent to the Kings, Princes, and other Potentates, inhabiting the Northeast partes of the worlde, toward the mighty Empire of Cathay, at such time as Sir Hugh Willoughby knight, and Richard Chancelor, with their company, attempted their voyage thither in the yeere of Christ 1553. and the seuenth and last yeere of his raigne.” It privileges “merchants, who wandering about the world, search both the land and the sea, to carry such good and profitable things, as are found in their Countries, to remote regions and kingdomes, and againe to bring from the same, such things as they find there commodious for their owne Countries,” thereby setting the interests of the company financing the voyage above those of dynastic politics or religion.⁴⁵ Subsequently, “the new Nauigation and discoverie of the kingdome of Muscovia by the Northeast, in the yeere 1553: Enterprised by Sir Hugh Willoughbie knight, perfourmed by

Richard Chancellor Pilot maior of the voyage” highlights the power differential between England, which was experiencing the instability of rapidly changing sovereigns with significantly different religious view, and Russia, whose dominions were steadily expanding under the consolidated reign of Ivan.⁴⁶ This imbalance of power manifests in the reaction of the first Englishmen to be received in Ivan’s court:

This so honourable an assembly, so great a Majestie of the Emperor, and of the place, might very well haue amazed our men, and haue dasht [dashed] them out of countenance: but notwithstanding Master Chancellor being therewithall nothing dismaied saluted, and did his duetie to the Emperor, after the manner of England, and withall, deliuered unto him the letters of our king, Edward sixt. The Emperor hauing taken, & read the letters, began a litle to question with them, and to aske them of the welfare of our king: whereunto our men answered him directly, & in a few words.

Ivan’s response to the English sovereign, which Hakluyt titles, “the copie of the Duke of Moscouie and Emperour of Russia his letters, sent to King Edward the sixt, by the hands of Richard Chancelour,” underscores this imbalance by detailing the extent of the Russian empire even as it stresses common Christian bonds between the two realms. Notably, the next missives to the Russian sovereign, “the letters of king Philip and Queene Marie to Iuan Vasiliuich the Emperour of Russia written the first of April 1555 and in the second voyage,” follow Ivan’s lead in mapping the competing Anglo-Spanish empire, a discourse with which Philip as “lord of all the world” was familiar.⁴⁷ Not surprisingly, during this joint reign, relations with Russia were seen as peripheral to Philip’s imperial interests and therefore stalled. The merchants gained a charter to trade in Russia, but royal support was minimal otherwise.⁴⁸ Hence, Jenkinson’s first voyage northward set out under one set of sovereigns, the Catholic and Spanish-oriented Mary and Philip, and returned to another, the Protestant and proudly English Elizabeth.⁴⁹ With the shift in sovereign came a shift in geopolitics, with the English nation increasingly distanced from Catholic Europe, particularly after the excommunication of their queen in 1570.⁵⁰ As noted above, this isolation led Elizabeth to turn toward unlikely allies, including Muslim sovereigns. It bears repeating, while much attention has been paid to the Anglo-Ottoman alliance of the 1580s and 1590s, along with the related Anglo-Moroccan rapprochement, the first attempts of the

English to forge relations with a Muslim ruler were with the Persian shah via the northeast route.

The report on "The first voyage made by Master Anthonie Jenkinson, from the Citie of London, toward the land of Russia, begonne the twelfth day of Maye, in the yeere, 1557," written according to company specifications, covers Jenkinson's mission to escort the Russian ambassador, the coordinates of his travels, the possibilities for trade, and other relevant ethnographical details.⁵¹ The letters he presents to "the Secretarie" delegated by the emperor to receive the English, Ivan Michailovitch Viscovatof, were from Mary and Philip, still sovereigns of England when he left on his first northern voyage. Only after the letters "were translated" did Jenkinson receive the answer that he "was welcome, and that the Emperour would giue me that I desired," which was a subsequent audience.⁵² As Daryl Palmer shrewdly observes in *Writing Russia in the Age of Shakespeare*, Jenkinson's fashioning of himself as indispensable to Anglo-Russian relations is central to this representation: "What stands out in this traveler's tale is the special attention—even recognition—conferred upon Jenkinson by the ruler, and it stands out because Jenkinson has shaped the story with this effect in mind."⁵³ To augment Ivan's importance, and therefore his own as a go-between, Jenkinson emphasizes the Russian ruler's recent conquests, "hauing thereby much enlarged his dominions."⁵⁴ Most likely, the newly crowned Elizabeth would have been briefed with this information, readily available to her councilors, some of whom were charter members of the Russia Company.⁵⁵ With this context in mind, "The Queenes Maiesties Letters to the Emperour of Russia, requesting licence, and safe conduct for M. Anthony Jenkinson, to passe thorow his kingdome of Russia, into Persia, to the Great Sophie," dated 1561, introduces her as "Queene of England etc.," addresses Ivan as "Emperor of all Russia"; references her brother, King Edward VI, as a precedent for Anglo-Russian relations, skipping over the reign of her sister; and asks for Jenkinson's safe passage, which he received.⁵⁶ Ivan, it must be said, did not respect Elizabeth's claims of sovereignty, wrongly considering her an elected rather than a dynastic queen.⁵⁷ However, having shown great respect for her father, Henry VIII, whom he regarded as "*imperator in regno suo*," or sole sovereign of his realm, gender considerations certainly shaped his dismissive attitude.⁵⁸ Indeed, after unsuccessfully attempting to win Elizabeth for his queen consort, he derisively called her a menstruous woman, using thinly veiled euphemisms, who could not control her kingdom.⁵⁹ Despite this pressure,

and even these insults, as ruler of a marginal island kingdom caught between several great powers, Elizabeth necessarily prevaricated in her response to Ivan.⁶⁰

Similar tensions inform the companion letter Jenkinson carried, "The Queenes Maiesties letters to the great Sophie of Persia," also dated 1561, with the greater gap in religion creating further difficulties.⁶¹ As previously mentioned, it is Elizabeth's first to a Muslim sovereign; it therefore functions as a touchstone for her subsequent correspondence with members of the Ottoman dynasty and related polities. As with her letter to the Russian emperor, Elizabeth begins by denoting herself "by the grace of God, Queene of England, &c." and her interlocutor as "the right mightie, and right victorious Prince, the great *Sophie*, Emperour of the *Persians*, *Medes*, *Parthians*, *Hyrcaenes*, *Carmanarians*, *Margians*, of the people on this side, and beyond the Riuer of *Tygris*, and of all men, and nations, betweene the *Caspian* sea, and the gulph of *Persia*, greeting and most happie increase in all prosperitie."⁶² Relying on classical references, the lens through which Persia was commonly viewed during the Renaissance, Elizabeth heightens the extent of the Safavid empire, which under Tahmasp was constantly beleaguered by the Uzbeks on its eastern and the Ottomans on its western flank.⁶³ Moreover, as in her initial letter to the Russian emperor, she undercuts her claims to sovereignty by presenting herself as "queen" of a realm completely unknown to the shah, despite her signature from "our famous Citie of London."⁶⁴ This parallels the response Englishmen experienced during their forays in the Levant at the beginning of the seventeenth century, then under Ottoman rule, where they were reduced to the generic ranks of "Franks" or western Christians.⁶⁵ Accordingly, by the time the queen addressed her first letter to Sultan Murad III in 1579, she expanded her titles and positioned herself prior to the sultan in her salutation, learning from her earlier correspondence with the shah the deleterious effects of the reverse order.⁶⁶

As with the subsequent Anglo-Ottoman correspondence, Elizabeth's letter to "the great Sophie" or Persian shah repeatedly evokes "the Almighty God" as a point of commonality, avoiding the Trinitarian references that characterized her letters to the Russian court.⁶⁷ Bearing this letter from "the most excellent and gracious soueraigne Lady *Elizabeth*, Queene of the sayd Realme [of England]," Jenkinson similarly attempted to finesse religious distinctions during his audience with the shah by identifying himself as "neither vnbeleueer nor Mahometan, but a Christian." However,

when the shah learned from one of his Christian subjects (“the king of the Georgians sonne”) that “a Christian was he that beleueeth in *Iesus Christus*, affirming him to bee the sonne of God, and the greatest prophet,” an answer combining Christian and Muslim understandings, Jenkinson was thrown out of the shah’s court, as we shall examine in more detail below. Jenkinson discerned the realpolitik underlying this spectacle when he discovered the recent rapprochement between the shah and “the great Turke his brother,” Süleiman the Magnificent, conspired to block his efforts to establish English trade in Persian domains.⁶⁸ In this case, Ottoman Sunni and Safavid Shi’a bonding trumped Protestant English efforts to trade in the region, even though religious ideologies did not prevent either Muslim power from forging trade agreements with England only a few decades later.

Seeking in his narrative to mitigate this humiliation, Jenkinson frames his failure by reporting that upon his arrival in the “Citie of *Casben* [Qazvin], where the sayd Sophie keepeth his court,” he was interviewed by “a prince called *Shallie Murzey*, son to *Obdolowcan* king of *Shiruan*,” from whose court he had recently departed loaded with gifts and goodwill. This reference not only emphasizes Jenkinson’s overall success in building alliances in the region, but it recalls a prior scene where he represented his queen with honor at the court of a Muslim ruler, albeit one who was a tributary to the “Sophie.” He reiterates the abundant courtesies with which he was treated in this court, even to the degree that Abdullah Khan, “perceiuing that it was painfull for me so to sit [i.e. cross-legged on floor cushions], his highnesse caused a stoole to be brought in, and did will me to sit thereupon, after my fashion.” Abundant feasting and questioning followed, with Jenkinson reporting the climax:

Then he demanded whether I intended to goe any further, and the cause of my comming: vnto that I answered, that I was sent with letters from the Queenes most excellent Maiesty of England, vnto the great Sophie, to intreat friendshippe and free passage, and for his safeconduct to be granted vnto English merchants to trade into his Segniories, with the like also to be granted to his subiectes, when they should come into our countryes, to the honour and wealth of both realmes, and commodity of both theyr subiects, with diuers other words, which I omit to rehearse.⁶⁹

This recollection of a favorable response to him as Elizabeth’s representative—highlighted by the marginal notation, “The Queenes

letters to the Sophie”—seems a last ditch attempt to counter the disrespect he, and she, received from the intended recipient of the letters.

As mentioned above, after a series of preliminary interviews with Abdullah Khan's son, then resident at the shah's court, and with "the Sophies Secretarie," Jenkinson realized that he arrived in Qazvin at a particularly inauspicious time, as "the great Turkes Ambassadors" had just arrived to ratify "a perpetuall peace betwixt the same great Turke and the Sophie": namely, the Treaty of Amasya (1555) marking the cessation of hostilities between the Safavids and Ottomans. After listing the opulent gifts brought by the Ottoman ambassador, against which the English presents paled, Jenkinson summarizes:

And thereupon a peace was concluded with ioyfull feastes, triumphs and solemnities, corroborated with strong o[al]thes, by their lawe of *Alkaran* [Qur'an], for either to obserue the same, and to liue alwayes after as sworne brethern, ayding the one agaynst all princes that should warre agaynst them, or eyther of them.⁷⁰

He even records his fear that his head would be offered to the Ottomans to seal the treaty, which was not implausible as one of its conditions was the head of Bayezid, the rebellious son of the Ottoman sultan, which was duly carried back with the ambassador.⁷¹ Again, by framing his account of his humiliating audience with this political analysis, Jenkinson attempts to mitigate the negative response Elizabeth might have to his, and by extension her, dismissal from the shah's court.

On the day of his audience, upon arriving by horseback at "the court gate," Jenkinson was forced to remove his shoes: as he states, "before my feete touched the ground, a pair of the Sophies owne shoes termed in the Persian tongue (*Basmackes*), such as hee himself weareth when he ariseth in the night to pray (as his maner is) were put vpon my feete." Rather than interpreting this gesture as a courtesy, as it may well have been, he views it as a humiliation, explaining "for without the same shoes I might not be suffered to tread vpon his holy ground, being a Christian, and called amongst them *Gower*, that is, vnbeleueer, and vncleane: esteeming all to bee infidels and Pagans which doe not beleuee as they doe, in their false filthie prophets *Mabomet* and *Murtezallie*."⁷² This outburst of bigotry for what he deems a humiliation is uncharacteristic of Jenkinson, who otherwise follows the merchant's code of avoiding discussions of religion or

politics as detrimental to trade.⁷³ At this point, he arrives at the culmination of his mission: “Thus comming before his maiestie with such reuerence as I thought meete to bee vsed, I deliuered the Queenes maiesties letters with my present.” The pursuant interrogation was unambiguously insulting. As he indicates, the shah “demaunded of me of what countrey of Franks I was,” with Jenkinson attempting to dissociate himself from this epithet by declaring himself “of the famous Citie of London within the noble realme of England, and that I was sent thither from the most excellent and gracious soueraigne Lady Elizabeth Queene of the saide Realme.” He then conveyed the request, in his queen’s name, for “friendship, and free passage of our merchants and people,” which he had rehearsed to better effect with Abdullah Khan.⁷⁴ The shah summarily refused the queen’s letter, which Jenkinson represents as his central charge throughout the narrative, on the grounds that no one could understand the languages in which it was written. Composed in the absence of up-to-date intelligence about the distant Persian realm, which Jenkinson and his party were the first Englishmen to visit since the medieval era,⁷⁵ the Latin letter was accompanied by versions in Italian, as would be subsequent letters to the Ottoman court where this language was commonly understood, and in Hebrew. The shah rejected all three as unintelligible, though Jewish communities did exist, and even flourished for a while, in Safavid Persia.⁷⁶ Jenkinson responded to this rebuff, and to the shah’s potentially dangerous questions about the relative power of “the Emperour of Almaine, King Philip [referencing Habsburg claims to the Holy Roman empire], and the great Turke,” with impressive tact.⁷⁷ He nevertheless remained intensely conscious of his subordinate status, with the shah “demaunding whether I was a *Gower*, that is to say, an vnbeleueer, or a *Muselman*, that is, of Mahomets lawe.”⁷⁸ As we have seen, Jenkinson attempted to finesse this distinction to no avail, with the shah expelling him from his court with the curse: “Oh thou vnbeeleeuer...we haue no neede to haue friendship with the vnbeeluers,” and ordering his retreating path covered with sand.⁷⁹

Fortunately, he was able to obtain “letters of safe-conductes and priuiledges...to bee free from paying custome” with the help of Abdullah Khan, and soon after left Safavid domains. The shah was advised by the latter, as Jenkinson summarizes, that if “he vsed me euill, there would be few straungers resort into his countrey, which would be greatly vnto his hinderance”; he therefore granted him “a rich garment of cloth of gold” and released him “without any harme.”

Jenkinson gave this robe to Ivan upon his return to the Russian court rather than retaining it for Elizabeth, which may have been part of the terms he had contracted with the tsar. Yet, it does suggest his doubled allegiances.⁸⁰ In any case, neither she nor her letter is mentioned in the balance of the narrative, even though we have evidence that his gifts to her included a Tartar girl and Persian silk, both of which we will discuss below. In summary, these lacunae point toward Jenkinson's failed efforts to represent his queen with honor in the Persian shah's court, despite more amenable receptions of subsequent missions.⁸¹ However, if Elizabeth did not forge an Anglo-Persian alliance as a result of her initial letters to a Muslim sovereign, she quickly learned how to position herself as an equal rather than a supplicant in later correspondence, which enabled her more successful attempts to establish links with the Ottomans.

The Tartar Girl and the Persian Lady

Daryl Palmer, whose astute analysis of Jenkinson's rhetorical stance we have cited above, concludes that Jenkinson exemplified "a kind of inter-cultural self-fashioning that continues, in our own day, to define the sophistication of multi-national existence."⁸² My discussion of the Tartar girl he brought back to Elizabeth's court uncovers the other side of this "multi-national existence": one characterized by human trafficking, integral to the network of commodity exchange that emerged in the early modern period and persisting as the "darker side" of globalization that postmodern (and even postcolonial) celebrations of cosmopolitanism mask.⁸³ Although appearing as mere traces in the historical record, this multiply subaltern subject speaks to all the levels of exchange—commodity, cultural, diplomatic, political, and religious—contemporary critics have engaged in their study of early modern English relations with the Islamic world. The issue I have raised elsewhere, and will continue to explore here, is not whether this subaltern speaks, because she does speak to us from the literal margins of written documents and beyond them through material signifiers, but whether we can develop the theoretical apparatus to listen to her.⁸⁴

This multiply subaltern subject receives a fleeting reference in "A letter of *Master Anthonie Ienkinson* vpon his returne from *Boghar* [Bukhara]... written in the *Mosco* the 18. of September 1559," and subsequently published in Hakluyt's 1599 edition of *The Principal Navigations*. This letter conveys the results, mostly disappointing,

of Jenkinson's first attempt to "voyage toward the lande of *Cathay*" via Central Asia, where "incessant and continuall warres" made him turn back once he reached what is now Uzbekistan and was then a contested region between the Russian, Safavid, and Ottoman empires. After this brief report, Jenkinson signs off, "Thus giving you most heartie thanks for my wench Aura Soltana, I commend you to the tuition of God, who send you health with hearts desire," a classic (and chilling) example of the exchange of women between men. Yet, Hakluyt's marginal note complicates the patriarchal circuit of this exchange by incorporating women privileged by class: "This was a young Tartar girle which he gaued to the Queene afterwarde."⁸⁵ This is the only direct evidence we have in the early modern English records of this gendered subaltern from the Islamic world. However, if these traces are read contextually, as I shall proceed to do, and are connected to other traces that have been similarly passed over as enigmas in the historical record, we may further limn her agency, however cautiously. What we must not do, I insist, is to accede to an "inoculating critique" that acknowledges these references only to bemoan the lack of enough positivistic evidence to justify their investigation.⁸⁶

In one of the few studies to take the "Tartar girl" seriously, Margaret B. Graham Morton, in *The Jenkinson Story*, links the acquisition of this girl to Ivan the Terrible's conquest of "the Nagayan Tartars, 'of the law of Mahomet,'" to use Jenkinson's language. Thousands were enslaved as a result, with Jenkinson in his extended narrative figuring that "the price of a Nagayan Tartar slave was 'a loafe of bread woorth sixe pence in England.'" Morton interprets this purchase of the Tartar girl as a compassionate act, imagining Jenkinson to be "deeply moved" by the suffering he witnessed.⁸⁷ Yet, his use of the term "wench," which carried denigrating class and sexual connotations, suggests less gracious designs on his part.⁸⁸ As Palmer observes, on the whole "Jenkinson, [Jerome] Horsey, and Giles Fletcher (along with their colleagues in the Russia Company) tend to elide the existence of women in their world."⁸⁹ Hence, it may be that Jenkinson's designation of the Tartar girl's as a "gift" for Elizabeth ironically raised this subaltern to the historical record, if only on the margins.

Morton, for her part, questions whether this girl actually reached England, though she does not provide any evidence otherwise.⁹⁰ Certainly, the journey was treacherous, as the near loss of the first Russian ambassador to England, Osep Gregorovich Napea, in the

North Sea attests. Like African captives in Elizabeth's court, many of whom also came from Muslim regions, if this girl did reach England, she likely fulfilled an ornamental role. While this role may not have resulted in extreme privation, it did not foreclose her chattel status. This status, moreover, is one she carried from the Safavid and Ottoman empires, where Central Asians, especially girls, were frequently sold into slavery.⁹¹ Dubbed "Aura Soltana," this gesture points towards the practice of forcing names with imperial connotations onto enslaved Africans, thereby depriving them of their history and elevating those English men and women who acquired them.⁹² This name may also allude to the multiethnic, multiconfessional imperial harems of the Islamic empires of the era, where females of non-Muslim provenance (sometimes even slave girls) could rise to the exalted position of "sultana" if they produced a son for the sultan or, even more decisively, if that son became the ruler.⁹³ Clearly, in the English system this was not an option, but its reference would lend prestige to Elizabeth's court if only by association. It also suggests the incipient orientalist discourse that fetishized the "harem" as a space of exorbitant sexuality, intrigue, and violence.

However, there is some tantalizing evidence that this Tartar girl did find a place in Elizabeth's court. David Loades, in his chapter on "The Great Queen" in his scholarly biography of *Elizabeth I*, rightly concludes that her letters to the Ottoman Sultan Mohammed [Mehmed] III (1595–1603), represent strategic negotiations of the great power politics of the era, whereby "the French believed that Elizabeth had incited the sultan to war on the [Holy Roman] emperor, and Philip II [of Spain] had similarly supported the Persians against the Turks."⁹⁴ As the queen of a "backward" realm, in the materialistic and imperialistic senses, Elizabeth could be no more than a bit player, but her strategic alliances with the Ottomans and related polities did provide some leverage as she gained trade and diplomatic benefits.⁹⁵ Elaborating his contention that the queen lacked imperialist ambitions, Loades continues:

Elizabeth did not share John Dee's vision of a British empire, but she was impressed by it; and convinced to the point of believing that England's future strength and prosperity lay in its commerce.... Good relations with the sultan, and with the tsar of all the Russias, to say nothing of Drake's circumnavigation of the world, spelled out a global ambition which the queen herself had neither the time nor the resources to realise.⁹⁶

In the same vein, he observes that Elizabeth “did not, apparently, indulge in the common contemporary practice of keeping ‘innocents’, or freaks [*sic*]...”:⁹⁷ in other words, dwarves, mutes, and others, whose appearance was requisite at the courts of the Ottoman sultan and the Holy Roman emperor.

These objects that speak represent the inventory of “living, breathing luxury items,” from horses to humans, the imperial courts of the era acquired to broadcast and even to create the illusion of their power.⁹⁸ Extending his comments about possible “‘innocents’, or freaks” in Elizabeth’s court, Loades concludes,

...although two mysterious young women feature in the records who may have been something of the kind. The first was known as Ippolyta the Tartarian, described in 1564 as ‘oure deare and well-beloved woman’, and the second was Tomasina de Paris. Both were made clothing allowances over a number of years, and Tomasina appears to have been a dwarf; but the nature of the service they provided is nowhere described. They are unlikely to have been jesters in the ordinary sense, and whether they were supposed to be a source of humour is not known.⁹⁹

Yet Ippolyta the Tartarian, as Janet Arnold documents in her landmark study, *Queen Elizabeth’s Wardrobe Unlock’d*, “was in the Queen’s service by 1561,” which corresponds with the return of Jenkinson to Elizabeth’s court with the “Tartar girl.” Arnold is unsure whether she is “a child” or “perhaps a midget,” but she notes that she was given a doll (“one Baby of pewter”) in 1562.¹⁰⁰ If Ippolyta is the “Tartar girl,” as I am proposing, then it makes perfect sense that she was a child, for whom a doll would be most appropriate, and not a “midget” or dwarf. That she is called a “woman” by 1564 does not counter this interpretation since the term was used generically for “a female servant, esp[ecially] a lady’s maid or personal attendant” (*OED*). Even the more specific sense of a “woman” as an adult female is not a counterargument, as the “Tartar girl” might well have grown into what the period considered adulthood in the course of three years.¹⁰¹ In summary, the inventories of Queen Elizabeth’s wardrobe show that Ippolyta the Tartarian, who is our concern here, is not the same woman as the dwarf, Thomasina, as she is sometimes assumed to be.¹⁰²

As the accolade “oure deare and welbeloved woman Ipolita the Tartarian” in the “warrant dormant for her livery in June 1564”

indicates, Ippolyta was a cherished member of Elizabeth's court.¹⁰³ Certainly, she was well-dressed, as the list of items in her livery, including "fyne hollande," "granado silke," and "venice golde & silver" confirms.¹⁰⁴ This list also shows how "Ipolita the Tartarian" was incorporated into the global exchange of exotic goods as both consumer and commodity. Arnold remarks that "Ippolyta was still in the Queen's service in 1569," as evidenced by the further garments she received. She clearly enjoyed a life of material comfort at court, sharing a similar status with "a small Negro page boy [who] attended on the Queen in 1574" and an "unnamed woman dwarf [later identified as Thomasinal]," both of whom receive impressive liveries.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, for all three, this life of comfort was at the cost of a full subject position in English society, even though we cannot assume that any of them were slaves in the strict sense.¹⁰⁶

Another fascinating detail, with which we will conclude, relates to the shoes Ippolyta the Tartarian received. Arnold records that she

was given twelve pairs of leather shoes, two pairs of Spanish leather shoes, one pair of leather pantobles [or slippers],¹⁰⁷ one pair of velvet shoes and one pair of velvet pantobles in 1562, while the Queen's footwear at this time was entirely of velvet.¹⁰⁸

This account continues:

All the Queen's shoes in the early years of her reign were made of velvet but after Ippolyta had had two pairs of Spanish leather shoes in 1562 and half a dozen pairs in 1563 Elizabeth ventured to try a pair in 1564. She ordered another three pairs in 1565 and two more pairs in 1569, still with up to forty pairs of velvet shoes each year.¹⁰⁹

The queen thus copies the Tartar girl's fashion in "Spanish leather shoes," an overlap that resonates with the recurring question about the subject of the portrait Roy Strong dubbed "the Persian Lady" and who was long thought to represent Elizabeth.¹¹⁰ Admittedly, Strong contested this attribution, with the recent study by Grant Moss exploring further nuances of the portrait's (mis)identifications. Still, the cluster of meanings around the Tartar girl-cum-Ippolyta the Tartarian leads us back to the primary purpose of Jenkinson's several northern missions. While they were ostensibly devoted to delivering the queen's letters to various eastern sovereigns, including her first letter to a Muslim one, the real focus was the less glamorous trade

of cloth through the Russian empire into Central Asia and, without success, the Safavid court. In Jenkinson's narrative, and in the more prosaic account of Sir Thomas Randolph, who replaced him as Elizabeth's representative to Russia and Persia, cloth is the main character, with English woollens traveling eastward and Russian furs and Persian silk traveling westward.¹¹¹ Whether "the Persian lady" is Elizabeth may be, at least for our purposes, a moot point. But that she wore Persian silk is confirmed by the inventories Arnold analyzes, including the ribbons on her dress in the Armada portrait.¹¹² Given the circuits of exchange we have traced, it would not be entirely facetious to dub this more famous image another "Persian Lady."

But we need to register the argument Jyotsna G. Singh makes in her introduction to *The Global Renaissance* that the Armada portrait, which showcases a globe with Elizabeth's "fingers 'covering the Americas,'" advances prospective imperialist themes.¹¹³ Given the indubitably subordinate position of the English realm vis-à-vis "the three great Muslim land empires" throughout Elizabeth's reign,¹¹⁴ and the persistent fear of English incorporation into the Spanish empire even after 1588, it may be better to qualify this portrait as an example of the "diplomatic wishful thinking regarding...imperial power" that Jardine and Brotton specify for the less powerful French (and English) facing the Iberian monopoly on global imperialism.¹¹⁵ After all, the English followed the French strategy of countering their relative weakness in the imperial contests of Western Europe by forging strategic alliances with the Islamic empire of the Ottomans, with the French signing their capitulations (*ahdname* or official trade agreement) in 1536 and the English in 1580.¹¹⁶ As we have seen, the nexus from Jenkinson's "wench," the "Tartar girl" he calls "Aura Soltana," to Elizabeth's "deare and welbeloved woman," Ippolyta the Tartarian, reveals the gendered subaltern in transit through the emerging circuits of exchange that constitute the "the modern/colonial world system."¹¹⁷ Attention to this subaltern thus sheds light on the queen's investments in the darker side of the Renaissance and shows how these investments were informed by the politics of positioning she learned from her correspondence with the Persian shah.

Notes

1. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (1978; New York: Vintage Books, 1979). Notable critiques of Said's anachronisms are listed in Bernadette

- Andrea, *Women and Islam in Early Modern English Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 131n3.
2. Lisa Jardine, *Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 74.
 3. Lisa Jardine and Jerry Brotton, *Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 11–62. Brotton explores similar connections in *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 87–118, and *The Renaissance Bazaar: From the Silk Road to Michelangelo* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
 4. Said, *Orientalism*, 7. For their critique of Said, see Jardine and Brotton, *Global Interests*, 60–61.
 5. For a survey of this criticism, see Linda McJannet, “Islam and English Drama: A Critical History,” *Early Theatre: A Journal Associated with the Records of Early English Drama* 12.2 (2009): 183–193.
 6. Andrea, *Women and Islam*, 12–29.
 7. For later encounters, see Bernadette Andrea, “Lady Sherley: The ‘First’ Persian in England?,” *Muslim and Non-Muslim Women in the Empires of Islam, 1453–1798*, eds. Nabil Matar and Bindu Malieckal, special issue of *The Muslim World*, 95.2 (2005): 279–295.
 8. According to T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553–1603* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), the north “was not regarded as an area in which men could trade, but as a region through which men [*sic*] could pass, either eastwards or westwards, to the fabulous riches of the east” (1). I mark the exclusive use of the generic “man” because two women were charter members of the Muscovy/Russia company, on which see T. S. Willan, *The Muscovy Merchants of 1555* (1953; rpt. Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelle, 1973), 10. Moreover, as I shall show, women traveled on Russia Company ships, though for the most part involuntarily.
 9. See Gerald MacLean, “East by North-east: The English among the Russians, 1553–1603,” in *A Companion to the Global Renaissance: English Literature and Culture in the Era of Expansion*, ed. Jyotsna G. Singh (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 163–177.
 10. Willan, *Early History*, clarifies that the “tiresome and verbose title ‘marchants adventurers of England, for the discovery of lands, territories, iles, dominions, and seigniories unknowen, and not before that late adventure or enterprise by sea or navigation, commonly frequented’ . . . was very rarely used, for the Company at once became known conventionally as the Russia Company, or the Muscovy Company, or the Company of Merchants trading with Russia” (7). I follow Willan in using “Russia Company” throughout.
 11. For a fascinating instance from the thirteenth century, see Gabriel Ronay, *The Tartar Khan’s Englishman* (London: Phoenix Press, 1978), 28–34.

12. On "Jenkinson's Journeys into Central Asia and Persia," see William Foster, *England's Quest of Eastern Trade* (1933; rpt. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), 14–30, and for subsequent attempts, see 31–47.
13. As István Vásáry explains in *Turks, Tatars and Russians in the 13th–16th Centuries* (Aldershot, Eng.: Ashgate, 2007), "Tatar" refers to the "Turco-Mongol overlords" of "the Kazan and Crimean Khanates," which were successor states of the Golden Horde (the western part of the empire founded by Chingis Khan "extending from the Aral Sea to the Lower Danube") (vii). He discusses the Nogays, to which Jenkinson's "girl" belonged, in "The Role of the Turkic People in the Ethnic History of Eastern Europe" (27–34, esp. 32). For more on the Nogays, see Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 9–11, 100–130. On the origins of the European misnomer, "Tartar," see Richard W. Cogley, "'The Most Vile and Barbarous Nation of all the World': Giles Fletcher the Elder's *The Tartars Or, Ten Tribes* (ca. 1610)," *Renaissance Quarterly* 58 (2005): 781–814, esp. 798–89.
14. On the cessation of the Anglo-Persian trade initiated by the Russia Company, see Rudolph P. Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21–22. For a recent assessment of the Levant Company's trade into the Ottoman empire, see Daniel Vitkus, "'The Common Market of All the World': English Theater, the Global System, and the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Period," in *Global Traffic: Discourses and Practices of Trade in English Literature and Culture from 1550 to 1700*, ed. Barbara Sebek and Stephen Deng (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 19–37.
15. See Matthew Dimmock, "'Captive to the Turke': Responses to the Anglo-Ottoman Capitulations of 1580," in *Cultural Encounters Between East and West, 1453–1699*, eds. Matthew Birchwood and Matthew Dimmock (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2005), 43–63.
16. In addition to Elizabeth's letters to members of the Ottoman dynasty (note 6 above), see Robert Markley, *The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 36–41, on her letters to the Sultan of Aceh, and Foster, *England's Quest*, 92, on those to the Mughal emperor, whom she addresses as "King of Cambaia."
17. On cloth as central to the early Anglo-Russian trade, see Foster, *England's Quest*, 5–6; Willan, *Early History*, 2–3. On the trade in human chattel, see Richard Hellie, *Slavery in Russia, 1450–1725* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), who identifies "a Russian slave in England in 1569," who "could have been a Russian, a Tatar, a Finn,

- a Pole, or a member of any of several other ethnicities" (22n32). For more, see Bernadette Andrea, "Persia, Tartaria, and Pamphilia: Ideas of Asia in Mary Wroth's *The Countess of Montgomery's Urania, Part II*," in *The English Renaissance, Orientalism, and the Idea of Asia*, eds. Debra Johanyak and Walter S. H. Lim (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 23–50, esp. 31–32.
18. This painting is on the cover of Andrea, *Women and Islam*, and is identified on 143n81. For more, see Roy Strong, "My Weeping Stagg I Crowne': The Persian Lady Reconsidered," in *The Art of the Emblem*, eds. Michael Bath, John Manning, and Alan R. Young (New York: AMS Press, 1993), 103–141, and Grant Moss, "'Are you now or have you ever been Queen of England?': Elizabeth, the 'Persian Lady' and the Vagaries of Identification." I extend my immense appreciation to Professor Moss for sharing this important study with me prior to its publication.
 19. Natalie Zemon Davis cited in Edward Muir, "Introduction: Observing Trifles," in *Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe*, eds. Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero; trans. Eren Brach (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), ix.
 20. Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, made by Sea or over-land, to the remote and farthest distant quarters of the Earth, at any time within the compasse of these 1600 yeres: Divided into three severall Volumes, according to the positions of the Regions, whereunto they were directed* (London, 1599), citing title page. Henceforth, I indicate the edition from which I am citing by the year on its title page. When listing the 1599 edition, I specify either the first volume, which focuses on the north and northeast voyages (including the Russian and Safavid empires), or the second volume, which focuses on the south and southeast voyages (including the Ottoman empire). The third volume, added in 1600, focuses on the Americas.
 21. Jardine and Brotton, *Global Interests*, 47–48; 54.
 22. On Elizabeth's authorship of state letters—with various levels of involvement such as personally penning, dictating, reviewing, and correcting—see Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose, eds., *Elizabeth I: Collected Works* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), xii–xiv.
 23. For an interesting example of these secret negotiations, see Andrew P. Vella, *An Elizabethan-Ottoman Conspiracy* (Malta: Royal University of Malta, 1972), whereby the English Protestants sought an alliance with the Muslim Ottomans (and Moroccans) against the Catholic powers of the western Mediterranean.
 24. On the significance of Ivan's contested title, see Isabel de Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005),

- 49–50; 98. Elizabeth during Edward VI's reign was seen as "a slip of a girl, whose future role was to be the King's sister and who would certainly be expected to marry a foreign prince," according to Roy Strong, *Gloriana: The Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 9. She continued to be seen as such until her elder sister Mary's false pregnancy became certain and her death imminent.
25. E. Delmar Morgan and C. H. Coote, eds., *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia by Anthony Jenkinson and Other Englishmen. With Some Account of the First Intercourse of the English with Russia and Central Asia by Way of the Caspian Sea*, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1886), I: ii, who cite Hakluyt (1589), 284, for the English response to the Russians' queries. Morgan and Coote's edition includes sources from "Hakluyt and in State documents" (I: i). However, Kurosh Meshkat, "The Journey of Master Anthony Jenkinson to Persia, 1562–1563," *Journal of Early Modern History* 13 (2009): 209–228, cautions that Morgan presents an unbalanced view of early modern Anglo-Russian relations in response to Anglo-Russian hostilities in Central Asia during the nineteenth century (224–228).
 26. Willan, *Early History*, clarifies that "Chancellor's 'discovery' of the northern route to Russia may not have been a genuine discovery, for the route was known before even if it had not been used commercially in the past, but it opened up the possibility of direct trade with a Russia which had at that time no 'window' on the Baltic" (6).
 27. Morgan and Coote II: 355–377, citing Hakluyt (1589), 338–347. They propose Robert Best, interpreter for Napea in London and Jenkinson in Russia, as the most likely author of this account (II: 355n). Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible*, refers to Napea as "a Russian envoy," not an ambassador (126). Variants of his first name, which Morgan and Coote transliterate as "Joseph" (I: 26n1), include Osep and Osip. They also propose that Napea or Nepea could be a variation of "Napier," which they claim "suggests the possibility of his having been Scotch by origin" (I: 125n)!
 28. For the Protestant view that Elizabeth was "miraculously raised to the throne by the direct hand of Providence," see Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572–1588* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 31. MacCaffrey lists among the "high-placed patrons at court" of the more militant Protestant faction Lord Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, and Sir Francis Walsingham (56), both of whom were actively involved with this trade; see Willan, *Early History*, 155–156, 201–202 (on Leicester), and 201–205 (on Walsingham).
 29. Morgan and Coote I: 5–6, citing Hakluyt (1589), 82. Also note the letter of 1557 from the governors of the Russia Company, who identify

- "one Anthonie Jenkinson, gentleman, a man well trauelled, whom we mind to vse for further traueilling" (I: liii).
30. Morgan and Coote I: 7-10, citing Hakluyt (1589), 332-333.
 31. Morgan and Coote I: xv. On "Jenkinson's services to geography," see I: cxiii-cxv.
 32. In addition, Jenkinson was "the first Englishman" to visit "Kazvan" (Morgan and Coote I: xiv), or Qazvin, to which Shah Tahmasp I had moved his capital "in the aftermath of the humiliating Amasya 1555 treaty with the Ottomans," on which see Andrew J. Newman, *Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 32.
 33. Morgan and Coote II: 343. Henry R. Huttenbach, "Anthony Jenkinson's 1566 and 1567 Missions to Muscovy Reconstructed from Unpublished Sources," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 9.2 (1975), 179-203, argues that Jenkinson made five trips.
 34. Morgan and Coote I: ci.
 35. Hakluyt (1589), "To the Reader," sig. 4v; Hakluyt (1599), "To the Reader," n. pag.
 36. See Mary C. Fuller, *Voyages in Print: English Travel to America, 1576-1624* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 141-174.
 37. MacLean, "East by North-east," 168. William Warner, *Albions England. A Continued Historie of the same Kingdome, from the Originals of the first Inhabitants thereof: With most the chiefe Alterations and Accidents theare hapning, vnto, and in the happie Raigne of our now most gracious Soueraigne, Queene Elizabeth... First penned and published by William Warner: and now reuised, and newly enlarged by the same Author: Whereunto is also newly added an Epitome of the whole Historie of England* (London, 1602), 282; Morgan and Coote I: cxlix. This is the sixth successively enlarged edition, the others being issued in 1586, 1589, 1592, 1596, and 1597; a "continuance" was published in 1606. Wagner died in 1609; a posthumous edition was published in 1612. Morgan and Coote I: cxlix-clii, include chapters 66 and 68.
 38. Warner 283, 232; Morgan and Coote I: cl.
 39. Warner 283, 287; Morgan and Coote I: cl, cli. In the account of his 1561 voyage, Jenkinson reports that "the king [Obdolowcan]" spent the evening "banketting [banqueting] with his women, being a hundred and fortie in number." The marginal note, added by Hakluyt, labels this a "multitude of concubines." However, as Leslie P. Peirce documents in *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), a high-ranking Muslim man's "women" (or harem) was not limited to his wives and/or concubines, but included various female relatives such as his mother, aunts, daughters, nieces, etc. (113-149). Similar conditions prevailed in the Safavid empire, on which see Maria Szuppe,

- "Status, Knowledge, and Politics: Women in Sixteenth-Century Safavid Iran," in *Women in Iran: From the Rise of Islam to 1800*, ed. Guity Nashat and Lois Beck (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 140–169. Hence, not only the Englishmen's reporting of numbers, but their understanding of the "harem" institution was faulty.
40. Alain Grosrichard, *The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies of the East*, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1998), 71. In this chapter, Grosrichard focuses on the accounts by the French travelers, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605–1689) and Jean Chardin (1643–1713), which were immediately translated into English. However, the elements in these accounts were anticipated by earlier masculinist fantasies such as Warner's.
 41. Warner 283; Morgan and Coote I: cl. For the identification of "Obdowolowcan" as Abdullah Khan, the *beglerbeg* or governor of Shirvan from 1549 to 1565, see Morgan and Coote I: clviii–clxii. Shirvan ("Hyrcania"), in the eastern Caucasus, is now part of the independent nation of Azerbaijan. When Jenkinson visited, it was a tributary of the Safavid empire characterized by frequent rebellions (I:152), on which see Newman, *Safavid Iran*, 28. After Tahmasp's death, a period of dynastic struggle among the Safavids enabled the Ottomans to conquer "parts of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Shirvan, Kurdistan and Luristan," as well as Tabriz, between 1578 and 1590 (43). These losses were confirmed by Shah Abbas I as part of a 1590 Safavid-Ottoman peace treaty (52).
 42. Walter Cohen, Introduction to *Antony and Cleopatra*, in *The Norton Shakespeare*, eds. Stephen Greenblatt, et al. (New York: Norton, 1997), 2621.
 43. Warner 289; Morgan and Coote I: clii. Warner retrospectively casts the queen as an empress, even though she "was not an imperialist," on which see Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 11.
 44. Meshkat, "The Journey of Master Anthony Jenkinson to Persia," presents an inadequate view of Queen Elizabeth's letters to the Persian shah as mere imitations of her brother's earlier letters to the Russian tsar (209–211; 212–213). As my detailed analysis of Elizabeth's letters shows, she responded dynamically to the knowledge gained by the first official early modern English mission to a Muslim sovereign, the Persian shah. Moreover, she certainly was more involved in the composition of such letters than her teenage brother, Edward, who was dying as the first voyage of the Muscovy Company set out (Foster, *England's Quest*, 9–10).
 45. Hakluyt (1599), I: 231, in "The Ambassages, Treaties, Priuileges, Letters, and other obseruations, depnding vpon the Voyages of

- this first Volume." Daryl W. Palmer, *Writing Russia in the Age of Shakespeare* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), views Edward's letter as advancing a "more humanistic vision of imperial cohabitation born of commerce" (13).
46. This document was originally "written in Latine by Clement Adams" (Hakluyt [1599], I: 243).
 47. Hakluyt (1599), I: 249, 255, 258–259. Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the Worlds: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–c. 1800* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 23.
 48. Hakluyt (1599), I: 265. As Willan, *Early History*, remarks, "the authenticity of these privileges is denied by Russian historians, who regard them as a statement of what the Company desired, not what the Tsar necessarily granted" (11).
 49. As David Loades, *Elizabeth I* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2003), affirms, "[t]he first propaganda piece of the reign, published within days of her accession... describ[ed] the new queen as a 'Prince (as ye wot all) of no mingled blood, of Spaniard or stranger, but borne mere Englishe here amongst us, and therefore most natural unto us'" (313).
 50. Pope Pius V, "The Bull of Excommunication against Elizabeth (February 25, 1570)," in *Elizabeth I and Her Age*, eds. Donald Stump and Susan M. Fletch (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), 155–157. Dimmock, "'Captive to the Turke,'" observes that "it was only after the papal Bull *Regnans in Excelsis* excommunicated Elizabeth in 1570 that an official association with the Ottomans—which, under papal jurisdiction, was strictly prohibited—became plausible and necessary both politically and financially" (42).
 51. Morgan and Coote I: 11–40, citing Hakluyt (1589), 333–338. On the parameters of these company reports, see Fuller, *Voyages in Print*, 2–7.
 52. Morgan and Coote I: 30.
 53. Palmer, *Writing Russia*, 51.
 54. Morgan and Coote I: 36–37.
 55. Willan, *Muscovy Merchants*, 10.
 56. Morgan and Coote I: 109–112, citing Hakluyt (1589), 359–361.
 57. Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible*, 168.
 58. Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible*, 50. Ivan's title refers to "an independent ruler, with no overlord, who could be either a king of one particular nation or people, as in the Bible, or an 'emperor' ruling over several nations" (49–50). Nicholas Canny makes a similar point in his Introduction to *The Origins of Empire*, Vol. I of the *Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1.
 59. As Morgan and Coote indicate, "It is generally known that Ivan solicited the hand of Queen Elizabeth, and it is most likely that his first

overtures in this direction were made through Jenkinson (I: xi–xii). For Ivan's tirade, especially the phrase "you flowe in your maydenlie estate like a maide," and Elizabeth's diplomatic response, see Morgan and Coote II: 296–98. Palmer, *Writing Russia*, 67, offers an astute gender analysis of this exchange. Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible*, nevertheless demurs: "It has been suggested that Ivan is referring to Elizabeth menstruating but the original Russian text does not bear out that suggestion" (431n8). Yet, she does not provide an alternate translation, which at the very least suggests that the Englishmen who transmitted this letter to Elizabeth understood the reference in this way.

60. Willan, *Early History*, 91–94, 97–107, 112–128.
61. Morgan and Coote I: 112–114, citing Hakluyt (1589), 361–362. As Morgan and Coote note, "Sophi, Sufi or Safi was a philosophy [more accurately, the theory and practice of Islamic mysticism], and became the surname of a dynasty of Persian monarchs, who adopted the tenets of the 'Sufi'" (I: 112n1). On the Sufi origins of the Safavid dynasty, see Roger Savory, *Iran Under the Safavids* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 1–26. Although Jenkinson uses this term, "the Sophie of Persia," throughout the account of his first journey to the Persian court (Morgan and Coote I: 130), by 1566 English merchants consistently use the correct title "Shaugh" [Shah] in their accounts (II: 385), even though they still transcribed Tahmasp's name as "Thomas" (II: 387).
62. Morgan and Coote I: 112–113.
63. For this classical lens, Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 223–237. For the Uzbek threat, see Newman, *Safavid Iran*, 26–27.
64. Morgan and Coote I: 114. By the "fourth voyage into Persia, begunne in the monthe of Iulie 1568," "Londro, meaning thereby London" and its "mayden Queene" were well known at the Safavid court (II: 415, 454).
65. Henry Timberlake, in *A True and strange discourse of the trauailes of two English Pilgrimes* (London, 1603), for instance, was barred from entering Jerusalem because he insisted on identifying himself as a (Protestant) Englishman, "for the turkes flatly denied, that they had euer heard either of my Queene or Countrey" (6).
66. Hakluyt (1599), II: 139. For other letters, see Hakluyt (1599), II: 145–146, 159–160, 191–192.
67. Morgan and Coote I: 113. For the second letter to Shah Tahmasp, issued in 1579, see Hakluyt (1599), I: 418.
68. Morgan and Coote I: 146, 146–147, 148.
69. Morgan and Coote I: 141, 132–133, 133. According to the *OED*, "seigniorie" indicates "feudal lordship or dominion; the authority, rights, and

- privileges of a feudal lord," though it could more generally denote "lordship, domination, sovereignty." It points towards the dynastic sense of empire dominant in the era, on which see Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible*, 99–100.
70. Morgan and Coote I: 141–142.
 71. On the Bayezid episode, see Richard Knolles, *The Generall Historie of the Turkes, from the first beginning of that Nation to the rising of the Othoman Familie* (London, 1603), 770–783.
 72. Morgan and Coote I: 145, with the latter being "Murteza Ali, son-in-law of Mahomet" (I: 145n4), the fourth of the "Rightly Guided" caliphs according to the Sunnis and the first Imam according to the Shi'as. Murteza (also, Murtaza, Murtada) means "the chosen one."
 73. Morgan and Coote II: 217.
 74. Morgan and Coote I: 145–146.
 75. In addition to Jenkinson's "firsts" listed above, he was the first European since Marco Polo in the thirteenth century to visit Bukhara and the first to visit Derbend since Gasparo Contarini in the fifteenth century (Morgan and Coote I: xxi, xxviii).
 76. Newman, *Safavid Iran*, 62–63.
 77. Morgan and Coote I: 146. "Almaine" literally signifies Germany, but actually refers to the Holy Roman Empire.
 78. Morgan and Coote I: 146. "Gower" derives from the Persian word "gabr" and means "infidel." Jenkinson's use here is the earliest instance cited in the *OED*, under the entry for "Giaour." However, Jenkinson knew the Arabic term, "kafir" (which he spells "caphar"), as he records several near escapes on his journey when it would mean death or enslavement to be identified thus (I: 62–63). Jenkinson was not above using the term "wicked infidels" for hostile Muslims (I: 128), though he is generally tolerant, which was the pragmatic policy of the Russia Company (II: 217).
 79. Morgan and Coote I: 147. See Morgan and Coote II: 433 for a description of this custom from the English merchants who voyaged in the region from 1568 to 1574. Rudi Matthee, "Christians in Safavid Iran: Hospitality and Harassment," *Studies in Persianate Societies* 3 (2005): 3–43, states that Shah Tahmasp's "fear of contamination by non-Shi'is was legendary" and that "some contemporary observers went further and claimed that Muslim Iranians in general abhorred Christians and were inclined to shun anyone other than Shi'i Muslims as ritually unclean (*najes*)" (16). However, Matthee documents exceptions to this rule reported by western Europeans travelling in Iran during the 1660s and 1690s (16n45 and n46).
 80. Morgan and Coote I: 150; 149; 155.
 81. Arthur Edwards, who was well received in the shah's court during his audience of 1566, concludes by commending Jenkinson, "for the

good report of his well and wise doings in those parts was oftentimes a comfort to me to heare thereof, and some good helpe to me in my proceedings" (Morgan and Coote II: 402).

82. Palmer, *Writing Russia*, 52.
83. See Walter Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance*, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), and *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
84. See Bernadette Andrea, "The Tartar Girl, The Persian Princess, and Early Modern English Women's Authorship from Elizabeth I to Mary Wroth," in *Women Writing Back/Writing Women Back: Transnational Perspectives from the Late Middle Ages to the Dawn of the Modern Era*, ed. Anke Gilleir, Alicia C. Montoya, and Suzan van Dijk (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 257–281.
85. Morgan and Coote I: 107–109; Hakluyt (1599), I: 305.
86. On the "inoculating critique," see Dymphna Callaghan, "Re-Reading Elizabeth Cary's *The Tragedie of Mariam, Faire Queene of Jewry*," in *Women, "Race," and Writing in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Margo Hendricks and Patricia Parker (London: Routledge, 1994), 163.
87. Margaret B. Graham Morton, *The Jenkinson Story* (Glasgow: William Maclellan, 1962), 40–41. Although Palmer, *Writing Russia*, dismisses this study as "a truly imaginative tramp through the life and times of Jenkinson" (70n94), it offers a useful account of Jenkinson's entire life, adding to Morgan and Coote's narrower focus on his northern career.
88. The *OED* records several definitions for "wench" current in Jenkinson's era: "a girl, maid, young woman; a female child"; "a girl of the rustic or working class"; "a wanton woman; a mistress." It could also serve as a term of endearment, which seems unlikely in this context.
89. Palmer, *Writing Russia*, xiv.
90. Morton, *Jenkinson Story*, 55.
91. Ehud R. Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 7–13.
92. On these "faux classical names," see Imtiaz Habib, *Black Lives in the English Archives, 1500–1677* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 99, 135, 244, 258. He focuses on women's names in "'Hel's Perfect Character' or the Blackamoor Maid in Early Modern English Drama: The Postcolonial History of a Dramatic Type," *LIT: Literature Interpretation Theory* 11 (2000): 277–304, esp. 280. Stephen A. Epstein, *Speaking of Slavery: Color, Ethnicity, and Human Bondage in Italy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 24–25, documents the renaming of Tartar girl slaves during their christening ceremonies. Queen Elizabeth may have attended the christening of her "Tartar girl," where she was presumably renamed Ippolyta.

93. Andrea, *Women and Islam*, 21.
94. Loades, *Elizabeth I*, 311.
95. On England's "backwardness," see Foster, *England's Quest*, 4.
96. Loades, *Elizabeth I*, 311. The quote concludes: "... but it was a legacy to her successors." See David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490–1690* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), for Elizabeth's reign (79–136) and on the reigns of her successors through 1649 (137–165).
97. Loades, *Elizabeth I*, 316.
98. Jardine and Brotton, *Global Interests*, 133. They provide a footnote explaining, "In this respect, there is an obvious relationship (as cultural objects) between horses and human beings pressed into service" (204n4).
99. Loades, *Elizabeth I*, 316.
100. Janet Arnold, *Queen Elizabeth's Wardrobe Unlock'd: The Inventories of the Wardrobe of Robes prepared in July 1600 edited from Stowe MS 557 in the British Library, MS LR 2/121 in the Public Record Office, London, and MS V. b.72 in the Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington DC* (Leeds: Maney, 1988), 107.
101. Loades, *Elizabeth I*, indicates that the canonical age for marriage was twelve (3). However, as Lawrence Stone documents in *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800*, abridged ed. (London: Penguin, 1979), most women (and men) in England during this period tended to marry in their twenties, even if they assumed adult responsibilities as early as seven (40–44).
102. "Most writers who mention Ippolyta speculate that she was a child, a dwarf, or one of Queen Elizabeth's fools," from "A Who's Who Of Tudor Women: H-I," compiled by Kathy Lynn Emerson, <http://www.kateemersonhistoricals.com/TudorWomen3.htm>, first accessed January 21, 2010. Emerson, a "historical mystery" novelist, broaches a similar connection between "Ippolyta the Tartarian" and Jenkinson's "Tartar girl." I encountered her short paragraph only after completing this chapter and initially made this point in "The Tartar Girl, The Persian Princess, and Early Modern English Women's Authorship" (264n27).
103. Arnold, *Queen Elizabeth's Wardrobe*, 107, with the first citation from the "warrant dormant." A "warrant dormant" is "one drawn out in blank to be filled up with a name or particulars, when required to be used" (*OED*).
104. Arnold, *Queen Elizabeth's Wardrobe*, 107. The first item refers to "a linen fabric, originally called, from the province of Holland in the Netherlands, Holland cloth" (*OED*). On the latter two items, which were deemed particularly luxurious, see Jardine and Brotton, *Global Interests*, 83. As Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass

- corroborate in *Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), “the livery of Ippolyta the Tartarian must have cost significantly more than the wages of Lady Cobham for a year’s work” (18). Lady Cobham, who was one of “the Ladies and Gentleman of the Privy Chamber and Bedchamber,” was among those who received “the highest wages for women at court” (18).
105. Arnold, *Queen Elizabeth’s Wardrobe*, 106–7. Habib, *Black Lives*, speculates that Thomasen (Thomasina) was African because she is mentioned along with “a little blak a More” (2, 72, 79).
 106. Habib, *Black Lives*, discusses “east Indians” and Persians in his final chapter, “Indians and Others: The Protocolonial Dream” (239–60), but he does not mention possible Tartar slaves in Tudor England.
 107. “Pantoble” is a variant spelling of the French, “pantofle”: “In early use...any type of indoor shoe, esp. applied to high-heeled cork-soled Spanish or Italian chopins”; “In later use...a slipper, sandal, or light shoe of exotic or foreign (esp. oriental) style” (*OED*).
 108. Arnold, *Queen Elizabeth’s Wardrobe*, 212–213. As a point of comparison, see Margaret Spufford, “The Cost of Apparel in Seventeenth-Century England, and the Accuracy of Gregory King,” *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 53.4 (2000): 677–705, who records a woman of the laboring class received “‘for 8 yeares and a halfes dyett at £ 5 per year’. In that time she had had 12 pairs of shoes, at prices between 2s. 6d. for a pair ‘bought in the Markett’ and 2s. 8d.” (684); for a table of the average price of shoes during the seventeenth century, see 688.
 109. Arnold, *Queen Elizabeth’s Wardrobe*, 214.
 110. Strong, “My Weeping Stagge I Crowne,” 106. He acknowledges Frances A. Yates’s earlier association of the painting with “Boissard’s *Virgo Persica* in his *Habitus Variarum orbis Gentium*” (106); Yates, *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Routledge, 1975), 220–221. Strong, *Gloriana*, identifies Elizabeth’s practice of wearing “dresses of the different nations”; however, this practice reflected “political alignment” rather than cultural appropriation (21).
 111. On the trade of English cloth to Russia into Persia, see Morgan and Coote I: 115. For the trade of Persia silk, spices, and drugs back to England, see I: 136.
 112. Arnold, *Queen Elizabeth’s Wardrobe*, 34.
 113. Jyotsna G. Singh, “Introduction: The Global Renaissance,” in *A Companion to the Global Renaissance: English Literature and Culture in the Era of Expansion*, ed. Jyotsna G. Singh (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 1, citing Karen Hearn, *Dynasties: Painting in Tudor and Stuart England, 1530–1630* (London: Tate Publishing, 1995; New

York, Rizzoli, 1996). This citation continues: "...covering the Americas, indicating England's domination of the seas and plans for imperialist expansion in the New World"; Hearn goes on to clarify that "in terms of long-term damage to the Spanish the destruction of the Armada actually achieved little, but at the time it was fêted" (88). Strong, *Gloriana*, marks 1579 as a benchmark in portraiture of Elizabeth, "when the imperialistic and maritime aspirations of the *magus* Dr John Dee were taken up by the government" (41). Prior portraits cannot be seen as "vehicle[s] for native imperial aspirations. Those came only in 1579 in George Gower's awkward presentation of Elizabeth as a Roman Vestal to whom, for the first time, the globe is given as an attribute" (42). As such, "the portraits produced during this period [post-1579] take on an impenetrable mask which looks back across the centuries to the holy countenance of majesty of the Byzantine and the medieval emperors and shares with them a common debt to sacred imperialism" (42-43).

114. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History*, ed. Edmund Burke III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 26.
115. Jardine and Brotton, *Global Interests*, 54; 57-62.
116. Andrea, *Women and Islam*, 22-23.
117. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*, 3.

CHAPTER 9

ELIZABETH AND INDIA

Nandini Das

Sometime in 1603, an English visitor arrived in Agra at the court of the Mughal emperor, Akbar. John Mildenhall (or Midnall), merchant and traveler, had set off initially for Constantinople in February 1599 on board the English ship, the *Hector*. Among his fellow travelers was the musician Thomas Dallam, and in the ship's hold, Dallam's creation—a mechanical musical organ that was to be Elizabeth I's gift to the new Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed III. Mildenhall's journey, however, would carry him further field. After six months in Constantinople, he continued traveling, ultimately taking the long and onerous overland caravan route through Aleppo and Persia to northern India. On his arrival in the city of Lahore, he sent letters to Akbar requesting an audience. The request was granted, and a royal "garde of horse and foote" escorted Mildenhall on the twenty-one-day journey to Agra. In a letter written three years later to the prominent London merchant Richard Staper, dated October 3, 1606, Mildenhall describes the interview that followed:

The third day after, having made before a great man my friend, [Akbar] called me into his Councell: and comming into his presence, He demanded of me, what I would have, and what my businesse was. I made him answere, That his greatnesse and renowned kindnesse unto Christians was so much blased through the World, that it was come into the furthestmost parts of the Western Ocean, and arrived in the Court of our Queene of *Englands* most excellent Maiestie; who desired to have friendship with him, and as the *Portugals* and other Christians had trade with his Majestie, so her Subjects also might have the same, with the like favours; and farther, because there have beene long Warres betweene her Majestie and the King of *Portugall*, that if any of their ships or Portes were taken by our Nation, that he

would not take it in evill part, but suffer us to enjoy them to the use of our Queenes Majestic.¹

Even for an adventurer like Mildenhall, this was an extraordinarily ambitious claim. His declaration of the Queen of England's "desire" for the friendship of the Mughal emperor was not really a message from Elizabeth I, and Mildenhall himself was not a recognized official agent. There are no records to suggest that he had been authorized to plead for trading concessions, or to ask—far more dangerously—for rights to engage in direct confrontation with the Portuguese already established in western India. Yet his audience with the Mughal emperor illuminates two crucial features of Elizabeth's relationship with India. Firstly, it is testimony to a growing acknowledgment of the importance of India in England's global negotiations in the last decades of Elizabeth's reign. Secondly, it reveals the cumulative nature of the development of Elizabethan foreign policy in the so-called Eastern nations, the slow accretion of experience and action that this essay will explore, which proceeded out of the oddly and crucially productive disjunction between the priorities of Elizabeth and her government on the one hand, and the efforts of her subjects on the other, whose individual and collective efforts helped to drive forward England's first, tentative encounters with the Indian subcontinent.

I. Individual Enterprise: The Traveler Abroad and the Scholar at Home

As far as the fortunes of the English in India were concerned, that effort had been initiated in February 1583 by John Newbery and Ralph Fitch, almost exactly twenty years before Mildenhall's arrival in Agra. Behind that first expedition was the support of a familiar figure, the recipient of Mildenhall's letter, Richard Staper, and his business partner, Sir Edward Osborne. Staper and Osborne were at the forefront of the small group of London merchants who constituted the Turkey Company in 1581, and their entrepreneurial prominence featured heavily as a result in the Letters Patent issued by Elizabeth I, which appointed Osborne as the governor of the new Company and named Staper as his successor. The recognition was justified. It was Staper and Osborne who had sent the latter's friend and agent, William Harborne, to Constantinople in 1578 to negotiate trading privileges for the English merchants from the Ottoman

Sultan Murad III. Harborne's efforts, and the correspondence that followed between Elizabeth I and Murad III and his queen, Sultana Safiye, ultimately led to the granting of formal Capitulations for trade by the Ottoman government in May 1580. The focus of the journey to India that Osborne and Staper funded in 1583, however, was more on the gathering of information than on material commodities; its aim was to bypass the Portuguese-dominated sea routes and explore the possibility of an overland route to the Persian Gulf and South East Asia. Its implications would become obvious a few years later in 1592, when the Venetian and Turkish trade were amalgamated into the single, much larger, Levant Company, also led by Osborne. The new patent issued this time by Elizabeth's government tellingly included within the Company's territories of activity not only "the trade of Marchandize as well by sea as by lande into and from the dominions of the sayde Grand Signor, and into and from Venice, Zante, Candie and Zephallonia, and other the dominions of the Signiorie and State of Venice," but also "by lande through the Countries of the sayde Grand Signor into and from the East India, lately discovered by John Newberie, Ralph Fitch, William Leech, and James Storie, sent with our letters to that purpose at the proper costs and charge of the sayde Marchants or some of them."²

Newberry and his companions, as that reference to "our letters" makes clear, received a degree of royal support which followed the model that had been established by the relationship between private trade and Elizabethan foreign policy in the Levant. Just as Harborne's journey to Constantinople in 1578 had triggered the well-known exchange of letters between Murad III and Elizabeth, the letter carried by Newberry for Akbar presented his visit as a private undertaking, but one that offered Elizabeth an opportunity to make a largely neutral overture of friendship toward her Indian counterpart. Addressed to "To the most invincible, and most mightie prince, lord *Yeladin el Kubar* king of *Cambaya*," its text serves simply to introduce Newberry as an example of the "great affection which our Subjects have, to visit the most distant places of the world, not without good will and intention to introduce the trade of marchandize of al nations whatsoever they can, by which meanes the mutual and friendly trafique of marchandize on both sides may come." It asks Akbar "to friendly and favourably accept him [Newberry]" for "our sake," and requests "that in respect of the hard journey which they have undertaken to places so far distant, it would please your Majestie with some libertie and securitie of voyage to gratifie it, with

such privileges as to you shall seeme good.”³ Yet this is a document significantly different from Elizabeth’s communications with the Ottoman empire, made familiar not only through the long-established activities of Portuguese and Venetian trade, but also through the agency of English subjects themselves. The studied neutrality of its tone, coupled with the potentially dangerous diplomatic errors latent in the phonetic approximation of the name of Jalaluddin Akbar, and in the reference to the Mughal emperor simply as the “King of Cambaya,” a port in the Indian state of Gujarat, makes the Elizabethan government’s comparative lack of knowledge about India and its political structures only too apparent.⁴

Instead, the documents surrounding this first crucial journey emphasize the intricate and tightly knit network of private enterprise through which English knowledge of India was beginning to take shape. Again, the precedent for this had been established already. The previous negotiations of the newly emerging trading companies had already familiarized Osborne, Staper, and their fellow merchants with the deep skepticism with which both the queen and her council tended to view the investments demanded by expeditions that were merely exploratory and potentially fruitless.⁵ Therefore, as the small group of travelers led by Newbery embarked on their journey, both the information that would provide the basis of their travels, and the networks through which news of the latter returned to England, depended on the initiative of private subjects, rather than any direct involvement of the queen and her government. Staper and Osborne provided the finances and their contacts in the Middle East. William Harborne himself would be among the latter—he had only recently left for Constantinople in November 1582 to take up the position of the resident English ambassador at the Ottoman court, officially a representative of the queen, but sent and maintained at the expense of the Levant Company.⁶ In Aleppo, they would find William Barrett, the resident consul, also appointed by the Levant Company. Within the group itself, John Eldred, who accompanied Newberry and Fitch till Baghdad, was a merchant with long experience in the Middle Eastern trade. Newberry himself had traded in Portuguese-dominated Ormus and had a serviceable knowledge of spoken Arabic.

In addition to this, a significant part of Newbery’s practical information came from contemporary English geographers, historians, and translators, whose “travaile”—to use a term so often made to perform a double duty in this period—was altogether more text-bound.

Among such sources, he would have found Richard Eden's *A Treatyse of the Newe India* (1553), which translated a section of Book Five of Sebastian Münster's *Cosmographia universalis*. One of the earliest English texts to argue the cause of English trade in South East Asia, China, and the New World, Eden's *Treatyse* bears the stamp of the political interest of his patrons, William Cecil, later Lord Burghley, and the Duke of Northumberland, but it contained a significant degree of personal investment as well—his father and uncle were among those who invested substantially in the first Northeast Passage voyage by Sir Hugh Willoughby and Richard Chancellor in 1553. That interest continued throughout a life that spanned the comings and goings of multiple Tudor monarchs, from his translation of Pietro Martire d'Anghiera's monumental *De orbe novo decades* (1516) and Gonzalo Oviedo's *Natural Hystoria de las Indias* (1526) in *The Decades of the New World or West India* (1555), to his very last work, a translation of Ludovico de Varthema's *Itinerario* (1510), which Richard Welles would include in the posthumously printed, augmented version of the *Decades* in 1577, *A History of Travayle in the West and East Indies*.⁷ Two years later, in 1579, John Frampton, himself a merchant traveler with long experience in the Spanish trade, produced his *Most Noble and Famous Trauels of Marcus Paulus* with updated excerpts from Niccolò de' Conti's early fifteenth century travels in Southeast Asia. And only a year before Newbery's departure, Nicholas Lichfield would translate Fernão Lopes de Castanheda's *Historia do descobrimento e conquista da India pelos Portugueses* (1551–1552) as *The First Booke of Historie of the Discoverie and Conquest of the East Indias, enterprised by the Portingales* (1582).

Above all, Newbery's most immediate source was the scholar and geographer through whose initiative the most significant early modern English textual repository of travel information was slowly taking shape—Richard Hakluyt. We know that Newbery had visited Hakluyt before embarking on his journey and had been shown an account of the East Indies by Francisco Fernandes, as well as a letter written in 1579 by the first contemporary Englishman in Goa, the Jesuit priest Thomas Stevens. Newbery's letter to Hakluyt from Aleppo, dated May 28, 1583, notes that he had taken away these documents with him "among other writings unawares, the which I have sent you here inclosed." In return, Hakluyt would print Newbery's letters to himself and to other correspondents, along with Ralph Fitch's more detailed report of their adventures in Persia and under Portuguese captivity in Goa, in his monumental *Principal Navigations*,

Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation (1589).⁸ The first detailed English accounts of India to be published in Elizabeth's reign, the information they offered was already providing the basis of further negotiations by the time Fitch himself arrived back in England in 1591, the only member of Newberry's party to return home. By 1599, when Hakluyt's greatly enlarged second edition of the *Principal Navigations* began to come out in print and Mildenhall boarded the *Hector*, it was evident that the driving force behind any concerted effort to establish an English presence in India would be this private enterprise—intellectual as much as mercantile and financial—and nowhere is the conjunction of the two better recorded than in Hakluyt's own activities throughout the last two decades of Elizabeth's reign.

II. Hakluyt and India

In a long career as one of the foremost English experts on overseas exploration, Richard Hakluyt, it has been pointed out, seldom ventured abroad. Like that of his queen, his sphere of activity remained largely within England, although it is with the encouragement of Sir Francis Walsingham and Elizabeth's own support that he would undertake his own first journey across the channel to Paris in September 1583, seven months after Newberry and Fitch embarked on their travels.⁹ Hakluyt had established his reputation in the previous year with his first collection of travel documents, *Divers Voyages* (1582). His active assistance in securing support for Sir Humphrey Gilbert's northwest passage expedition had gained the acknowledgement of Walsingham, who wrote warmly of his wish that Hakluyt would "continue [his] trouble in these and like matters which are like to turne not only to your owne good in private, but to the publike benefite of this Realme." Notably among Elizabeth's other courtiers, Sir Philip Sidney would soon write to Hakluyt's patron and employer, Sir Edward Stafford, about how he was "haulf-perswaded to enter into the journey of Sir Humphrey Gilbert very eagerli; whereunto your Mr. Hackluit hath served for a very good Trumpet."¹⁰ Hakluyt's visit to Paris would put him at the heart of a major center for the production of what has been termed as "travel knowledge."¹¹ But as Mary Fuller has observed, it is characteristic of Hakluyt that his first journey abroad took him "not to the places of which 'knowledge' spoke, but to the place where it was itself stored up—not towards the New World of discovery and observation, but towards the Old World of libraries and printing presses."¹² As Fuller also notes, this

is also the point in his career when Hakluyt began to build up his formidable network of sources and correspondents—Andre Thevet, Abraham Ortelius, Gerard Mercator, Theodor de Bry, among others. It is during the visit to Paris, that Hakluyt's report back to Francis Walsingham also records his interest in finding that overland route to the "East Indies," in search of which Newberry and his companions had left already. "I have talked twise with Don Antonio of Portugal and with five or sixe of his best captaynes and pilotes, one of whom was borne in East India," Hakluyt writes, noting that among "[t]he number of Portingalls which hange uppon the poore King [...] are one or two are come out of the East India overlande by Tripoly in Syria."¹³

Quite apart from the information they could provide, such disparate foreign voices were important for another reason. Writing again to Walsingham in his dedicatory epistle to the first edition of the *Principal Navigations* (1589), we know that Hakluyt himself identified this as a decisive period in his career, when he "both heard in speech, and read in books other nations miraculously extolled for their discoveries and notable enterprises by sea, but the English of all others for their sluggish security, and continuall neglect of the like attempts especially in so long and happy a time of peace, either ignominiously reported, or exceedingly condemned."¹⁴ The response of the *Principal Navigations*, as his letter to the reader promises, is to present an account of "the Nauigations onely of our owne nation," and accommodate "strangers as witnesses of the things done" as a last resort, only when they are "such as either faythfully remember, or sufficiently confirme the trauels of our owne people."¹⁵ This singleness of focus and purpose, of course, is what makes Hakluyt's project different from that of predecessors like Eden and Willes, one that would later earn it Froude's famous description as the great "prose epic of the modern English nation."¹⁶ Hakluyt's object is to replace the Babel of foreign voices—heard and read—with an English alternative. Yet that alternative itself was fragmented, split up into individual texts and incomplete narratives. As a result, even as the *Principal Navigations* traces a narrative of emergent national identity and collective endeavour under "this most famous and peerlesse gouvernement of her most excellent Maiesty," it directs its readers to the voices of the "paynefull and personall trauellers," so that they "might reape that good opinion and iust commendation which they haue deserved, and further, that euery man might answere for himselfe, iustifie his reports, and stand accountable for his owne doings."¹⁷

The small selection of reports, letters, and other documents about the journey of Newbery and Fitch to India printed in the 1589 edition illustrate exactly this tension. On the one hand, they present an overarching linear narrative, one that begins with the royal approval expressed in Elizabeth I's letter to "Yeladin el Kubar," and concludes with the greatest commodity that the travelers could offer for what Walsingham might call the "publike benefite of this Realme"—hard facts and information. In the Indian section of the *Principal Navigations*, this takes the shape of a small group of documents prepared by William Barrett, the consul at Aleppo. Barrett's contribution consists of four lists: a tabulation of currency, weights and measures used in "Babylon, Balsara and the Indies"; a list of standard customs charges from Aleppo to Goa; a list of sources of "commodities" and their places of origins; and the times of the arrival of the Monsoon winds at various Indian ports. Yet between Elizabeth's letter and Barrett's lists, the pages of the *Principal Navigations* reveals letters from Newbery and Fitch to Hakluyt and the London merchant, Leonard Poore. These are "personall" voices that tell a markedly incomplete story, of diplomatic tension and suspicion in Ormus and imprisonment in Portuguese-dominated Goa, strikingly in contrast both to the diplomatic neutrality of Elizabeth's letter and Barrett's dry enumeration of facts and figures. That fragmentation would increase even further in the second edition of the *Principal Navigations* (1598–1600), when the familiar set of documents is interspersed with multiple additional accounts. One of these is the account by the Venetian traveler, Cesare Federici, the other by the Dutch traveler, Jan van Linschoten, who had been a sympathetic eyewitness of the troubles of Newbery and Fitch in Goa, and whose complete *Itinerario* was published in translation in London with Hakluyt's support only a few months before the printing of the revised *Principal Navigations*. Only one new account is English: a first person report by Fitch himself, recently returned to England. Yet that, too, is heavily indebted to Cesare Federici's *Viaggio nell'India Orientale et oltra l'India* (Venice, 1587). These texts, as before, sit uncomfortably within the narrative trajectory mapped out by the two texts that stand at either end of this section, from royal sanction to the "benefits" of the traveler's return. But the rifts in that narrative are more strikingly apparent than before. The texts echo and contradict each other. They illuminate pockets of uncertainty and gaps of knowledge. Newbery's letter to Poore written in January 1584 hopes that they will be able to regain their freedom in Goa when

the Portuguese governor returns, but we know from the accounts of Fitch and Linschoten that this would not happen. Linschoten is left in the dark about the English plans till well after the English escape surreptitiously from Goa; Fitch's English account is unaware of the "great stirre and murmuring among the people" that Linschoten describes after their escape.¹⁸

The "murmuring" of English and foreign voices in Hakluyt's own compendium emphasizes two things at once. On the one hand, it further underlines the fragmentary nature of the "travel knowledge" slowly taking shape through the efforts of individual merchants, adventurers, witnesses, on which policy necessarily had to depend. On the other, as I have argued elsewhere, the image of the heroic humanist scholar that it helps to establish, the self-imposed task of the lone intellectual "travailer" who rescues the scattered limbs of knowledge from the "Jaws of Oblivion," which Hakluyt celebrates in his new epistle to the readers in 1598, makes a far-reaching case for private enterprise as a whole.¹⁹ Linking one text with another, juxtaposing disparate and often mismatched accounts to fill in existing narrative lacunae, what Hakluyt's editorial process demonstrated was a practice that could double as a viable model for Elizabethan mercantile initiative itself. Using the collective voices of travelers and translators to generate new texts and new knowledge through an ever-expanding process of collection, juxtaposition and explication, it celebrated the intricate interweaving through which discrete individual interventions could become parts of a national reconstruction, turning the risky enterprise of private investments into necessary foundations for the public policies of the realm.

III. Collective Voices

That affirmation was necessary for the trading companies, whose workings had depended always on the uneasy coupling of state policy and the commercial profit of its subjects. But in the last years of Elizabeth's reign, its assurance was particularly important for the London merchants and investors who had an interest in the East Indies, because their approach to trade was changing, and in a direction about which they could not expect either the queen or her government to feel particularly enthusiastic. The Levant Company's earlier attempts to find an overland route to the Indian subcontinent, as I have mentioned before, bypassed the Spanish and Portuguese dominated sea-routes. It gained the crown's tacit support precisely

because it was a relatively safe choice, both in terms of expense and potential embroilment in European politics. As Philip Lawson has pointed out, it could be seen simply as a steady extension of the overland trade for which Mary I had given the Muscovy Company its charter in 1555, and it got around the problem of tricky maritime diplomatic negotiations with Spain and Portugal, who had already established sea routes for trade with the eastern markets.²⁰ But the years after the defeat of the Spanish Armada brought renewed English maritime confidence, as well as a second chance. As Dutch voyages started to destabilize Iberian control on the spice trade and looked set to establish a new monopoly, English merchants began to consider the real possibility of sending their own voyages on the same trade route.²¹ The first two privately funded enterprises led by James Lancaster (1591) and Benjamin Wood (1596) were hounded by the loss of ships and lives. Lancaster managed to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and travel on to the Indonesian archipelago and then the West Indies, but lost all three ships before his return home in 1594; Wood's entire fleet appears to have been lost at sea. Then in 1599, reports arrived in England about a successful Dutch voyage to the East Indies by Jacob van Neck's fleet. This was alarming news. The long and complicated overland route of the commodities sold by the English merchants in the Levant trade was expensive. If this new Dutch sea-trade took hold, then the goods that it could supply would easily undercut the price of anything that the English could sell. As William Aldrich, agent to James Sanderson, warned his employer, "be you assured that if spices be not brought from Aleppo, as in time past, into England, but the place be otherwise served[,] our Company shall not be able to defray half their charges."²²

In the circumstances, Elizabeth's mercantile subjects in London responded by initiating a campaign that effectively demanded a complete rethinking of Elizabethan foreign policy as far as trade in Asia, and south East Asia in particular, was concerned. On September 22, 1599, over a hundred investors led by Sir Stephen Soame (Lord Mayor and a member of the Levant Company) subscribed to a new "voiage to the East Indias."²³ On September 24, a smaller, more select group from among those investors met in "an assembly" at which a committee of fifteen directors were appointed, and the formal decision was taken to apply for Elizabeth's assent to the intended project. The next day, at a further meeting of the directors, a petition to Elizabeth and the Privy Council was approved, which would request the Crown for the grant of a privilege in succession, and the permission to be

incorporated into a single trading company, “for that the trade of the Indias being so farre remote from hence cannot be traded but in a Joint and a unyted stock.”²⁴ In the rapid flurry of documents produced by the fledgling company, a curious note of balance is struck—one that Hakluyt’s compendia, by now, have trained us to expect. Their emphasis appears squarely to be placed on the maintenance of accurate records of individual involvement, from the initial list of investors that notes the “names of such persons as have written with their own hands,” to the careful division of labor within the directors of the company. Yet a collective enterprise, steeped in the rhetoric of worthy nationalistic fervor, emerges gradually from that careful record-keeping. As their accounts repeatedly assert, the aim of the enterprise is both “the honor of our native Cuntrey and for thadvancement of trade of merchaundize”; the “divers merchants” who make up the group of petitioners are “stirred up with noe lesse affection to advaunce the trade of ther native Cuntrey then the Duche merchauntes were to benefite ther Comon wealthe, and uppon that affection have resolved to make a viage to the est Indias.”²⁵ The emphasis, as in Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations*, is on the quiet symbiosis between personal and public interests. It heralds a kind of nationalism, which, while acknowledging the power and authority of the queen, is nevertheless caught up in the emergent individualism of her subjects.²⁶ What the trading companies demanded, as the historian Niels Steensgaard has argued, was effectively “delegated sovereignty” that amounted to far more than royal sanction and support against foreign competitors.²⁷ The proposed institution would not only have the sophisticated and intricate administrative structure, rules and “laws”—essentially the constitutional framework—that a joint-stock company required, but also monopoly over trade (therefore control over English presence in Asia), freedom from certain customs duties, and perhaps most crucially, exemption from the ban on exporting precious metals in the form of bullion out of England, and the right to request the royal mint to coin foreign currency so that its factors could buy goods freely in the Asian markets without being dependent on barter and exchange.²⁸

Hakluyt’s involvement in shaping the nature of this negotiation between Elizabeth and the London merchants is evident from the very beginning. The English translation of Linschoten’s *Itinerario*, the *Voyages into the Easte and West Indies*, which he encouraged the printer, John Wolfe, to publish in 1598, was a significant impetus behind the English drive to emulate the Dutch.²⁹ And on October 16,

1599, on the eve of their application for the crucial royal warrant at court, Hakluyt himself attended the meeting of the directors of the East India Company. It is not surprising, therefore, that as Elizabeth became increasingly wary of destabilizing the recently initiated peace negotiations with Spain and the Company's venture seemed doomed even before its start, its directors repeatedly called upon his individual expertise. Elizabeth's Privy Council had decided that it was "more beneficial for the general state of merchandize to entertain a peace than that the same should be hindered by the standing with the Spanish Commissioners, for the maintaining of this trade to forego the opportunity of the concluding of the peace."³⁰ But while the Company was left no choice except to defer their first voyage till the next year, their interim preparations proceeded discreetly with Hakluyt's continued assistance. Barely a week after their unsuccessful plea at the court, on October 24, 1599, Hakluyt wrote his dedicatory letter for the second volume of the *Principal Navigations* (1599–1600). Unlike the first volume, dedicated to Charles Howard, the Earl of Nottingham, this much enlarged collection of accounts of travels "made by Sea or ouer-land, to the South and South-east parts of the World" was addressed to Robert Cecil. This in itself was a timely intervention. As Hakluyt's epistle points out, Cecil had an "extraordinarie voyce" in matters of state, especially after the death of Burghley in 1598. It is telling, therefore, that even as the letter acknowledges the need of what was no doubt—for Hakluyt as well as for the directors of the trading companies—Cecil's frustratingly cautious resistance to "Action" that could affect the welfare of "the State and common wealth," Hakluyt's description of the volume repeatedly draws attention "to the great charges and speciall industrie" of familiar figures—Osborne, Staper and Harborne, Thomas Stevens and James Lancaster, Newbery and Fitch.³¹ That "industrie," rather than the fluctuations of political motives, ultimately is the matter of Hakluyt's volume, the foundation on which its self-consciously English pride and identity is established.

Over the next year, as Quinn's chronology has shown, Hakluyt's individual voice and grasp of the intricate and growing machinery of "travel-knowledge" would influence both the thinking of the queen's Council and the course of royal policy.³² Between the Privy Council's disappointing and nearly disastrous response that October and the final granting of the royal patent on December 31, 1600, the East India Company equipped Elizabeth and her Council with not only the rationale behind the urgent need to obtain direct access to the

Asian trade, but also with the means to defend English trade in the event of potential diplomatic wrangles. The documents that they submitted included valuable information to prove “in whate partes of the same Indies the Spanish King hath Souereigntie and in what other partes he hath no coller to barr other Christian Princes &c from trade.” Giving detailed lists of places and ports, they argued that “if theis be all ye places which are under their gouernement and comaunde, [...] it then remaineth, yt all the other rich, kingdomes and Ilandes of the easte (which are in nomber infinete) are out of their power, Jurisdiction or comaunde, & therefore free for anie other Princes and people of ye world to repaire unto, whome ye soveraigne Lordes & Princes of those places and Counteries, wilbe willinge to admite, into their Domynions.” In corroboration, they cited, with a typically Hakluyt-like turn of phrase, up-to-date roll calls of both continental and English “authours and witnesses” to support their case.³³

Compared to that detailed muster of information and sources, the attempts of the Elizabethan government to assess the situation for themselves strike a curiously perfunctory note, often seemingly oblivious to the nexus of textual and actual “industrie” within which the company’s demand for mandate and “Action” had placed them. In March 1600, when Elizabeth and her Privy Council asked the Treasurer of the Navy, Sir Fulke Greville, to confirm “the names of such kings as are absolute in the East, and either have warr, or traffique, with the Kinge of Spaigne,” for instance, the Mughals and their contact with the Portuguese, particularly through the mediation of the Jesuit priests entertained by Akbar at the Mughal court, remain unmentioned. Greville knew Hakluyt through his connection with Sir Philip Sidney and Walsingham. Yet the *Principal Navigations* itself is another notable omission in the list of books that he acknowledges as the primary sources of his information. “Theis collections I have made out of Osorius, Eden’s Decads, and spetially owt of the voyages of John Huighen,” he notes in his letter to Cecil, “havinge neyther meanes nor tyme to seak other helpes.”³⁴

It is evident, however, that Hakluyt’s help was not only sought, but also amply acknowledged within the East India Company itself. As the committee met in January 1601 to prepare finally for their first voyage after the granting of the royal charter, “Mr Hacklett the historiographer of the viages of the East Indies,” was summoned again before the committee to help to convert knowledge into practice. “[H]aving read unto them out of his notes and bookes

divers instruccions for provisions of Jewelles [he] was required to sett downe in wryting a note of the principall places in the East Indies wher Trade is to be had to thend the same may be used for the better instruccion of our factors in the said voyage.”³⁵ This probably was also the occasion that led Hakluyt to update his past research for the Company, producing notes on “The chiefe places where sundry sorte of Spices do growe in the East Indies,” as well as the revised “Reasons why the English Merchants may trade into the East Indies.”³⁶ In return, the Company paid him £10 for “his travailes taken in instruccions and advyses touching the preparing of the voiage and for his former advyses in setting the voyage in hand the Last yere.”³⁷

IV. From Enterprise to Policy

The “travailes” of John Mildenhall with which I began this chapter, had no such acknowledgment from either queen or Company. As William Foster has suggested, it is likely that the news of the planned establishment of the Company and its first attempts at gaining the royal charter had reached the English traders in Constantinople and Syria fairly early in the proceedings, and that it was this news which so suddenly encouraged the entrepreneurial John Mildenhall to undertake his own expedition to secure trading privileges in India that he could then offer, for a price, to the merchants at home.³⁸ But long before his return to England in 1608/09, the royal charter of December 31, 1600, had extended official recognition to “The Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies” as “one body Corporate and politick in deed and in name,” and as Philip Stern has recently argued, invested it with a legal and political character that was unique even among the trading corporations of the period.³⁹ The Company could now purchase and sell land and enter into legal negotiations as an independent entity, use a common seal, organize its own government and general assemblies where their own laws (so long as these remained agreeable to the laws of England) could be made, and offenders against such laws sentenced to punishment by fine or imprisonment. Even more crucially, in addition to the customs and bullion exportation exemptions the merchants had requested, the charter also invested the Company with the power to be the only institution able to extend licenses for trade in the East Indies to any other private individual or company, so that even the Crown could not exercise its jurisdiction in this matter without their explicit consent. It is not surprising,

therefore, that when Mildenhall embarked on his journey home, his claims of reward for his private enterprise led to legal wrangles with the Company's committees that he may not have quite anticipated.

On June 21, 1608, the Company's records note the receipt of "Letter received from John Mednoll to his master Rich Stapers, declaring what privileges he had obtained in the Indies, and offering them and his service to the Company for 1,500*l.* in hand." In May 1609, the Company was still toying with the idea of conferring "with John Midnall concerning his demands and project for going to 'Mawgoule' in the East Indies," till Mildenhall grew impatient and petitioned James I, directly: "declaring his ten years' travels, and charge of 3,000 (*sic*) in the discovery of a rich trade in the dominions of the Great Mogul, and praying that he and his coadventurers may be permitted to enjoy the privileges he had obtained there." It is an indication of the relationship that had been established by now between the Crown and the Company, that the Lord Treasurer asked Sir Walter Cope, Arthur Ingram, Hewett Staper, and Nicholas Leate to discuss the claims with the Company itself before any response was made to the petition. Mildenhall's demands continued, till in October 1609, he was appointed as a factor of the Company, and then peremptorily dismissed during the next month on the grounds of being "not thought fit to be engaged."⁴⁰ Mildenhall did not give up easily. He would undertake a final journey to the Levant and India in 1610, and died at Ajmer, in India, in June 1614. The reports that he wrote of his initial journey were preserved, as one could expect, by Richard Hakluyt, and printed ultimately by Samuel Purchas.⁴¹

Just as Mildenhall's initial journey had borne testimony to the nexus of events that brought India undeniably to the attention of Elizabeth and her government, the ultimate fate of his belated petitions illuminates how radically the terms of English engagement with India had changed as a result of the processes that had been initiated in those final, eventful years of Elizabeth's rule. By the time James I had come to the throne, it was understood that the relationship between the British state and India would be mediated largely through the East India Company. By the time of the great public debates about the workings of colonial dominion in India in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both defenders and detractors of company power acknowledged that the institution that had been created and validated by Elizabeth's royal charter in 1600, was far more than an amalgamation of the enterprise of individuals: its activities had long begun to transform private action into matters

of national policy. But for Elizabeth herself, its effects were visible already when the first voyage of the East India Company set sail in 1601.

If in 1583, Elizabeth's letter to the Mughal Emperor of India carried by John Newbery had mentioned merely the desire of her individual subjects "to visit the most distant places of the world" and "to introduce the trade of marchandize of al nations whatsoever they can," the general letter of introduction to Asian monarchs that the commanders of the new voyage received struck a significantly new note.⁴² With the names of addressees left to be filled in as necessary by the voyagers, its contents made a sustained and confident argument for free trade. "Almightie God, in his infinite wisdom and providence," it argued, had ensured "that no place should enjoy (as the native commodities thereof) all things appteyninge to man's use, but that one country should have nede of another, [...] by which meanes, men of severall and farr remote countries have commerce and traffique, one with another, and by their interchange of commodities are linked together in amytie and friendship." Limiting that trade to specific nations, such as the "Spanyard or Portugale" was dangerous, because such commercial monopoly ultimately would pose a national threat. For the first time in no uncertain terms, Elizabeth's letter claimed that the Spanish and the Portuguese already "pretended themselves to be the soveraigne lordes and princes of all your territories, and gave it out that they held your nation and people as subjects to them, and, in their stiles and titles, do write themselves kinges of the East-Indies." Instead, it offered the "amity" of English merchants and the English monarch, as a solution and an alternative form of encounter between nations where English subjects would establish themselves within the host nations by learning the language and directing "them selves accordinge to the fashions of your countrie."⁴³ Commissioned and funded by the Company, but written by royal heralds for the queen, this is a document of multiple "travailes" and multivalent interests. Its voice is neither of the queen nor of her private subjects, but a composite product, one that can only gesture toward the complications of the new national, political and economic structure in the making.

Notes

1. "The second Letter of John Mildenhall to M. Richard Staper, written from Casbin in Persia, the third day of October, 1606," in Samuel

- Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes* (London, 1625), Part I, Book III, Chapt. I.iii: 115.
2. "The second letters Patents graunted by the Queenes Majestie to the Right worshipfull companie of the English Marchants for the Levant, the seventh of Januarie 1592," in Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London, 1598–1600), Vol. II, Part I: 295.
 3. Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London, 1589), 207.
 4. The journey undertaken by Newbery and Fitch, among others, had begun to fill in the gaps of this English knowledge about the political structure in India by the time Hakluyt's second edition of the *Principal Navigations* emerged in print. Here, the addressee of the letter is described as "Zelabdim Echebar." *Principal Navigations* (1598–1600), Vol. II, Part I, 245. By 1606, the East India Company, at least, had learnt to be more careful. The Court Minutes of the East India Company dated December 31, 1606, for instance record the decision to obtain letters "from King James to the King of Cambaya, the Governors of Aden, and two more places not far from Aden; their titles to be inquired of Ralph Fitch." W. N. Sainsbury et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan, Volume 2: 1513–1616* (London, 1864), 145. In one of the most perceptive recent examinations of such royal missives, Miles Ogborn has commented on their complicated status. [Chapter 2](#), *Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 27–67.
 5. Wallace T. McCaffrey, *Elizabeth I* (London: Arnold, 1993), 382–385.
 6. This practice would be maintained in India. In 1615, Sir Thomas Roe was appointed the first official English ambassador to the Mughal court by James I, but his journey would be funded by the East India Company.
 7. In the mid-sixteenth century, Eden, as a secretary to Cecil, was involved in the Earl of Northumberland's initial efforts to open up English trade with South-East Asia and China.
 8. For Newbery's letter, see *Principal Navigations* (London, 1589), 208. For the rest, see *Principal Navigations* (London, 1589), 160, 208–222. Hakluyt, however, never printed the report by Fernandes.
 9. Peter C. Mancall, *Hakluyt's Promise: An Elizabethan's Obsession for an English America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 102. Mancall notes that Elizabeth herself urged Christ Church, Hakluyt's college in Oxford, to grant him the necessary leave of absence.
 10. "Sir Francis Walsingham to Richard Hakluyt", letter dated 11 March 1582, in *The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts*, ed. E. G. R. Taylor (London: Printed for the Hakluyt

- Society, 1935), I: 197. Sidney to Sir Edward Stafford, letter dated July 21, 1584, in *The Prose Works of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed. A. Feuillerat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), III: 145. The lack of consistent royal support, however, as John Appleby has noted, led to the ultimate failure of the Gilbert expedition. John C. Appleby, "War, Politics, and Colonization, 1558–1625," in Nicholas Canny and Alan Low, eds., *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, Vol. 1 of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 55–78 (63).
11. See Ivo Kamps and Jyotsna G. Singh, eds., *Travel Knowledge: European "Discoveries" in the Early Modern Period* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
 12. Mary Fuller, *Voyages in Print: English Travel to America, 1576–1624* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 145.
 13. "Letter from Richard Hakluyt to Sir Francis Walsingham, 1584", in *The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts*, II: 206–207.
 14. Hakluyt, "Epistle dedicatorie" to *Principal Navigations* (London, 1589), sig. *2^{r-v}.
 15. "Richard Hakluyt to the favourable Reader", *Principal Navigations* (London, 1589), sig. *3.^v
 16. J.A. Froude, "England's Forgotten Worthies", in J.A. Froude, *Short Studies on Great Subjects* (New York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1868), 361. Originally published in *The Westminster Review*, NS 2 (July, 1582): 32–67.
 17. Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations* (London, 589), sig. *2^r, *3.^v.
 18. Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations* (London, 1598–1600), II.I: 267.
 19. "Richard Hakluyt's two Indias: textual *sparagmos* and editorial practice" in *Richard Hakluyt: Life, Times, Legacy*, eds. Daniel Carey and Claire Jowitt (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming 2011).
 20. Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A History* (London and New York: Longman, 1993), 12.
 21. *ibid.*, 11–13; see also K. N. Chaudhuri, *The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-stock Company, 1600–1640* (London: Frank Cass, 1965), 10–11.
 22. John Sanderson, *The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant, 1584–1602*, ed. Sir William Foster (London: Hakluyt Society, 1931), 190.
 23. *The Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies as Recorded in the Court Minutes of the East India Company, 1599–1603*, ed. Henry Stevens (London, 1886), 1.
 24. *ibid.*, 8.
 25. *ibid.*, 5, 8.
 26. The two tendencies, of course, as Richard Helgersson has argued, were already "deeply implicated in one another. That mutual implication begins with the sharing of a common term of difference.

- Each comes into being in dialectical opposition to royal absolutism." *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 122.
27. Neils Steensgaard, "The companies as a specific institution in the history of European expansion," in *Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Regime*, eds. L. Blussé and F. Gaastra (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1981), 263. Philip J. Stern offers a useful overview of recent scholarship about the early modern, northern European merchant organization in "'A Politie of Civill & Military Power': Political Thought and the Late Seventeenth Century Foundations of the East India Company-State," *Journal of British Studies* 47 (April 2008): 253–283.
 28. See Lawson, *The East India Company*, 23.
 29. Wolfe's dedicatory epistle to *John Huighen van Linschoten his Discours of Voyages into the Easte and West Indies* (London, 1598) does not mention the "learned gentleman" by name who had showed him the original Dutch volume "which he wished might be translated into our Language, because hee thought it would be not only delightfull, but also very commodious for our English Nation." The prefatory address to the reader by the translator, William Phillip, however, mentions that the book was "commended, by Maister Richard Hakluyt, a man that laboureth greatly to advance our English Name and Nation", sig. A1^v, A3^v.
 30. Stevens, *Dawn of British Trade*, 11.
 31. Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations* (London, 1599–1600), sig. *4^{r-v}, *3^v.
 32. D.B. Quinn and A.M. Quinn, "A Hakluyt Chronology", in *The Hakluyt Handbook*, ed. D. B. Quinn, 2 vols. (London, 1974), 1: 263–331. See especially 312–316.
 33. "Noates of remembrances for the Right Honorable the Lordes of her Majesties moste Honorable Privie Councell presented by the Merchants entendinge a voiage to the East Indies". See transcription in Heidi Brayman Hackel and Peter Mancall, "Richard Hakluyt the Younger's Notes for the East India Company in 1601: A Transcription of Huntington Library Manuscript EL 2360," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 67.3 (2004): 423–436 (esp. 432–433). The dating and revision history of this document is somewhat complicated, since two slightly different versions exist. Hackel and Mancall follow Quinn in identifying the Huntingdon mss as the earlier version on the basis of internal evidence, and date it to early 1601 (see Quinn, *Hakluyt Handbook*, 1: 316; Hackel and Mancall, "Richard Hakluyt the Younger's Notes," 429). The other version, entitled "Certayne Reasons why the English Merchants may trade into the East Indies" is dated to 1600 in the early editions of the text by John Bruce in *The Annals of the Honourable East-India Company, from their establishment by*

- the charter of Queen Elizabeth, 1600, to the union of the London and English East India Companies 1707–08* (London: Black, Parry and Kingsbury, 1810), 1: 115–121 and Taylor, *The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts*, 2: 465–468.
34. *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan, Volume 2: 1513–1616*, 104–105. Printed in Bruce, *Annals*, 1: 121, 126.
 35. Stevens, *Dawn of British Trade*, 123–124.
 36. Taylor, *The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts*, 2: 476–482, 465–468. Hakluyt would continue to provide similar service in later years. Thus, just before the signing of the Treaty of London in 1604, he would again produce a revised note on “The places in the East Indies where the subjects of the King of Spayne haue any Fortes and settled Residence,” arguing that “the harbours, ffortes or havens now possessed by the king of Spaynes subjectes may be as open & fre to the subjects of this kingdome, though not for the trade, yet for succor and releife, a the harbors of his majesties kingdome may be fre and open to the merchants and people of the king of Spayne.” See Taylor, *The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts*, 2: 487–488.
 37. Stevens, *Dawn of British Trade*, 143.
 38. Sir William Foster, *England’s Quest of Eastern Trade* (London: A and C Black, 1933), 174.
 39. Stevens, *Dawn of British Trade*, 198. Stern, “A Politie of Civill & Military Power”, 262–263.
 40. *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan*, 2: 174, 184–185, 190, 198.
 41. Purchas, *Pilgrimes* (London, 1625), Part I, Book III, Chapt. I.iii: 114–116. For detailed accounts of Mildenhall’s journeys, see Foster, *England’s Quest of Eastern Trade*, 173–182, and Ram Chandra Prasad, *Early English Travellers in India* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965, rev. ed. 1980), 63–81.
 42. Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations* (London, 1589), 207.
 43. Bruce, *Annals of the Honourable East-India Company*, 147–150.



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